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No Shortcuts: The Case for Organizing 
By Jane McAlevey 
 
Advisor: Frances Fox Piven 
 
This dissertation will explore how ordinary workers in the new economy create and 
sustain power from below.  
In workplace and community movements, individuals acting collectively have been 
shown to win victories using a variety of different approaches. In this dissertation, I will argue 
that different approaches lead to different outcomes—often very different outcomes. I will use a 
framework throughout of three broad types of change processes; advocacy, mobilizing, and 
organizing, although my emphasis is on the latter two. And I will argue that each is productive of 
a different kind of victory.  
In arguing my case, that advocacy, mobilizing, and organizing are different approaches to 
social change that produce different outcomes and relative successes, I will move in, out, and 
between key arguments in the literature of social movements and unions published over the past 
forty years: the years when progressive movements began to lose everything they had gained and 
the right wing began consistently winning back the ground progressives lost. The twelve cases I 
analyze involved one classic social movement organization, two national unions, and two local 
unions, one of them also a local of one the nationals. Strikes were utilized as part of the overall 
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strategy in three of the cases. By focusing on campaigns that led to success, I will identify the 
factors that I argue facilitate rather than inhibit the rebirth of a vibrant workers movement. 
This research will contribute to the sociological literature on social movement strategy 
and power. Specifically, my dissertation will test the current debate about “leaderless 
movements” and “horizontalism” by sharply focusing on leaders, including who they are, how 
they are identified, how they develop, the choices they make, and the roles they play. The cases 
involve workforces with mostly women workers, in projected growth sectors of the U.S. labor 
force (health care and education) that are dominated by women. Therefore, my work will address 
the dearth in the literature about labor organizing in heavily gendered sectors of work. By 
analyzing the factors that explain successes under new political, economic, and work conditions, 
I will contribute to new collective action theory and offer a substantive understanding of how 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Sociologically Speaking: 
Labor Unions as Social Movements and  
Unions as Hardest Test of Social Movement Success 
Social movements and unions have been studied in separate academic disciplines for longer than 
I have been alive. After long practical experience—as a young, radical educator at the 
Highlander Center, a full-time worker in the community organizing movement, an overtime 
organizer and chief negotiator in the union movement, and an electoral campaign manager in 
each sociologically divided sector—I find it impossible to sort the process of progressive social 
change into two distinct piles or traditions.  
There’s an informal gestalt in much of the social-movement field that unions are not social 
movements at all; that union equates to undemocratic, top-down bureaucracy. Yet not all so-
called social movement organizations (SMOs) fit their own definition of “social;” some function 
from the top down as much as any bad union. An SMO’s membership can be as irrelevant and 
disregarded as the rank and file in the worst union. Likewise, there is an assumption that material 
gain is the primary concern in unions, missing that the most important aspect of the fight is over 
the deepest of human emotions: dignity. It is the development of an emotion, dignity, which can 
lead to workers clubbing up to form the type of solidarity needed to sustain workers in the face 
of the union busters. Equally true, all of the unions with which I worked were by any definition 
absolutely social movements, with progressive goals that went well beyond the workplace, 
2 
 
prefigurative decision making, and robust participation by workers, their families, and their 
communities.  
For the purpose of this dissertation, when I use the term movement or movements I am 
consciously merging agencies that have been studied separately: the people in unions, who are 
called workers, and many of the same people after they have punched the clock at the end of 
their shift and put on their SMO volunteer hats—people who are then called individuals. 
Workers, too, are individuals.  A dichotomous approach to workplaces and communities 
prevents people and movements from winning much more significant victories.  To the extent 
that a dichotomous approach persists in academia, it impairs sociologists, even those we might 
call Phase II social movement theorists, the ones who thankfully put agency (people) and 
strategy (choice) alongside and not subservient to structure in social movement studies. 
In workplace and community movements, individuals acting collectively have been shown to 
win victories using a variety of different approaches. In this dissertation, I will argue that 
different approaches lead to different outcomes, often very different outcomes. I will use a 
framework throughout of three broad types of change processes; advocacy, mobilizing, and 
organizing, though my emphasis is on the latter two. And I will argue that each is productive of a 
different kind of victory. My intense interest and focus is on what I am calling relative success 
(and perhaps relative defeat, too). There is an impressive body of evidence for what leads to 
failure. And there’s a lot of analysis of the factors involved in big, huge, macro-level social 
movements, as, say, in the civil rights movement. There’s very little understanding of what 
factors lead to small, medium-, and high-impact victories, or why. There are three key variables 
that I see as crucial to relative success: power, strategy, and collective action method; that is, the 
degree of power needed to win a particular victory; a strategy for making full use of the power; 
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and a  methodology for engaging people in collective action. I will argue that many small 
victories can be and are won without any collective action at all, the key actors being paid 
lobbyists, PR professionals, and good smoke and mirrors. That model is what I call advocacy, 
and, those are small victories, and I am getting ahead of myself. 
I focus on relative success because, contrary to prevailing wisdom, I think progressives are 
entirely capable of rebuilding a movement with the power to successfully challenge the 
dominating corporate right wing. I even think they have enough resources to achieve a massive 
turnaround in what’s been happening in the United States, if not in all of the so-called Western 
industrialized countries.  One implication of my argument is that the people controlling the 
movement’s resources, the individual people who are decision makers in national unions, the 
Democratic Party, and in philanthropy, have been focused on the wrong strategies for decades, 
leading to an extraordinary series of setbacks and defeats. The biggest victories of the past 100 
years, those won in the heyday of the labor and civil rights movements, have been all but rolled 
back.  
Yet the victories achieved by the people in these two movements were durable—and have 
not been entirely lost—because they instituted major structural changes that became embedded 
in government policies throughout the national, state and local levels; they included strong or 
relatively strong enforcement mechanisms; the governmental agencies that enforced them had 
more income and many more enforcers than they do today; and, most importantly, each victory 
penetrated and became part of the consciousness of most people, what sociologists sometimes 
call collective consciousness. We know this because even today, people who say they don’t like 
unions will also say, “At least in this country it’s illegal for children to work in factories,” or “I 
told the boss I wouldn’t handle anything so toxic without protection,” or simply, “Thank God It’s 
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Friday.” That is, they don’t like unions, but they see child labor laws, workplace safety 
regulations, the eight-hour workweek and the weekend—all benefits won by workers engaged in 
collective action through their unions—as the reasonable and beneficial norm. Similarly, most 
people in this country who feel personally uncomfortable with or suspicious of those outside 
their own racial or ethnic group would still not accept a formal return to the apartheid of Jim 
Crow laws.   
That is why reversing the gains of our two most successful movements—labor and civil 
rights—has required a sustained, multidecade and multifront campaign by the corporate right 
wing.  The global trade rules they have put into place have been a key strategy: they have put 
workers in the U.S. (and, increasingly, in Europe) in direct competition with workers making $1 
a day in countries where repression is high and rights are low. These changes to the trade rules 
are but one example of people, in this case the corporate right, changing the ‘opportunity 
structure’ to suit their long term goals. Global and regional trade accords give multinational 
corporations the right to buy land anywhere in almost any country, and those corporations have 
forcibly evicted millions of people from self-sustaining plots of land (or tricked them into giving 
land up for one-time payoffs that seemed much better deals than they actually were), directly 
contributing to a huge rise in the immigration into the U.S. and Europe of cheap labor. 
The corporate-driven right wing has pocketed the courts, one judicial appointment at a time 
over forty years, and this deeply conservative judiciary has inflicted death by a thousand cuts to 
the major laws sustaining the victories of labor and civil rights. Seizing the judiciary has also 
facilitated a vertically integrated system resulting in the mass incarceration of African Americans 
and mass detention of small farmers and peasants whose land in their own countries was 
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engulfed by the corporate shareholders in our privatized prisons and, now, privatized detention 
centers. 
The corporate right has also created a version of a ‘popular front,’ including seizing the 
cultural apparatus through rulings like the Federal Communications Commission’s Clinton-era 
decision to allow multinationals to outright own the means of communication, and by building 
up, through very generous funding, the powerful Christian right.  
In arguing my case, that advocacy, mobilizing, and organizing are different approaches to 
social change that produce different outcomes and relative successes, I will move in, out, and 
between key arguments in the literature of social movements and unions published over the past 
forty years: the years when progressive movements began to lose everything they had gained and 
the right wing began consistently winning back the ground progressives lost. The twelve cases I 
analyze involved one classic social movement organization, two national unions, and two local 
unions, one of them also a local of one the nationals— an outlier with a very different approach 
than its parent.  
The unions span the private sector and the public sector; the cases involve trade jobs and 
service jobs, workers harder to replace (teachers and nurses) and easier to replace (factory hands, 
teacher’s aides, nurse’s aides, cooks, and cleaners). In one case, (mostly) men of widely diverse 
backgrounds slaughter and prepare pork in a right-to-work Southern state. In others, (mostly) 
women teach and care for the young and tend to the sick and infirm in at least partly unionized 
Northern states. Multiple cases originated within each of the five organizations. In one of the 
national unions, the United Food and Commercial Workers Union (UFCW), three separate 
campaigns to unionize workers in the same factory, spanning more than a decade, resulted in two 
defeats and one big victory. I will argue that in all of the union cases, losing and winning a little 
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or a lot are correlated to one common factor: the beliefs and motivations, or purposefulness, of 
the leadership team. Chart #1 provides a summary of the cases.  
Chart #1: Table of Cases 
Organization Type  
& Name 
SMO 















Time Frame New Millennium 2000 to 2015* 
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Until just a few years ago, I would have argued that private-sector unionization and 
collective bargaining efforts, when they involve majority strikes (the kind that shut down 
production) are the hardest test of any kind of campaign mounted by any type of organization in 
the U.S.A., definitely presenting conditions much tougher than those faced by social movement 
organizations. This is still true, as I will explain; but now, some types of public-sector union 
fights have become just as tough, with conditions just as stiff, and my case studies include 
examples of those too.  
Factors that make private sector union fights and now some public ones so hard include:  
 
1. Recruitment: In union fights, your opponent recruits your membership base, by 
hiring the workers. In the vernacular of McCarthy and Zald’s classical resource mobilization 
theory, there are no “bystander publics” in a unionization fight or in a strike; every single 
person is immediately invested (“a direct beneficiary”) and expected to vote yes or no. 
Because the union needs yeses to win, in a contentious union campaign any abstention 
equates to a no.  
2. A threat level always set to High Threat–High Risk: Throughout a union campaign, 
your opponent, the employer, who recruited your base, is in full control of whether or not to 
unrecruit them; that is, to fire them, or to institute a sudden wave of layoffs, or, more subtly 
but no less effectively and quite commonly, to make their working lives go to hell very fast, 
by radically altering their schedules (say, assigning the night shift to single parents), by 
canceling a long-awaited vacation in the name of a sudden workplace emergency (think of all 
the nonrefundable parts of a family vacation), or by instituting a new reporting system 
designed to put unfavorable write-ups into everyone’s personnel file. 
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3. Concession cost: this is variable, as I will discuss, but in all union fights, and, in the 
biggest and hardest, the concession costs are high which motivates the employer to fight-to-
kill. 
4. The arena: The arena of this game, using the strategic-choice game theory analogy, 
is owned and controlled by your opponent, and your opponent, the employer, can easily 
make it a war ‘space,’ a vantage point for constant surveillance of the actions and behavior of 
your membership base. 
5. Access to the base: The staff or outside volunteers working for the union are 
forbidden to enter or approach the chief arena in which the game plays out, and therefore 
cannot even talk to the players involved in the “game.” Even parking lots have been ruled as 
private property so that the employer can institute a total-control arena, where no outsider has 
access to the workers, not only once they’ve punched the clock, but even afterward, when 
they are punched out and are walking on their own to their parked cars. All the union 
representative may do is visit the workers in their homes, and to obtain the necessary list of 
names and addresses, the union must file for a National Labor Relations Board election and 
satisfy the NLRB standards for sufficient interest in such an election before meeting most 
voters. 
 
All of this adds up to a substantially more difficult terrain than most social movement 
organizations fight on. Many typical SMOs put out a flier or post something on Facebook that 
says, “Hey, if you are interested in x,y,z, come to a meeting on p,d,q day.”  Unions have no way 
of doing this with workers— certainly, they cannot stand outside the parking lot handing out 
fliers or announce a union meeting for a specific employer via social media, unless they want the 
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employer to turn the workplace into a war zone the next day, a sure way to kill the campaign 
before it starts. The entire campaign has to be run by brand-new volunteers. And that the 
toughest, most gut-wrenching moments of the campaign will be handled by these workers 
themselves rather than paid, experienced staff like the ones who often run SMO campaigns.  
The now stale distinction between the challenges faced by the private and public sectors has 
historically been made on the presumption that public-sector bosses don’t fight as hard. This can 
be true, but it was not true in the my case study of the Chicago Teachers Union, whose boss was 
very powerful and very vicious. The other special challenge to private sector union fights is that 
outside union organizers, whether paid or volunteer, are prohibited from entering the workplace. 
In the case of a school fight, since Columbine, Sandy Hook and similar disasters, the K-12 
school system has effectively been as closed as a private-sector worksite. In Chicago, in order to 
conduct observations and meetings with teachers in school, I had to present all sorts of ID and be 
accompanied by someone on staff at all times, and the teachers had to notify the principal and 
front desk that they had a guest. 
Which Unions, Why, and the Context Today 
Unions in the United States are experiencing a profound crisis. In 1995, the biggest 
shake-up in the U.S. labor movement in more than fifty years took place when a new generation 
of unionists forced the first contested election in the history of the AFL-CIO. The victors, 
dominated by the service-workers’ unions and often referred to as New Labor,
1
 promised 
revitalization through aggressive new organizing. Exactly two decades and hundreds of millions 
of dollars later, union ranks have declined even further to 6.7% in the private sector and 11.3% 
overall.
2
 Why has New Labor failed to reverse the decline of union power?  
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U.S. unions are not monolithic. As some of my referenced literature will attest to in chapter 
two, most unions have not been trying to organize the unorganized; mostly they’ve been 
managing their decline. In 1995, though, a set of unions declared they would reverse the tide of  
their falling membership. This dissertation is focused on that set of unions. The grouping is 
slightly porous but contains a core that self-identifies as unions trying to change and organize. I 
rely on several intersecting groups of unions to constitute the universe I investigate: a list 
generated by Kate Bronfenbrenner that she used in her enormous body of union research; the list 
on the winning side of the AFL-CIO victory in 1995; the unions that formed the breakaway from 
the AFL-CIO in 2006, known as the Change-To-Win (CTU) unions; and, very recently, the two 
main teachers unions that have gone through significant top leadership changes, and, owing to 
the national attack on teachers unions, that have been active participants with the others for the 
first time in decades. 
Dominated since 1995 by unions in the service sector, the overlapping lists include Service 
Employees International Union (SEIU); Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees (HERE) 
and Union of Needle Trades Employees (UNITE), which merged to become UNITE-HERE; 
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME); United Food and 
Commercial Workers (UFCW); United Auto Workers (UAW); United Brotherhood of 
Carpenters (UBC); Laborers International Union of North America (LIUNA); the United Farm 
Workers (UFW); the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) and the National Education 
Association (NEA). There is a complicated variation of who is in and out of the overlapping list, 
depending on the exact months and years of various turf wars.  
This dissertation argues that although the external environment of all unions is extremely 
hostile, the reasons for the ongoing decline of union membership lie mainly in how unions 
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organize among their existing members as well as among unorganized workers. Most labor 
history and analysis focuses on external factors—such as the employer offensive, hostile courts, 
globalization, automation, and a changing employment structure—relegating organizing methods 
to a “black box.” In contrast, this dissertation connects New Labor to the legacy of Saul Alinsky, 
who is often referred to as the dean or father of community organizing. It identifies the influence 
of several strands of the Alinsky doctrine in the organizational background of many current New 
Labor leaders and attributes the strengths and weaknesses of New Labor’s organizing approach 
to Alinsky’s own strengths and weaknesses. 
I will argue that a critical factor in the failure of the effort at union revitalization after 1995 
has been the strategic choice made by key leaders of New Labor to move away from workers and 
the workplace. Because of hostile labor laws and unfriendly court rulings, these leaders decided 
they could no longer win traditional union elections and shifted their strategy to securing so-
called card-check and neutrality deals, and fair-election-procedure accords with employers. The 
means they used to achieve such agreements are anchored in demonstrating that they could cost 
the employer money through a “corporate campaign,” including publicity offensives against the 
employer’s brand, stockholder actions, and lobbying to have the varied public subsidies that flow 
into the so-called private sector cut off or decreased. 
When these labor-run corporate campaigns first developed in the 1970s as a response to the 
degeneration of worker protections under U.S. labor law, they were designed to complement 
worker organizing.
3
 By the early years of the new millennium, they had all but replaced it.
4
  The 
strategy of weakening employer opposition to union organization through corporate campaigns 
made employers—not workers or their communities—the primary focus of New Labor’s energy. 
Today corporate campaigns continue to locate the fight in the economic arena by threatening to 
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disrupt profit making, but not by workers withholding their labor. Instead, a new army of 
professional union staff wage the strike by devising tactics to hit the employer’s bottom line. 
In examining this change in strategic choices after 1995, I argue that the New Labor 
leadership’s Alinskyist origins are a causal factor in key aspects of their methodology. New 
Labor’s prioritization of corporate campaigns reproduced and privileged Alinsky-like “jujitsu 
tactics in a war conducted between labor and business elites. Workers were no longer essential to 
their own liberation. 
I will argue that Alinsky’s extreme pragmatism and his embrace of “ends justify the means” 
tactics enabled New Labor’s leaders to rationalize accords with big business that stripped 
workers and their communities of the ability to defend themselves against their employers.
5
 
Moreover, New Labor’s adoption of Alinskyist tactics stands in contrast to the organizing style 
at the root of many of organized labor’s great victories, which were won during a more hostile 
period of industrial relations than that of the past four decades: the successful organizing of the 
unions of the Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO) during the 1930s. A key aspect of the 
CIO organizers’ craft was identifying organic worker leaders in the shop and anchoring 
campaigns in the “whole worker,” understood to be a person embedded in a range of social 
relationships in the workplace and in the community.
6
 
By contrast, Alinsky’s “people’s organizations,”—what he called “O of O,” or Organization 
of Organizations—were top-down rather than bottom-up formations, staff driven and focused 
more on tactical warfare than on keeping workers organized to control their own destiny.
7
  
One serious consequence of McCarthyism was that organizers skilled in the CIO-era 
method were driven out of the labor movement. Since then, union leaders have adopted an 
increasingly accommodationist method that has achieved material gains and union security by 
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surrendering the option to strike and often all other real rights on the shop floor. After the strikes 
that crippled production were abandoned, there was no longer a perceived need to build a strong 
organization among a majority of workers. As a result, wage increases and improvements in 
working conditions have come to a halt. Workers as the primary leverage in their own salvation 
has been replaced by the corporate campaign, a method of tactical warfare that takes campaign 
action away from the shop floor and away from the workers. 
The Search for Black Swans: 
Unions That Still Run Successful Majority Strikes 
This dissertation will explore the thesis that workers can still win more substantial 
victories by building and holding majority participation among the key affected constituencies, a 
very different strategy from the one deployed by New Labor. Because strikes that shut down or 
cripple production—the most powerful kind—are contingent on the overwhelming majority of 
workers, not staff, engaging in collective action, it follows that to use labor’s strongest weapon 
requires organizing models that facilitate most workers’ participation in the union. The 
preponderance of cases I will examine involve successful majority strikes in the new millennium. 
While creating an analogy to the industrial-era factory of the past, I will focus on cases in the 
growth industries of today’s service economy—health care and education—in which many 
workers with a wide range of skill and education constantly collaborate in the same buildings. 
Unlike in the past, however, the workforces in my case studies are mostly comprised of women, 
and emotional labor and technical skill are equally crucial to success. In my research I ask, how 
do these factors, characteristic of today’s economic growth sectors, affect the strategies and 
relative successes of these strikes? 
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These case studies will lead me to be able to contribute analysis to the following big-picture 
questions: 
1. What is the relationship between the ideology of the insurgents/organizers and the 
strategies they prioritize? Is the decision to embrace a minority participation versus a 
majority collective-action model contingent on ideology? 
2. What is the relationship between power and strategy? What is the relationship between 
research models and their subsequent collection-action models? Has New Labor’s focus 
on the corporate campaign—colloquially called the air war—and its concurrent power-
structure theory, “corporate research,” helped or hindered labor’s revitalization? What 
alternative power and research theories have been utilized in the new millennium? 
3. The transition from a manufacturing to service economy radically altered traditional 
worker-consumer relations, what are the strategy implications for insurgents? Does the 
strike strategy of a female-dominated workforce look different from the old one? Many 
large workplaces today are dominated by women engaged in emotional labor intimately 
tied to the consumer, does labor need to view the public differently in strike strategy? 
Does the relationship between these workers and their patients, students and their 
families demand a different relationship between their unions and the community? The 
corporate right is attempting to wedge the public against workers whose salaries rely on 
taxes, but can the public in the neoliberal service economy instead become an extension 
of the workers against the employer? 
4. What is the relationship between success in collective bargaining and revitalizing or 
expanding labor’s ranks? Do workers’ expectations of winning concrete and measurable 
improvements in their lives through collective action have to be raised as a precondition 
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to workers themselves for them to become the base from which labor’s ranks might 
grow? 
Methodology  
In this paper I employ mixed qualitative and quantitative methods. I conducted fifty-eight semi-
structured interviews with rank and file workers, civil society leaders, members of local media 
organizations, current and former lead strategists in the campaigns, and long-time active as well 
as retired Alinsky-trained organizers. I analyzed data sets from the Federal Mediation and 
Conciliation Services (FMCS) work-stoppage databases from the year 2000 to present. I did 
archival research on each case’s strategic planning documents; analysis of the current collective 
bargaining agreements of each local union; read published newspaper stories and internal 
memos; and I conducted a line-by-line content analysis of the key Alinsky texts and the 
organizing training manuals of numerous Alinskyist organizations. I utilized participant 
observation for chapter four, first as a young organizer being apprenticed at 1199 New England 
and later as national deputy director for SEIU’s Healthcare Division, where I participated in 
numerous discussions leading up to the launch of what became known nationally as the Nursing 
Home Industry Alliance, which the Washington State case represents. I was trained as a 
community organizer in one strand of the Alinsky tradition prior to my years as a labor organizer 
and contract negotiator 
 My case studies represent a small section of union and worker-center actions. 
They include failure but are mostly comprised of relative successes in a period of massive union 
decline. My aim is not to produce theory that explains labor successes and failures in toto but to 
understand in depth the dynamics, strategies, and contexts in which particular victories were 
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achieved. I argue that understanding these successes is key to attempts to rethink and revitalize 
the future labor movement. 
The Chapters 
In chapter two, I explore the literature that relates to my primary interest: organizing. I 
begin by reflecting on what sociology’s grand theorists did or did not tell us about organizing. I 
move to a more substantial discussion about four key thinkers: George Herbert Mead, Saul 
Alinsky, Frances Fox Piven, and Marshall Ganz. I argue that all of these theorists merit special 
attention in my drive to delineate what I consider to be real organizing (versus other actions 
commonly called organizing). I then integrate the concepts of the four theorists and that of more 
recent literature in social movement and union revitalization. 
In chapters three through six I examine my twelve cases of failure and relative success. 
Chapter three explores the Chicago Teachers Union (AFT) before and after its 2010 leadership 
change. I examine the twenty-five-year period leading to its successful strike in 2012 and 
compare and contrast the relative success of its various leaders and contracts. 
Chapter three takes two similarly situated union locals—members of the national SEIU—
and examines the wildly different strategies each deploys in private-sector nursing homes. One 
local represents the best expression of Andrew Stern, who the press for years called the leading 
figure of New Labor and whose imprint still dominates the local’s present culture and strategies. 
The other local is an outlier of the national SEIU and represents the past militant traditions of the 
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). 
Chapter five steps outside the bounds of the traditional service sector to explore the 
relative failures and relative successes in the exit-prone manufacturing sector. Most academics 
have long assumed organizing the unorganized might be possible among low-wage service 
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workers, but this chapter demonstrates that motivation and strategy may have more to do with 
failure and success across all sectors of workers than previously thought. This is a case study of a 
Smithfield Foods plant in North Carolina, the state with the lowest rate of unionization in all of 
the U.S. Here, the workers are mostly men. They are twice defeated in attempts at unionization, 
but on third try, they win—and win big, bringing massive change to plant operations and to their 
own lives. 
Chapter six explores a group that is not a union: Make the Road New York, which is 
typically considered a worker center by today’s literature. It is actually a hybrid worker center 
and community-organizing community that has enjoyed more success than most other groups 
that are similarly situated, and I discuss the reasons. 
Chapter seven, titled Two Models, is a discussion that sums up my observations and lessons 
from the cases I have examined. I suggest there are two dominant models today: what I define as 
the mobilizing model, a staff-heavy model that can lead to limited success; and the organizing 





CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
"In short, the principle must always rule that ideas are not born of other ideas, 
philosophies of other philosophies; they are continually renewed expression of real historical 
development….Identity in a concrete reality determines identity of thought, and not vice versa. It 
can further be deduced that every truth, even if universal, and even if it can be expressed by an 
abstract formula of mathematical kind (for the sake of theoreticians), owes its effectiveness to its 
being expressed in the language appropriate to specific concrete situations. If it cannot be 
expressed in such specific terms, it is a byzantine and scholastic abstraction, good only for 





Labor renewal and collective action theorists stack their books in two distinct piles and 
conduct their intellectual gatherings as parallel but separate dialogues. Existing sociological 
literature reflects, but does not challenge, the modern ensiling of movements. Union 
revitalization literature (Voss, Sherman, Milkman, Fine, Chun, Cobble, Bronfennbrenner, 
Clawson, Getman, Fantasia, Lopez, McCullum, Moody) is distinct and divided from social 
movement literature (McAdam, McCarthy, Zald, Benford, Bellah, Goodwin, Jasper, Polletta, 
Swidler, and Payne). Because I will argue that the terrain of success for ordinary people in the 
twenty-first century is located in their ability to forge equally deep solidarities in, outside, and 
between the workplace and the community, my analysis breaks down these two silos and 
combines them.  
In this chapter I begin by briefly situating my ideas about organizing and relative success 
in the early works of our field’s three grand theorists, Karl Marx, Émile Durkheim, and Max 
Weber. I do this precisely because the literature I am engaging tends to root itself either in Marx 
(labor renewal) or Weber (social movements). I propose that sociology’s failure to understand 
what I call organizing began more than a century ago, and at least in part because our three grand 
theorists were situated in Europe, where conditions at the end of the nineteenth century were 
quite different from those in the newly formed nation-state, the United States. Because of the 
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dearth of sociologists writing about my primary interest—that is, organizing and what leads to its 
success or failure—I also turn to historians to fill in the many gaps in the sociological literature.  
I next discuss George Herbert Mead, considered the founder of a field that didn’t exist in 
the years Mead was writing but was later recognized as a distinct subfield in the discipline of 
sociology, symbolic interactionism, by one of Mead’s students, Herbert Blumer, and credited 
posthumously to Mead. I argue that Mead’s theoretical work, the basis of Blumer’s symbolic 
interactionist theory, is intimately related to organizing as I understand it. Mead was an esteemed 
professor at the newly constituted University of Chicago in the 1920s and 1930s and worked 
alongside Robert Park and a set of professors who developed theories that presented the 
community as a social ecology.  
I trace the influence of symbolic interactionism on the methodology of one eager student 
who studied with and under the University of Chicago team from 1926 through 1932—Saul 
Alinsky. But I also link Alinsky’s method to a second major influence: the communists and 
socialists in the leadership of the first union Alinsky worked with, the Packing House Workers 
Union. I follow this thread to the pivotal work of Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, who 
introduced the agents of change into contemporary literature and focused generations of thinking 
on the central issue of power. From there, I move to a discussion of Marshall Ganz’s contribution 
to our understanding of strategy. Finally, I introduce a dozen more writers who, I argue, have all 
been discussing in some shape or form the key role of the process of change and how human 




What We Did and Didn’t Learn About Organizing  
from the Grand Theorists 
An axiom of sociology is that a decade or two must pass before theorists can translate or 
understand actual events that have taken place in society. For example, it took resource 
mobilization and political opportunity structure theorists a decade or two after the civil rights 
movement to legitimize protest and devise theories attempting to explain it, normalizing protest 
actions and civil disruption within what the subfield section the American Sociological 
Association calls collective behavior/social movements. 
Karl Marx was a particularly astute observer who interpreted the events around him and 
formed his interpretations into theory. Thanks to historians, whose records help sociologists to 
compare what happens with what theorists predict will happen, it is clear that some of what we 
understand as Marx’s theories, even his central theories, were based on his direct observation of 
the social history unfolding around him. He theorized that the economic order, what he calls the 
mode of production, conditions the whole of society. He predicted that workers would rebel 
against the capitalist economic order. Marx’s writing was much influenced by his observations of 
the English working class in the Victorian era, the dawn of industrial capitalism. E.P. Thompson, 
writing of that era in his great social history The Making of the English Working Class, a 
biography of that class “from its adolescence to its early manhood,” reveals that Marx in fact was 
predicting what was already taking place: “In the years between 1780 and 1832 most English 






Thompson quotes from and discusses pamphlets and crudely written articles produced in 
the early 1800s, in which workers engaged in active struggle debated on how massive changes in 
the economy were changing their society: 
“The equation between the cotton-mill and the new industrial society, and the 
correspondence between new forms of productive and social relationship, was a 
commonplace among observers in the years between 1790 and 1850. Karl Marx was only 
expressing this with unusual vigor when he declared: ‘The hand mill gives you society 




Thompson argues that mass consciousness developed not because of the teachings of 
what would become Lenin’s vanguard party, but rather because  
 
“…where the manufacturer not only made riches out of the labour of the hands 
but could be seen to make riches in one generation—all contributed to the transparency of 




Marx and Engels methodically described the way the capitalist factory system worked, 
and they also correctly identified the primary leverage against the system: the workers, the 
system’s own agents. In the Manifesto, they lay out an explicit theory of power: workers could 
withdraw their cooperation from the capitalist class by collectively withholding their work 
through the strike weapon; labor as a class in itself would eventually become a class “for itself.” 
Workers, once small farmers or craftspeople with little experience working collectively or 
cooperatively, would learn solidarity as a feature of capitalism by interacting together in the 
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factories. As industrialization spread around the globe, so, too, would the ranks of the 
discontented. At some never specified time, the working masses would rise up.  
Beverly Silver’s recent book Forces of Production confirms that Marx was generally 
correct in what he imagined might happen, as he watched from his vantage point what was 
happening. Her thesis, in part, demonstrates that under certain conditions, in situations with key 
features similar to those of Victorian Marxism, when societies undergo the mass industrialization 
process, workers consistently rebel. Under very specific conditions, in very specific contexts, 
workers will learn to act collectively rather than individually, will understand their power to 
withhold their labor, and will sometimes even win concessions. The problem, as many analysts 
before me have recognized, is that these very specific conditions rarely occur in the very specific 
way they are theorized in order for such events/developments to unfold.  
Marx couldn’t know all that we know 175 years later, but his successors more often than 
not have doubled down in defense of the idea of inevitable worker collective action, even when 
faced by a colossal body of evidence that things aren’t turning out the way Marx prophesied. As 
C. Wright Mills argued, we can use Marx’s model, but we must adjust to the conditions of time 
and place. Many of Marx’s successors have not done that. 
Ironically, it was another member of the grand trinity, Durkheim, although he wrote no 
literature relating to my central interest, organizing, whose concept, anomie is central to the 
arsenal of successful activists today.
12
 Durkheim describes anomie as the rather massive gap 
between the life people are told they can expect under capitalism and the life most of the 
working class is actually handed. Conservative and right-wing activists use anomie to sow 
anxiety and fear, tugging at human emotions by blaming blacks for taking white male workers’ 
jobs, for example, Durkheim is also in every face-to-face conversation where leftist-inclined 
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organizers seek to raise workers’ expectations of what they deserve. Marx doesn’t enter the 
conversation until near the end, if and when the successful organizer has guided the two-way 
conversation to strategy. I will speak more about these conversations in chapter seven, “Two 
Models.”  
The third of sociology’s grand theorists is the deeply relevant Max Weber. Though many 
before me have insisted that Weber saw himself in conversation with Karl Marx, in his own time 
Weber was dismissed by the left and Marxist academic circles as soon as he veered off the main 
path of Marxist doctrine. As a result, many people today who desire radical change miss out on 
the valuable contributions of Weber and his successors. This is especially so among leftists 
pursuing academic labor studies. The very fact that sociologists recognize two distinct subfields 
of collective action in sociology, labor movements and collective behavior/social movements is a 
testament to how little we have really learned since the grand theorists were first canonized. 
Human agency works in the workplace as it does in the community, despite the academy’s 
untiring insistence that these are distinct arenas of action. Humans don’t self-sort their 
consciousness into categories—“mind on the clock, mind off the clock.” Weber suggested that 
power lies both in and outside the economic arena, a concept he tried hard to define with words 
like social status and prestige. Weber insisted that the social and political order would greatly 
complicate the Marxist project if left unattended.  
Weber was clearly onto something important. He said:  
 
“Economically conditioned power is not, of course, identical with ‘power’ as 
such. On the contrary, the emergence of economic power may be the consequence of 
power existing on other grounds. Man does not strive for power only to enrich himself 
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In his unfinished essay Class, Status and Party, Weber attempted to describe how 
nationalism arises and how racism, religious identification, and other factors complicate Marx’s 
theory that workers the world over would rise up together. Marx’s analysis of capitalism and the 
power of the economic arena is profound, yet it has proven insufficient. Unfortunately, although 
Weber saw the problems, he only hinted at solutions; he didn’t fully develop answers to the 
urgent questions he raised.  
I argue, finally, that academics studying progressive or radical societal change—who 
have long been split into social movement theorists drawing heavily on Weber’s insights about 
prestige and emotion and labor movement theorists drawing on Marx—need to reunite. Neither 
theoretical body is sufficient on its own. We need to bring them together, and we know we need 
to bring them together not only because these two theories of capitalism complement each other, 
but also because in practice people’s working lives are not separate from the lives they live 
outside of the workplace, where other forms of power complicate and condition their decision 
making.  
 
Beyond the Grand Theorists: Organizing in the USA  
By the time sociology as a discipline had begun to gain a foothold in the United States, 
capitalism had already established itself here in a far more vicious form than in Europe. While 
Marx and Engels were theorizing and issuing the Manifesto of the Communist Party, calling on 
all workers to unite, slavery was still legal and, for the first time in world history, racially 
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bounded. While the debates of the Second International raged, vast numbers of American trade 
unionists were being beaten and shot by American employers. As historian Jeremy Brecher 
writes in Strike:  
 
“The assumption that American society is based on consent may be attractive, but 
it hardly fits the facts. Instead, we find that the realm of protected liberties is a small, 
circumscribed sector of society, surrounded by vast hierarchical institutions based on 
command and backed by force. Repression is absent in American history only where the 
status quo is unchallenged.”  
 
In fact, Brecher’s history of worker struggles in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
and Charles Payne’s I’ve Got the Light of Freedom,
14
 a detailed compendium of the routine 
nature of lynching in the American South in the years leading up to the civil rights movement, 
paint a picture of the nation’s working class as courageous and resilient in the face of massive 
repressions unimagined of by the European theorists. 
U.S.-based theorizing does not pay enough attention to hegemony, Antonio Gramsci’s 
term for the way capitalism plants seeds and takes root not only in every aspect of a society, but 
also in the hearts and minds of the individuals who make up that society. To date, our official 
narratives still begin with some variation on “The U.S.A. is so different, and so exceptional, 
because it is the only country to have come into being without a war.” Howard Zinn’s A People’s 
History of the USA has helped shatter the myth by exposing the genocide against the indigenous 
population quantitatively and qualitatively and ridiculing the notion that this country began 
“without a war.” But the narrative persists.
15
 So too do K-12 history books that are filled with the 
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same propaganda, a constructed narrative aimed at legitimizing the powerful as they carry out 
repression. Weber gave us an insight about this in his essay on “Power Structure” where he 
explain that the elite holders of power will seek to legitimize their repressive behavior.  
In 1835, political scientist Alexis de Tocqueville, whose own aristocratic family had lost 
their ancient wealth to the masses in the French Revolution, wrote passionately about the 
brilliance of the New World’s new nation state in Democracy in America.
16
 He describes in 
detail the development of the  hegemony project in the United States in his chapter “Why Great 
Revolutions Will Happen Less Often,” and outlines how the elite might transition successfully 
from the legal but illegitimate sanction of a formal aristocracy to the far more legitimate power 
class of a democracy, by “giving a little” to maintain stability. “Giving a little” meant creating a 
middle class, so that a limited number of people outside the aristocracy could own property, and 
awarding the franchise to  the new property-owning class: non aristocratic white men. He 
predicted that this novel political order called democracy would ensure its informal aristocracy a 
firmer footing than that enjoyed by the aristocracies of Europe’s old regimes.  
E.P. Thompson argued that the European Karl Marx accurately observed that mass 
consciousness developed because “…where the manufacturer not only made riches out of the 
labour of the hands but could be seen to make riches in one generation—all contributed to the 
transparency of the process of exploitation and to the social and cultural cohesion of the 
exploited.”
17
 Yet although Marx himself addressed mass meetings of workers and helped to 
found the International Workman’s Association, his analysis fell short of explaining the role of 
organizers and party organizations in transforming the working class in itself to the working 
class for itself. Perhaps he didn’t need to, because capitalism, like the working class, was then 
only in what Thompson called its adolescence. By the time the working class reached adulthood, 
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capitalism had, too, and had woven itself into all aspects of an individual’s socialization process 
from birth, through the school system, religious practice, social traditions, the media, and more. 
The ruling class was developing a cultural apparatus that impeded the workers’ from more easily 
seeing their oppression.  
 
George Herbert Mead: Organizing Theorist  
(Another Posthumously Awarded Label) 
Herbert Mead didn’t call himself a symbolic interactionist; he was given the identity after 
his death, by his former University of Chicago student Herbert Blumer. Nor did he call himself 
an organizing theorist; he called himself a pragmatic philosopher. I propose to examine Mead’s 
concepts, in particular role play, for their significance to organizing, a significance that until now 
has been all but completely overlooked by social movement and labor theorists alike. 
Although it was Blumer who established symbolic interactionism as a field, the 
foundational texts are Mead’s.
18
 In 1934, Mead connected his formal education and training in 
philosophy to behavioral psychology in Mind, Self and Society, From the Standpoint of a Social 
Behaviorist. His analysis explored objectivity in the social realm and how the self develops. He 
argued that we are born without a concept of self: 
 
“The self is something which has a development; it is not initially there, at birth, 
but arises in the process of social experience and activity, that is, develops in the given 







For Mead, meaning in life is based on the triadic relationship, which consists of two 
partners in reciprocal communication with an indicative object, a gesture.
20
 Mead calls this 
process a conversation of gestures. What separates humans from animals is their ability to be 
reflective through the use of significant gestures. Mead argued that language itself is a gesture, 
taking the form of what he calls a significant symbol.
21
 Significant symbols are central to human 
interaction because they elicit meaningful responses between people in a two-way, interactive 
call and response. 
In Mead’s view, there is the self and the generalized other. He further theorizes that two 
phases of self, both conditioned by the generalized other, are distinct in human development. The 
first, the ‘I’ phase, is not reflective; it represents the child’s conception of coming into being. 
When the child moves from ‘I,’ self as subject, to ‘me,’ self as object, reflection and self-
reflection have emerged: the child is aware of its relationship to the preexisting society, to a set 
of social institutions that predate its own existence and  condition its sense of personhood. This is 
the generalized other that, according to Mead, conditions the set of expectations people bring to 
society based on their socialization process.  
To Mead, the concept of role play is a central mechanism in this process of human 
development.
22
 He argues that the process comes about initially when a child plays alone, as with 
a doll. Before children play multiple roles, they play alone, developing their sense of ‘I.’ 
Toddlers talk to themselves; speech for them is not yet a call and response, but rather “just a set 
of responses that follow on each other indefinitely.”
23
 As they mature, they begin to engage in 
games with other children, “either the competitive or more or less dramatic.”
24
 It is in this game 
phase
25
 that they transition to the more reflective understanding of self, called ‘me.’ In games 
with others, they are expected to play multiple roles—pitcher, catcher, first, second, and third 
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base; doctor, nurse, patient; mommy, daddy, baby—and they interchange in these roles, 
responding to others in the game and at the same time being conditioned to the expectations of 
the varied roles of society. They internalize the generalized other by becoming aware of 
individual others’ responses and their own, as well as of the expectations and intentions in the 
game.  
As individuals grow into adults, they become more reliable and transition into group 
behavior. Mead defines two types of groups:  concrete, including “political parties, clubs, 
corporations,” and abstract, such as “class of debtors, class of creditors”—the latter type cutting 
across functional lines.
26
 The institutionalization of behavior happens when whole communities 
behave in certain ways, when the generalized other produces group- or community-wide 
responses toward and between the individual and the community. Mead accounts for the 
possibility of social change when he discusses how an individual might decide to change his or 
her gesture toward the community, to respond to the community in a new way, which in turn 
could change the response of the community.  
As a rule, Mead assumes that the general voice of the present community is identical with 
that of the larger community of the past and the future: 
 
“We can reform the order of things; we can insist on making the community 
standards better. We are not simply bound by the community. We are engaged in a 
conversation in which what we say is listened to by the community and its response is 
one which is affected by what we have to say. This is especially true in critical 
situations… The process of conversation is one in which the individual has not only the 
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right but the duty of talking to the community of which he is a part and bringing about 




For Mead, the mind is in society and the society is in the individual mind; it is not 
transcendental. This is similar to Marx’s, and later Antonio Gramsci’s, concept of hegemony. 
Marx described class struggle as the mechanism by which the working class would overthrow its 
oppressors. When he talked about workers moving from field to factory, assuming new roles in 
the division of labor, and described them as pitted against  their employers, the workers’ 
generalized other changed dramatically; class struggle reconditions the sense of me and that 
other. Interacting with each other in new roles in Mead’s “critical situations,” workers could 
decide to change the rules—and roles—of the game. 
 I argue in the next section and in chapter seven, “Two Models,” that the social theories 
of Mead and Marx—both philosophers by training—are complementary. Furthermore, 
Gramsci’s observations of the workers in the 1919 Turin revolts
28
 and their interaction with the 
small farmers who aligned with them are consistent with Mead’s  observation of how in a more 
mature phase of the capitalist system the working class can unify and rebel within and outside 
the factory gates through the interaction of class struggle—a “critical situation.”  
When workers in the U.S. attempt to form a union, or go on strike, Mead’s “critical 
situations” go into overdrive. As most employers faced with employee organization immediately 
commence class struggle, workers can begin to see, far more clearly, both their own contribution 
to the work system and the employer’s repression. The repertoire of a well-designed union 
organizing campaign serves to undo and redo the self and the generalized other, first inside the 
workers, as individuals begin to understand themselves differently, and then understand their 
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coworkers in new ways, and finally in confrontation with their employer. Because consciousness 
is shaped by role plays, the stages of a worker campaign correspond to Mead’s games. 
Conditions change fast, speeded by the maneuvers of the employer, and workers build their sense 
of self and their confidence in each other in an escalating series of actions that enable what 
Frances Piven and Richard Cloward call rule breaking.
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Mead did not situate Mind, Self and Society within a political framework promoting 
revolutionary or even radical social change. Very few scholars in the field have so framed their 
work, which begs further research. In chapter seven, I will situate Mead in a discussion of the 
craft of organizing—a process whereby individuals come to see themselves in relationship to 
society in fundamentally different ways. In the next section of this chapter, I turn to three 
particularly preeminent people who have discussed organizing at length.  
 
Saul Alinsky: Gestating in Mead’s Chicago School in the 1920s  
and Marx’s Workshop in the 1930s 
 
“Political philosophies are intellectual and moral creations; they contain high ideals, easy 
slogans, dubious facts, crude propaganda, sophisticated theories. Their adherents select some 
facts and ignore others, urge the acceptance of ideals, the inevitability of events, argue with this 





Saul Alinsky was born in Chicago in 1909 to two working-class Russian Jews.
31
 In 1926,  
he entered the newly established University of Chicago, where Herbert Mead and Robert Park 
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were significant intellectual powers. Accordng to Alinsky’s biographer, Alinsky took many of 
Park’s classes, and whether or not he studied under Mead as well, certainly he would have felt 
Mead’s influence. In two articles written in the 1980s, Donald and Dietrich Reitzes, trace 
Alinsky’s roots to the influence of Park and the University of Chicago generally. They call 
Alinsky an “urban social interactionist”
32
 and attribute his understanding of the community as a 
complex set of institutions—what they call the social ecology of the community—to his graduate 
fieldwork in criminology. According to the Reitzes, Alinsky saw the community in broad terms, 
and their analysis of his thought does not take into account his views on organizing or the nature 
of the interactive process. They also entirely miss Alinsky’s other significant schooling: the 
socialist mentors he adopted in Chicago’s unions, especially what Judith Stepan-Norris and 
Maurice Zeitlan
33
 call the Red-led unions, such as Alinsky’s first partner, the Packing House 
Workers. If Alinsky benefited intellectually from Mead’s early teachings on symbolic 
interaction, he experienced firsthand Marx’s own form of that interaction, the classes in struggle, 
throughout the 1930’s in his own hometown.  
Alinsky spent a full decade doing academically directed participant observation, first with 
youth gangs and then with the Chicago mob. He published several scholarly articles in the 1930s 
and early 1940s that reveal his early thinking about power analysis, based on his observations of 
the power dynamics of both of these nontraditional types of organization.  
In the late 1930s, bored with criminal justice work (he often referred to boredom as a 
kind of chief life motivator) and alarmed by the rise of fascism in Europe, Alinsky transitioned 
from his job in the Joliet Prison into “moonlighting with the CIO.” This gave him his first 
contact with the people he later said were the best organizers of his day: the communists in the 
CIO. Working as a volunteer, he helped raise funds for striking mine workers, and for the 
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International Brigades heading off to fight in the Spanish Civil War. It would take several more 
years before for Herb Marsh, a socialist and the leader of the Packing House Workers, would 
enter Alinsky’s mentorship team.
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Saul Alinsky’s name has been synonymous with organizing for more than half a century. 
Though he died in 1972, shortly after the publication of his most famous book, Rules for 
Radicals, his influence remains strong among community and New Labor organizers today. And 
since Obama came to power, he has been reborn as an inspiration to Tea Partiers, a development 
that has confounded many (though not this author). In any casual Internet search, next to 
Wikipedia, the top three Alinsky hits are radical-right websites, including Glen Beck’s, and these 
sites urge anyone serious about building power to read Rules for Radicals— a top seller in 2008 
and 2009 to right-wing grassroots activists, whose leaders got complimentary copies from the 
likes of Dick Army.
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So trying to talk about Saul Alinsky in the activist world is a lot like trying to talk about 
Marx in the academic world. There’s what Marx and Alinsky wrote and what Marx and Alinsky 
actually did, and, based on one or the other of those aspects, there are the very diverse people 
and groups claiming to be the real Marxists or the true Alinskyites. 
 The resemblance ends there, however, for Saul Alinsky and Karl Marx had very different 
goals: Marx wanted to overthrow capitalism; Alinsky wanted to defend and protect it with ideas 
very close to his favorite political scientist, Alexis de Tocqueville. Both Alinsky and de 
Tocqueville were enchanted by the nebulous concept of freedom. And both placed a high value 
on individualism. Alinsky quotes de Tocqueville more than anyone else in each of his two books, 
Reveille for Radicals and Rules for Radicals. He spun de Tocqueville’s long digressions about 
the importance of creating a middle class into his own vernacular: he called de Tocqueville’s 
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creation the “have a little, want some more class.” Both he and  de Tocqueville agree that it’s 
essential to have a such a class to ward off the Jacobins and the Communists.  
Stability in our freedom-loving society, said Alinsky, will be achieved by having strong 
unions, the guarantor of a middle class. The unions Alinsky wanted were the kind John Lewis 
believed in. Lewis, the anticommunist head of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, was 
Alinsky’s hero, and Alinsky’s John L. Lewis: An Unauthorized Biography
36
 is a 400-page love 
letter to the man. The book opens with a grand, full-page black-and-white photo of a regal-
looking Lewis standing over Alinsky, his hand gesturing as he explains some important concept, 
while Alinsky take notes. Both men are wearing crisp suits; the room they inhabit is furnished 
with handsome lamps and oversized leather chairs—the kind of chairs fancied by Mills’s “men 
of power.” In fact, the photo shows an American working man’s dream of economic and social 
as well as political achievement; it seems to illustrate the best outcome of organizing for de 
Tocqueville’s aspiring middle class.  
Alinsky tells us, “To me, Lewis is an extraordinary individual and certainly one of the 
outstanding figures of our time.”
37
 And certainly under his leadership the CIO won campaigns, 
though his noncoms were not always rewarded. According to Stepan-Norris and Zeitlan, in their 
chapter “Who Gets the Bird?” Lewis routinely hired socialist organizers—the “best of the 
day”—and once the fight was won, he just as routinely purged them. Lewis famously quipped, 
“Who gets the bird, the hunter or the dog?” Clearly, Lewis was the hunter.  
That Lewis became Alinsky’s chief mentor probably explains some of Alinsky’s lack of 
focus on internal democracy within the organizations he helped form or brought into his orbit. 
Alinsky did not invent community organizing—despite the right wing’s claim that he did, 
repeated loudly and often since Obama’s election in 2008—but he did codify it into a practice. 
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His efforts to document his model enabled successive generations to focus on the craft itself, 
which Alinsky defined as an explicit effort to get ordinary people to participate in the decisions 
affecting their lives. 
Alinsky was drawing, then, on Mead and Marx. But, I will argue, when he blended their 
influence with his own showboating personality and his commitment to defeat communism 
within the movement, and when he moved the method outside the factories and into the 
community, he oversimplified and bastardized their theories. Weeks before his sudden death 
from a heart attack, he spoke of his aspirations to Playboy in a wide-ranging interview, published 
posthumously:  
 
“What I wanted to try to do was to apply the organizing skills I’d mastered in the 
CIO to the worst slums and ghettos, so that the most oppressed and exploited elements 
could take control of their own communities and their own destinies. Up until then, 
specific factories and industries had been organized for social change, but never whole 
communities.”  
 
Later in the same interview, he made an interesting acknowledgment: 
 
 “Back in the ’30s, the Communists did a hell of a lot of good work…Their 
platform stood for all the right things, and unlike many liberals, they were willing to put 
their bodies on the line. Without the Communists, for example, I doubt the CIO could 




This was tardy praise from a man who’d spent most of his adult life trashing the socialists 
and communists, as Alinsky does throughout Rules for Radicals. Alinsky himself never did any 
labor organizing; he just observed it. He never mastered the best labor organizers’ method and, I 
will argue, his attempt to unlink it from the workplace has led to seventy-five years of confusion 
about how successful organizing works. 
 
 
Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward:  
Putting Power, Ordinary People, Agency and Bottom-Up Strategies  
Into Sociology and Social Change Movements 
Alinsky’s Rules for Radicals has been a consistent best-seller for decades, but so, too, has 
the classic book by Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, Poor People’s Movements: Why 
They Succeed, How they Fail. While Alinsky is praised by Glen Beck, Frances Fox Piven is 
demonized. Alinsky’s Rules is about the people he names as the real agents of change, the 
professional full-time organizers. Poor People’s Movements is about Piven and Cloward’s (and 
Marx’s) agents of change; ordinary people. Piven’s influence inside academia and outside, in 
social movements, is unmatched by that of any other contemporary theorist. Like Alinsky, Piven 
was born to Russian-Jewish immigrants and attended the University of Chicago. But after six 
years Alinsky dropped out of academia; Piven stayed and attained the very highest positions 
among her peers, eventually becoming the president of the American Sociological Association. 
And Piven, alone and with Cloward, has authored a long list of pathbreaking articles and books. 
Before Piven and Cloward published Poor People’s Movements, they worked with poor people 
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in the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO), helping to devise  strategies and 
publicizing the efforts in the popular press, notably The Nation.  
In Poor People’s Movements, they pay particular attention to structure and agency, 
searching for and identifying structural changes that enabled the forms of power that ordinary 
people exercised. Piven and Cloward point to the mass defiance shown by workers in the 1930’s 
as causal to some of the most important and lasting policy changes favoring the poor and 
working class.
38
 Large numbers of workers in an expanding swath of industries interrupted the 
flow of profits in the big factories, a situation that by 1934 the corporate owners could or would 
not withstand. But it was precisely because of the more widespread/general consolidation of 
capital into large factories and urban areas that workers could exercise the strike weapon with 
such great impact. Large national corporations had been fewer in number and therefore less 
vulnerable forty years earlier. And, as historian Jeremy Brecher has pointed out, the repression of 
labor in the late nineteenth century was more difficult for individual workers to survive and 
therefore harder for workers as a group/class to overcome.
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Piven and Cloward observed something similar in the Black freedom movement. African 
Americans in large numbers defied the rules of society by engaging in mass protests across the 
American South. The local authorities’ heavyhanded and violent response, brought into homes 
throughout America (and the world) by a new device, the television, revealed the true vicious 
nature of those who controlled the lives of Southern Blacks. As Thompson said, people were 
suddenly seeing something they had previously been ignorant of or had ignored. Black protest 
and the retaliation of Southern racists made visible an amoral system, and that exposure led to its 
collapse and to the signing of laws as significant as those generated by workers protesting the 
ordering of America’s factories. 
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According to Piven and Cloward’s analysis of the civil rights movement, in order for the 
African American campaign for freedom and equality to be successful, the structure of the 
South’s economy had to first change. As long as agriculture was the dominant industry there, 
Black workers remained dispersed across isolated working and living communities, and were 
easily divided and often terrorized. Total repression of the African American population only 
eased when automation and globalization radically decreasedthe South’s reliance on agricultural 
labor. Rural Blacks began a massive migration to urban areas, creating new possibilities for a 
movement to rise.  
In Rule Making, Rule Breaking and Power, Piven and Cloward theorize about the very 
nature of social life and what constrains and enables people to acquiesce in or rebel against 
societal rules. They posit that ordinary people have a great deal of potential power. This power is 
embedded in what the authors call “the interdependent relations that are social life.”
40
 Their 
essay is a groundbreaking analysis of the conception of the power of the nonelites, expanding 
Marx’s theory of the power of the proletariat beyond the workplace and even the working class. 
Marx said that the proletariat, specifically, were the revolutionary agents because of their 
particular position in the capitalist production system: they literally had their hands on the 
machines; they could shutter the factory. It wasn’t that Marx didn’t appreciate farmers, 
intellectuals, or the unemployed poor, it was that the proletariat could stop production. 
Near the end of Rule Making, Rule Breaking, Piven and Cloward suggest that their 
challenge to the exchange theorists, on the issue of the perceived value of the relative 
contributions of the various players involved in interdependencies, serves as a “bridge” between 
structure and agency.
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 I agree. A few paragraphs later, they return to Thompson’s point about 
how mass consciousness emerges when people see the impact of a process—in the case of labor, 
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when workers see the impact of their own contribution to and position in the interdependencies 
of industrial society: 
 
“Of course social structure is constraining. Human agents do not construct 
interpretations out of whole cloth. Rather, they reevaluate their circumstances within an 
ideological framework that is largely inherited, to which they are largely socialized. To 
assert a capacity for reflection and innovation is not to deny this but rather to say that 
people continue to probe and question the dominating interpretations that they inherit and 
to modify those interpretations in the light of their experience. That experience includes 
the reflexive observations of their contribution to social life.”  
 
The concluding paragraphs of the article discuss why people obey and disobey social 
rules in ways that enable their continued exploitation.  
I argue in chapter seven that Marx’s analysis of class struggle might serve as a bridge 
between Mead’s analysis of how socialization occurs and Piven and Cloward’s astute analysis of, 
and lingering questions about, why people decide to break the rules.   
Piven and Cloward’s work is focused on what behavior leads a struggling class/group to 
success and what to failure. I will argue, drawing in part on Mead, that successful organizing 
changes conditions in such a way as to enable very large numbers of workers to engage in rule 
breaking, to respond sometimes spontaneously and effectively to the employers’ actions in a 
union campaign, or to the landlord in a tenant fight, and even to do this in the periods in between 
great change. Making use of Piven and Cloward’s framework, I propose that only people situated 
in a very particular relationship can themselves exercise interdependent power. In chapter seven, 
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again drawing on Piven and Cloward, I will argue that if more union campaigns premised on 
interdependent power were anchored in locally focused, bottom-up organizing—class struggle in 
the workplace—ordinary people would be winning more, and our movements would be more 
successful. I further propose that what Piven calls the times-in-between
42
 could be brief. The 
method matters, and as Piven tells us, the keys to the exercise of power are the ordinary people 
themselves.   
 
Marshall Ganz: Strategy Defined 
Building on Piven and Cloward’s work, Marshall Ganz defined  strategy in clear and 
simple terms that broke through the structuralist approach and gave sociologists new tools for 
understanding how people and groups with less power can combat and defeat those with 
considerably more. In Why David Sometimes Wins: Leadership, Organization, and Strategy in 
the California Farm Worker Movement, he uses his formulation to explain why the United Farm 
Workers (UFW), with fewer resources than their rival, the Agricultural Workers Organizing 
Committee (AWOC), gained far more from the growers, in a campaign more successful than any 
previous attempt at farmworker organizing. This work also owed much to a new cohort of 
leaders in social movement scholarship who several years prior to Ganz’s  contribution had 
begun challenging the overly structuralist concepts that Wave I sociologists used to explain 
“outcomes.” These Wave II social movement scholars, including Jeff Goodwin, Francesca 
Polletta, and James Jasper, had all been writing about the choices and real-world dilemmas that 
people in leadership confronted when trying to make decisions on the fly during a campaign—
decisions that would have direct bearing on outcomes.  
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The concept of strategy is still not sufficiently attended to in much of the analysis of how 
social change happens. In part this is because actors hide strategy, and for good reason: they 
don’t want the opposition to understand what they are doing. Moreover, successful campaigns 
can span many years and decades. Movement strategists understand that five or six plays may be 
needed to bring about a desired outcome, including changes in the law, policy revisions, or any 
number of things. The successful outcome of the final play may appear to the general public and 
even to academics studying the field to be the only, or only significant, victory. A good example 
of this is found in the effort to help homecare workers improve both the quality of care they 
provide and the quality of their own lives, at work and in the community.  
Like farmworkers, homecare workers were excluded from the limited provisions of the 
National Labor Relations Act, but for a different reason: they didn’t have what is called a 
common employer. They were considered isolated workers, employed by private homes, even 
though most of them were paid through Medicaid and Medicare and county-level social service 
agencies. Improving their working conditions and pay took more than a decade’s campaigning 
made up of many individual battles and wins—changing the law, creating an employer of record 
by changing how homecare workers got paid, defining a common employer where none 
previously existed—before contracts that began to raise base wages could be won. The law, that 
is, the structure, stood in the way of that victory, and movement actors changed the law.  
By understanding how the process of long-term strategy worked, Ganz was able to 
successfully challenge three overarching theoretical approaches that had dominated social 
movement literature: political opportunity structure, resource mobilization theory, and framing. 
Ganz also understood what factors are needed for social movement organizations to win a 
long-term strategic fight. He emphasizes the importance of diverse leadership teams comprised 
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of highly motivated individuals with access to salient information and relevant life experience 
and knowledge. Motivation is a key aspect of what he calls strategic capacity, because it 
generates “critical creative output” and keeps an actor focused while working long hours for 
extended periods of time. Judith Stepan-Norris and Maurice Zeitlan discuss the same factor in 




  Previous analysis of the UFW fight by Jenkins and Perrows
44
 argued that the 
elimination of the Bracero, or seasonal worker, program made a positive change in political 
opportunity structure for farmworkers. They were correct, but as Ganz points out, people, that is, 
movement actors, campaigned to end the Bracero program, because they knew the farmworkers 
could not stop production as long as cheap labor was endlessly and easily coming in from 
Mexico. The Bracero program didn’t end because the employers got tired of it, or because a shift 
in tectonic plates broke Mexico off from California. Movement actors ended it and changed the 
previously existing opportunity structure.  
Ganz also lays waste the notion that simply having more resources means one group can 
succeed where another fails. According to McCarthy and Zald’s classic primer on resource 
mobilization, AWOC had far greater financial resources than the UFW. The rival farmworker 
groups each had access to various parts of the resource mobilization schema: the actual 
farmworkers, called the constituents (because they directly benefited); their families, who could 
be either constituents or conscience constituents (depending on whether you define them as 
supporters or direct beneficiaries); their communities and sympathizers, known as conscious 
constituents or conscience adherents (depending on whether you define them as direct 
beneficiaries or simply supporters); the public at large, called the bystanders; and of course, the 
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agricultural lobby, called the counter movement.
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 Resource mobilization wasn’t just insufficient 
as an explanation, it was overly complicated.  
Framing, or one-way messaging, on the other hand, did matter in the Ganz schema for 
this campaign. Repositioning the farmworker fight in the public eye, turning it from just another 
self-interested union effort for wage increases into a civil rights struggle, was key, particularly in 
the America of 1965. Ganz notes, however, that framing alone would have been insufficient as a 
winning strategy. It was also necessary to deploy “ a heuristic process” in which decision making 
came from leaders with close ties to the farmworkers, with “life experience, networks, and 
repertoires” distinctly different from the backgrounds of organizing staff in the other unions, in 
order to arrive at the right mix of factors to generate movement success.  
Ganz’s great analysis does justice to some factors previously underappreciated in social 
movement studies, but there are others he does not fully examine and that require further 
investigation. For example, his primary focus is on leadership and leadership capacity. This is 
important because, he explains, leadership teams get more done than single leaders, no matter 
how charismatic and talented a single leader may be. Ganz defines leaders as “persons 
authorized to make strategic choices within an organization.”
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 He uses this definition to 
constitute the people whose biographies he foregrounds as central to his analysis of strategy. As I 
will explain in more depth in chapter seven, I define leadership differently. While I think Ganz is 
right that the formal leadership, the top leadership, fits this definition, I will argue there are 
hundreds, if not thousands, of what I call organic leaders in the grassroots base of any 
community or union group. And if we apply his chart “Three Elements of Strategic Capacity,”
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which layers motivation, salient information, and heuristic process onto biography, networks, 
and repertoires, the strategic capacity of a group overall might be many times magnified. In the 
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UFW fight, the organic leaders I have in mind were out in the fields among their fellow workers, 
and if, like Ganz, we focus only on the fights directed by the official leaders in that campaign, 
we miss recognizing some potentially unexplored capacity, the capacity of the base. 
Another element we don’t learn enough about in Ganz’s excellent contribution is the 
method by which the leadership arrived at the power analysis. Ganz refers to targeting, making a 
main issue of what I consider only a part of the variables mix that goes into power analysis.  He 
tells us, in effect, that David (the farmworkers) realized that Goliath (the employer) had too 
much power for them to tackle alone. He does not tell us why that decision was reached. He 
simply speaks of the importance of the deliberative process, the highly interactive process the 
UFW leadership team used to arrive at strategy overall, adjusting it in the heat of the fight, 
without discussing who did the research so crucial to informing that strategy. I will argue later in 
this dissertation that how the research is done, and by whom, is a reflection of the kind of 
organization that gets built. Is it exclusively done in a locked room by a handful of Ivy League–
educated professionals, or is it made part of an interactive, heuristic process that brings in the 
organic leadership and the base? 
 Ganz tells us much about the leadership team and what made the UFW’s a good 
one, but too little about the collective action mechanisms among and between the actual 
farmworkers. Frank Bardacke’s 2012 book Trampling Out the Vintage suggests that there were 
never many farmworkers involved in the UFW. In some ways, that makes the union’s success 
even more interesting. It might mean, however, that very low wage immigrant workers, such as 
farmworkers, simply don’t possess the ability to exercise power in the ways that Marx or Piven 
and Cloward imagined. In Rule Making and Rule Breaking, Piven and Cloward raise this very 





 Though the growers depend on farmworkers for their outsized profits, 
they allow most farmworkers—those that have not been successfully unionized—to live hand to 
mouth, with no savings at all, housing them in shanty-like facilities from which they can be 
easily evicted, with no prospect of being able to find affordable new lodging. This suggests that 
for so oppressed a workforce to win, they must rely heavily, at least initially, on full-time 
professionally staffed operations driving secondary strategies like consumer boycotts and 
framing rather than strategies that depend on the power of the workers themselves. I will explore 
this further, in this chapter and throughout my cases. 
 
Organizing at Center and as Process  
(Not Tactic, Not Repertoire, Not Campaign) 
Three great books describing the process of organizing hit the literature within twelve 
months of each other in the late 1980s: Rick Fantasia’s Cultures of Solidarity, Consciousness, 
Action and Contemporary Workers;
49
 Howard Kimeldorf’s Red or Rackets? The Making of 
Radical and Conservative Unions on the Waterfront;
50
 and Leon Fink and Brian Greenberg’s 
Upheaval in the Quiet Zone, a History of Hospital Workers Union Local 1199.
51
 In the early 
pages of each of these books, the authors discuss the “crisis” facing labor, describing dwindling 
membership and a hostile climate brought on by neoliberal structural shifts and an increasingly 
aggressive employer offensive. Poland and PATCO lurk in the background. It was 1988 and all 
of these authors were sounding alarm bells. Far more important, all were analyzing and 
publicizing the kinds of organizing strategies that I argue could have greatly stemmed the tide of 
disaster that swept over American labor from 1988 to the present day, strategies that were largely 
shelved by the end of the twentieth century. For a little perspective, the numbers in the chart 
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below show union membership percentage statistics for the three states that have recently 




3 States Now 








1988 2014 1988 2014 1988 2014 
Indiana 2012 20.6 10.7 20.2 8.7 22.9 25.5 
Michigan 2012 26.6 14.5 21.6 9.9 55.1 50.5 
Wisconsin 2015 21.7 11.6 16.7 8.2 48.8 30.9 




All three books describe successful unionizing efforts during this otherwise disastrous 
period, and all of the efforts described have certain factors in common: they were focused on 
bottom-up grassroots organizing within the labor movement, and featured campaigns in which 
dignity and not wages was the front-and-center issue, in which the workers themselves were 
rightly understood by the authors to be the primary lever of power, and in which smart strategy 
was devised by savvy and diverse leadership teams that deployed good framing. All three books 
celebrate the ingenuity of the working class.  
Kimeldorf examines the stark differences between two dockworkers’ unions, one on the 
East Coast and one on the West Coast, during same time period. He identifies several key factors 
that led to distinct development paths for the two organizations, focusing less on which arose 
first or which were more important than on the way these factors combined to create the unions 
they did. Kimeldorf’s narrative describes the distinctions between the employer’s agency and the 
particular opportunity structures on each coast and how they inevitably enabled and constrained 
the workers and their unions in fascinatingly different ways.  
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On the West Coast, when workers began to demand safe conditions and better 
treatment—essentially a fight over control of the production process—they faced a more 
homogenous and consolidated employer class, which united against the workers and set the tone 
for class warfare on the docks. The result was almost an invitation to the Wobblies and the 
development of a fighting union.  
On the East Coast, the employers were much less consolidated and in fact were often in 
cutthroat competition with one another, and this division prevented them from mounting the kind 
of employer offensive the dockworkers in the West had to face. Too, the Eastern workers’ 
primary demands did not involve control of the production process, but had instead a more 
materialistic aim: better wages and compensation. Kimeldorf probes and examines the 
recruitment base of the employers on each coast and determines that the West Coast 
dockworkers were more readily able to develop what Rick Fantasia’s book calls a culture of 
solidarity because they came primarily from the logging industry and the maritime trades. As 
loggers and seamen, they had all spent months on end working and living with other men in 
rather isolated situations, drinking, eating, playing cards and living the life of cooperative 
bachelors. Thanks to this experience, they brought to the dockyards an instinct for bonding 
outside of the workplace as well as in it. On the East Coast, at least in New York City, 
Kimeldorf’s case study, dockworkers were recruited from an entirely different base, more 
miscellaneous, and isolationist in temperament. And like their employers, they faced intense 
competition with one another, vying for jobs in a region and city with a glut of unemployed 
immigrants.  
The West Coast’s Wobbly-inclined base produced a radical leader, Harry Bridges, openly 
a socialist. Wobblies and their methods were rejected by the East’s more conservative, divided, 
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and weaker base, which produced a leader the polar opposite of Bridges, Joseph Ryan, a 
“fanatical anticommunist.”
54
 Kimeldorf comes to many of the same conclusions about the 
relative strengths of the West Coast radical dockworkers compared with their East Coast 
counterparts as do Stepan-Norris and Zeitlan in their examination of socialist or “Red-led” 
versus conservative unions.
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 Bridges and the workers on the west coast routinely engaged in 
strikes; they had to; their employers weren’t easy to beat. On the east coast, where money was 
the chief issue for the workers and their leaders, official corruption and bribes became legendary 
and served to buy off the unions for decades. On the west coast, where the demand was for 
control of production, so that safety, hours and more could be negotiated for and by the workers, 
bribes didn’t work; money didn’t supply what the workers were looking for. Kimeldorf 
concludes that the left-wing leadership was better at every level and observes that socialists were 
routinely reelected, even in the face of McCarthyism and their expulsion from the CIO, precisely 
because the endless class struggle in which they engaged cemented a strong membership and a 
strong relationship between the rank and file and union leaders.  
Fantasia and Fink and Greenberg reach the same conclusions. This might be because both 
books examine, Fantasia’s in part Fink and Greenburg’s entirely, the same union: the 
independent national hospital and healthcare workers’ 1199. After the books were published, the 
union would split, with some locals remaining independent, some merging into the SEIU, and a 
smaller group merging into AFSCME. Yet the successes even these remnants are still producing 
in 2015 are significant and deserve further attention, especially as there are too few unions 
producing equivalent victories. There are also, I argue, too few books or even scholarly articles 
about good union organizing in contemporary times. Exceptionally and interestingly, 1199 and 
its radical traditions are the subject of yet another terrific book on organizing, Reorganizing the 
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Rust Belt, An Inside Study of the American Labor Movement, by Steven Lopez. And 1199 is the 
one of the cases covered in this dissertation. That one of the most successful unions in the post-
McCarthy period has served as the basis for so many good books about organizing might seem 
almost surreal, but it is significant.  
 Fantasia rejects the use of surveys as instruments to assess whether or not or to 
what degree class consciousness exists in the U.S. Instead, he documents case-based proof that 
working-class solidarity, the kind workers need in order to stand a chance against union-busting 
employers, is formed through struggle. Workers aren’t born with a culture of solidarity any more 
than they are born with a high-school degree: each are developed through a type of pedagogy—
one in a formal classroom, the other in the classroom of struggle. Using many of the same 
arguments proposed in George Herbert Mead’s analysis, though never referring to Mead, 
Fantasia lays bare the process by which workers in struggle, in “critical situations,” come to 
develop a different sense of self and a totally different notion of the generalized other—that is, 
the workplace and society around them. Fantasia uses key words and phrases many times 
throughout his book—collective interaction, collective chemistry, in interaction. Near the end of 
it, he tells us: 
 
 “It is not a simple matter of preferring solidarity over individual responses. What 
the case studies have shown is that whereas corporate praxis and the system of labor 
relations create formidable obstacles to solidarity, cultures of solidarity are formed out of 
friction and opposition itself. That is, solidarity is to a considerable degree formed and 






Like Kimeldorf when he discusses the case of the West Coast dockers’ union under the 
legendary Harry Bridges, Fantasia concludes that the militancy of the employers in the case of 
Local 1199 helped create a deep solidarity among the workers. Fantasia and Lopez point out one 
difference between their own period and that covered by Kimeldorf: the structural position of the 
organizers. In the heyday of the labor movement, most people who developed an expertise in the 
craft of organizing were socialists who took jobs in the factories and spread the craft by being 
cadres in the plant.
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 Fantasia’s book (and all three of the excellent books about 1199 and 
organizing that I have named) point out that while the 1199 organizer is structured outside the 
plant, he or she plays the same role: identifying the organic leaders within the workplace and 
then teaching, coaching and apprenticing them throughout the fight. I will argue in later chapters 
of my dissertation that this suggests that the craft of organizing is being practiced at the very 
highest levels possible in the 1199 model, because the agency for the fight is vested 100 percent 
in the organic worker leaders themselves and not in outside cadres sent in among the workforce 
to do the leading and fighting for them.  
There is one union today that relies heavily on the use of outsiders being planted inside 
the workforce: UNITE-HERE. Some argue that this is a perversion of the methods used in 
successful unions of the past. A strange dynamic is created when these often young and middle- 
or upper-class student organizers begin to confuse themselves with “real workers.” Mead’s thesis 
about role plays and consciousness might help explain this; if you keep playing a role, you might 
begin to believe yourself to be the role you play. In a fascinating story in the New York Times by 
Steve Greenhouse, UNITE-HERE has been accused of acting like a cult with these middle and 
upper class youth-turned-workers.
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 Teresa Sharpe raised a related issue, that they name workers 





Fantasia’s book is very rich in detail, so rich that his discussion of the actions of the 
organizer in the Springfield hospital fight reveal that the organizer there did not, in fact, build the 
organizing committee in a way that could have possibly led to success, except by accident. In 
chapter four, Fantasia discusses this at length in a section he calls “The Organizing Committee.” 
But successful union organizers reading his terrific analysis would pick up on clues that this 
committee was a poorly constructed committee even before Fantasia gets to this distinct 
subsection. In expounding the 1199 method, he intersperses two terms that carry distinctly 
different meanings: union activists and organic leaders. He conflates commitment with both, and 
in real life and in this case study that proves problematic. He says, “An organizing committee 
generally consists of the most committed and most active supporters of the union drive, and in 
many respects it is the main actor in the process of unionization.” He’s right when he says the 
committee is the main actor—today’s cadre—but he’s wrong in describing the committee it as 
the most committed. .  
In the 1199 case, as I will describe in detail in chapters four and seven, we see that a 
leader might well be antiunion and that the definition of leader has nothing to do with being 
committed to the union. The union lost the Springfield campaign, and from his quite detailed 
description it seems evident that the main reason it lost is that the organizer did not build an 
effective committee. The organizer’s primary job is helping to select and then coach this group 
of workers. Fantasia’s descriptions of the committee in the losing campaign are ample evidence 
that this was not done; in one telling revelation he notes that twenty-four of the forty-six 
employees in the organizing committee worked on the same shift. That’s too many from one 
single shift, and, on top of that, it’s the wrong shift: the day shift has the most staff in any 
healthcare facility and Fantasia tells us most came from the swing shift, the bridge between day 
52 
 
and night. I was not surprised that this drive ended in defeat for the workers. I discuss this 
extensively in chapters four and seven. 
The same themes that are brought to the fore in Fantasia’s and Kimeldorf’s books appear 
in Fink and Greenburg’s and also in Lopez’s Rust Belt. Where Fantasia goes deep into the details 
of organizing drives and strikes, blending all the interactions into a process, Fink and Greenburg 
opt for a historical approach, taking us back in labor history. before coming forward to the 1970s 
and 1980s. There are actually many parallels between Ganz’s analysis of the UFW’s strategy and 
success and Fink and Greenburg’s writing on 1199 in the same era as Ganz covered. Both groups 
of workers, farmworkers and healthcare workers, were officially excluded from the National 
Labor Relations Act of 1935. Not surprisingly, the workforces in the fields and in what Fink and 
Greenburg aptly describe as the quiet zone—the corridors of a hospital—are both predominantly 
people of color, Black and Brown. Yet there is a key difference that is as true today as it was in 
the days when Cesar Chavez was working for Saul Alinsky and Elliot Godoff for Leon Davis: 
although both industries, agriculture and healthcare, rely heavily on immigrant labor, in 
healthcare, because of the high level of active government regulation and the need for employees 
to speak English, the immigrant workers tend to be second-generation or at least documented. In 
agriculture, the opposite is true, so farmworkers are a much less secure workforce, a “precariat,” 
like many of the workers in the Justice for Janitors campaigns. There are other significant 
differences—including gender and the attitude of each workforce toward that which they 
“produce”—which I will discuss in chapters three through seven. 
But the similarities are still highly significant, as we learn. In both cases, the authors 
show that the workforce’s exclusion from the Labor Act functions as a constraint yet also allows 
the workers to use militant tactics forbidden to other unions by the NLRA’s many restrictions. 
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The UFW has been able to engage in boycotts and 1199 in wildcat strikes, tactics illegal for 
unions covered by the Act. Both fights were born and embedded in the frame, repertoire, and 
alliances of the civil rights movement, far less the case with other unions. Both sets of 
unionization fighters do a fantastic job of what Patricia Hill Collins calls intersectionality, as 
they confront, rather than avoid, the intersections of race, gender, and class (gender more notably 
in the case of 1199). The 1199 workers won a state-level labor law in 1963. But also unlike the 
farmworkers’s case, in 1974 the National Labor Relations Act was amended to include 
healthcare, something that Jerry Brown, leader of one of the most militant 1199 Locals for many 
years, described in an interview with me as a huge setback. With the federal law, as distinct from 
the state law that Nelson Rockefeller signed under pressure in 1963, the right to strike and mount 
protests was significantly weakened by the imposition of legally mandated ten-day notice-to-
strike and ten-day notice-to-picket provisions. I have examined the changes to the law and have 
also experienced the ten-day provisions as an organizer and contract negotiator, and can state 
that the provisions are not insurmountable, but they are quite problematic.  
For Fink and Greenburg, 1199’s victories have the same crucial elements as the victories 
of the West Coast dockworkers in Kimeldorf’s analysis: the rank-and-file workers were the key 
actors and the leadership was explicitly left-wing (socialist originally; merely radical-left in later 
decades, including today in the most successful locals). The model, unlike the UFW’s, was based 
on achieving majority support among the mass base of the workforce. I will argue later in the 
dissertation that this is related to the capacity of the base of the workers to effectively withdraw 
their labor. Nurses and most other healthcare workers, like most dockworkers, play a strategic 
role, are difficult to replace, and tend to have some savings in the bank, all factors that enable 
them to take a high-risk action and succeed my withdrawing from the interdependencies 
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discussed by Piven and Cloward. Fink and Greenberg’s Upheaval and Ganz’s Why David 
Sometimes Wins focus more on the endlessly clever leadership teams and far less on the base. 
Ultimately, both unions’ leadership teams later experienced internal division and paralysis 
because of succession crises; in many ways, 1199 overcame its crisis, but the UFW has not.  
Though Lopez uses fictitious names throughout Rust Belt, he gives a clear picture as he 
picks up the pieces of the 1199 story after the union’s national breakup and the confusing array 
of mergers that followed. Fortunately, that’s not the main focus of his book; his focus is on the 
workers, the organizers, and the process of organizing. Lopez unravels three complicated 
campaigns and then masterfully stitches a relationship between them and lays out a coherent 
analysis of that relationship. He sets his narrative in one of the more successful 1199 local 
unions, 1199 Pennsylvania—1199P for short. This union covers most of the state, except for 
Philadelphia, whose 1199 branch voted to join AFSCME). At the time he writes of, 1199P was 
embroiled in a war with a company then known as Beverly Industries. Their reputation for union 
busting was bested only by their reputation for fraud and patient abuse, which in recent years  
prompted a name change, but not a change in attitude or policy toward staff or patients.
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The same employer plays a bit part in my chapter three, in a case where I extend the 1199 
story into the second decade of the new millennium. In addition to everything else we learn 
about organizing from the many organizing-focused books that involve this same union, the very 
fact that 1199’s story is ongoing, that the union continues to enable its workers to be the primary 
lever of power, including militant actions and majority strikes, is evidence that oligarchy does 
not always win. 
Lopez, like Fantasia, shows both a defeat and victories of an organization that by any 
standards would be considered a highly functioning union today, if only because the workers are 
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its central agents and actively participate in its campaigns. Lopez points to organizer failure as 
the reason for the one defeat he profiles early in his book. He then does a good job of showing 
how the organizer herself understood exactly how she failed the workers by attempting to skip 
steps. There is some similarity here to Fanstasia’s analysis of the Springfield failure, but either 
Lopez’s organizer is more aware of her errors or Lopez was more interested than Fantasia in 
discussing the specifics of the organizers failure. I will argue later, using Mead’s analysis of how 
the self in relationship to the generalized other develops through a series of steps, from play to 
game to role play, that the organizing method as I describe it, and that Lopez and Fantasia have 
described, does not work successfully if steps are skipped, because it is not a set of 
interchangeable tactics, but rather a process. In his analysis of the development of self-
consciousness, Mead doesn’t presume that the “me” phase of human development can be rushed 
by skipping over the toddler phase of “I.” So, too, good union organizers know that skipping 
steps in developing worker leaders and the worker base will likely, though not always, lead to 
problems, if not colossal defeats. 
Lopez recognizes and points out how important it was that the organizer was able to 
recognize her mistake, analyze it, and then tell the workers what had gone wrong, accept 
responsibility, and return one year later, to help the same workers build their union step by 
step—and then win their campaign. Frances Fox Piven, writing in the forward to an organizing 
manual written by Lee Staples back in 1984, says that most organizers are reflective and do 
know why they fail or succeed, but they rely on an oral tradition instead of making the time to 
record their successes and failures for others to learn from. In this case, an astute sociologist has 
filled in the blanks for us and shared the details. One reason Lopez’s book is so superb is that he 
takes us through several different kinds of efforts made by the same local union within a short 
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time period, fights that each played out in a different arena and involving related but distinct 
challenges: in the private sector and in the public sector; inside the workplace and out in the 
terrain of the broader community; with workers who had not had a union before and were fresh 
to the process, and with more long-standing, cynical union members who had lived through the 
cycle of being mobilized and then demobilized over and over again.  
Lopez, like Fantasia, also addresses head-on the issue of antiunion workers and an 
antiunion working class. In Pennsylvania, this attitude was cultivated by the capitalist classes’ 
diabolical destruction of the once proud Pittsburgh working class who produced the coal and 
steel that built much of America. (Jack Metzger’s Striking Steel is an eloquent and sharp analysis 
of that generation and workforce.) Lopez finds the same solution for it that Fantasia found: 
working-class consciousness emerges or remerges in struggle, through interactions first among 
the workers themselves and then between the workers and management. 
The fact that books about union fights that were printed in the late 1980s could use real 
names without threat of legal action or retaliation, whereas in 2004 Lopez had to fictionalize his 
narrative, suggests that as union membership numbers were plummeting in the private sector (see 
the chart at the beginning of this chapter), and along with them the relative power of the private-
sector workforce, the private-sector employers’ power was increasing. Jake Rosenfeld
61
 talks 
about how the fall of union membership contributed to a rise in income inequality. He’s right, 
but it is even more important to focus on power inequality, the root cause.  
No single scholar has done more than Kate Bronfenbrenner to analyze and make real the 
employer offensive that led to that huge gap in power—and the repertoires that can overcome 
their current very sophisticated union-busting schemes. Bronfenbrenner’s theory is that if union 
organizers would adopt a checklist of certain tactics to be used in each campaign regardless of 
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context or setting or opportunity structure or type of worker, unions would win more. Her 
checklist includes making house visits to workers, having a system for regular assessment of 
worker support for the union, and conducting high-level corporate research on corporate 
vulnerabilities. Our work is similar in that we both are trying to determine what is crucial to 
union success, and what therefore could be done even under current adverse conditions.  
Bronfenbrenner’s writing has been extremely influential, and for good reason: Many union 
organizers and activists are eager to learn how they could be more effective. Although our 
general goals are similar, we take very different approaches to making our case. Bronfenbrenner 
relies heavily on regression analyses of the presence or absence of various tactics; I believe that 
in-depth qualitative analysis is a better way to understand the process of building powerful 
solidarities and helping a united working class gain the confidence to act successfully. 
Regarding the employer offensive that Bronfenbrenner has very astutely analyzed, many 
scholars attribute labor’s current failure to globalization. Beginning with the development of the 
Maquiladora Free Trade Zone in northern Mexico in the late 1960s and accelerating with each 
new regional or global free trade pact, capital has used its mobility as a weapon against domestic 
union-organizing efforts. In fact, Bronfenbrenner’s research documents just how often the threat 
of “exit” is deployed by employers during campaigns, especially employers in manufacturing. It 
is true that in some sectors of the U.S. economy, such as manufacturing and textiles, capital has 
relocated to countries where the cost of production is vastly cheaper (and the price paid for 
attempts at workplace organizing far higher). But other scholars insist that the importance of 
global mobility has been exaggerated.
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 Kim Moody and Sam Gindin argue that while large 
numbers of jobs with American auto makers moved out of the U.S., Japanese and German auto 
makers were simultaneously creating a new U.S. auto economy, located not in the Northeast or 
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Midwest but in the nonunion, right-to-work South. Likewise, the Big Three U.S. auto companies 
have been hollowed out in the Rust Belt, replaced by a new U.S. growth sector of nonunion auto-
parts plants located away from urban areas to traditionally nonunion geographies such as 
suburban and rural areas. What Moody and Gindin argue is that in blaming corporate 
globalization and outsourcing for the job losses in their traditional bailiwick, unions are 
obscuring their failure to organize the new plants.
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The employer class, exercising its agency, identified several weapons to change the 
opportunity structure and facilitate the deunionization of the American workforce. Globalization 
was one of them; others were privatization and outsourcing. All of them created, by design, a 
vast new low-wage workforce.
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 Janice Fine argues that there is a “mismatch” between today’s 







 suggest that demographics is another, related factor in the decline of unions: 
the rapidly expanding contingent workforce is made up in disproportionately large numbers of 
undocumented immigrants, who have historically been excluded from U.S. unions. They argue 
that in order to expand rapidly in today’s economy, unions must embrace immigrants, 
documented or not.  
Milkman points to the success of the SEIU’s Justice for Janitors unionization drives as an 
example of success in immigrant organizing.
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 Fine suggests that the state has replaced any 
single private employer as the key target for much of the low-wage contingent labor force.
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 In a 
new volume edited by Milkman and Ott, thirteen case studies of advocacy and organizing among 
New York’s largely immigrant precariat demonstrate some success with the remedy Fine 
suggests: worker centers targeting the state as a way to “fill in the holes of what a collective 





However, every state law that has been heralded as a win by worker centers has relied heavily on 
the preexisting power of unions in states where unions still have some clout. This raises 
significant future challenges, as the model articulated by Fine and Milkman doesn’t address the 
central issue which is how to build power where little or none exists. This difficulty has been 
magnified by Supreme Court decisions that are unraveling the 1965 Voting Rights Act and 
solidifying corporations not just as persons, but as superpersons entitled to spend without 
restraint to increase their political influence. The corporate rightwing’s strategy is to make 
irrelevant the demographic changes that Democratic Party strategists, and, some trade unionists, 
hoped would alone be a panacea of some sort. 
While much of the hope of a revitalized labor movement has been focused on low-wage 
workers and immigrants, as Dan Clawson discusses in The Next Upsurge, Labor and the New 
Social Movements,
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 the strategies used in low-wage worker campaigns—short-term “minority” 
strikes (meaning a minority of workers are participating), which Jennifer Jihye Chun
72
 calls 
“symbolic strikes”—may not suffice for the campaigns of higher-wage workers, whose labor 
represents a greater proportional cost to employers than does casual, lower-wage work. And 
since most low-wage workers cannot effectively withdraw their contribution from the 
interdependent relationship they have with their employers, the academics focused on low wage 
and symbolic efforts do not adequately address the question of power-building strategies for such 
workers. I agree with Clawson, and my dissertation addresses a broad spectrum of types of 
workers precisely so that I can more accurately probe some of these issues.  
Dan Clawson, Bill Fletcher, and Fernando Gapasin
73
 have all suggested that unions will 
only be able to grow when they see themselves and position themselves as part of a broader 
movement for change. These thinkers call for a more intentional form of “social movement 
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unionism” than what is often found in the stiff, self-interest-driven labor-community alliances or 
coalitions—coalitions typified by staff leaders of groups signing onto each other’s efforts but 
rarely integrating the base constituents, that is, if they have any grassroots base at all. Amanda 
Tattersol
74
 calls for more coalition building, too. I intend to go further and ask: coalitions with 
whom, and much more importantly, based on what kind and level of power? Clawson uses the 
term fusion to express a model that goes beyond our often weak contemporary coalitions. Part of 
the general trend in the United States under neoliberalism has been a general weakening of civil 
society broadly speaking, a point made succinctly in Robert Putnam’s 2000 classic, Bowling 




 argues that part of 
neoliberalism’s logic is to condition people to turn inward, to reinforce what in America already 
has deep roots: individualism.  
Charles Payne’s I’ve Got the Light of Freedom: The Organizing Tradition and the 
Mississippi Freedom Struggle, Aldon Morris’s The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black 
Communities Organizing for Change, and Francesca Polletta’s Freedom is an Endless Meeting: 
Democracy in American Social Movements have the same richness and depth as the Kimeldorf, 
Fantasia, and Lopez trilogy discussed at greater length earlier in this chapter. All three books 
interrogate the central role of agency in social change movements. All three examine leadership 
decision making and strategy. Payne and Morris pay particular attention to the role of the 
indigenous leadership in the South and the relationship between grassroots-level leaders and the 
better-known decision makers in the movement. Payne perhaps more than the others investigates 
the process of organizing.  
But social movement scholars interested in effective bottom-up organizing, like labor 
scholars, are stymied by the dearth of actual organizing since the late 1960s. The general failure 
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of unions to organize from the base upward is evident, but the crisis is at least equally dire on the 
nonunion side of the movement, at least when it comes to the kind of organizing that Payne 
describes taking place in Mississippi. This underscores the pitfalls of calling for coalitions and 
alliances as solutions. Social movement scholars and people examining motivations, emotions, 
and cultural processes would have an expanded and more contemporary field to study if they 
more readily examined local level labor struggles as micro–social movement cases. Gabriel 
Hetland and Jeff Goodwin
77
 assert that the very concept of capitalism has vanished from the 
field. In their chapter “The Strange Disappearance of Capitalism from Social Movement 
Studies,” they juxtapose the spread of capitalism with the decline of analysis of capitalism in 
contemporary social movement studies.  
Today’s fashionable strategies—most of them not yet found in book-length treatments, 
but bubbling up in the mainstream and progressive media and in secret and not-so-secret strategy 
meetings—amount to what Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward have called “spitting in the 
wind.” By that term, they meant strategies that were nonstrategies because to enact them the 
movement would need to expend just as much power as would be required to win something big. 
Many of these strategies, too, seem quite dangerous, because they involve making changes to the 
National Labor Relations Act, and the only changes that would likely be made to the NLRA 
given today’s power structure would put a final end to whatever benefit to workers the law still 
affords, and there is plenty of benefit still left in it, including the right to strike. Labor leaders 
have chosen not to strike; they have not been forbidden to—certainly the law does not forbid it, 
although yes, it has gotten more and more difficult. The most popular of these calls for reform is 
the demand to end what’s called exclusive representation under the NLRA. But if unions could 
not force employers to actually bargain collectively, something today’s Congress and courts 
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would never  do, this idea would be worse than spitting in the wind. It would get workers nothing 
at all and only increase already problematic divisions and turf wars between unions.  
Another idea afloat is to change the Act to include many types of workers currently 
excluded. Other than the always savvy New York City Taxicab Workers Alliance, almost all of 
the “excluded workers” represented in the Excluded Workers Congress have called for their own 
inclusion under the Act. The taxicab workers have taken a different position precisely because 
they have built more power than the others among their primary base, taxi drivers, and exercised 
that power using tactics that would be illegal if they were included under the Act, such as wildcat 
work stoppages, work slowdowns, and actions against secondary targets. In today’s climate, 
opening the Act to change is much more dangerous than protecting what we have, a point made 
well by Rich Yesselsen in his article “Fortress Unionism.”  
 
My Dissertation: Mobilizing Versus Organizing 
As some of this literature suggests, victories have been won using a variety of different 
approaches. My hunch is that what I call a mobilizing approach, which is a staff-driven model, is 
only capable of winning under certain restrictive conditions (and in other cases fails), whereas an 
organizing approach, which relies not on staff but instead places the agency for success on an 
ever-expanding base of ordinary people, can win even in the more difficult circumstances. My 
dissertation will investigate what the key factors are that will enable sociologists and 
practitioners to understand when a mobilizing approach can win and when only an organizing 
approach can win. My hypothesis is that the critical factors are going to be how well unions 
understand the degree of power needed to win and whether movement organizations deploy a 
mobilizing or organizing approach.  
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To clarify the degree of power required to win, I will build on a thesis articulated by 
Joseph Luders. Interestingly, his theory about costs structures related to protest is situated in the 
civil rights literature, not the labor literature. He argues that the most successful organizing 
drives in the civil rights movement were those that carried high economic concession costs for 
the racist regime, and those where movement actors could inflict a high degree of economic pain. 
In his article “The Economics of Movement Success: Business Responses to Civil Rights 
Mobilization,”
78
 Luders created what he calls an economic opportunity structure to explain and 
predict outcome of the power of people, that is, of agency. I find it ironic that that he felt a need 
to describe agency as structure, but I also find his argument compelling. His central thesis is 
threefold: 
 
 “First, economic duress is a major proximate cause behind the decision of 
economic actors to make substantial concessions to movement demands; second, two 
general movement-imposed costs can be distinguished, and the uneven vulnerability 
among economic actors to these costs produces distinctive responses; and, third, 
economic sectors vary in their exposure to the costs movements generate.”  
 
The two movement-imposed costs are what he calls the concession cost, that is, how 
much it will cost the business to agree to the movement’s demands, measured against the 
disruption cost, meaning the ability of the activists to create highly effective actions against the 
target.  
What Luders calls the concession and disruption costs is central to my overall analysis 
about power. I will build on Luders’ thesis in what I will call the “power needed” variable in my 
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overall theory of relative success in the new millennium. I hypothesize that success in any fight 
or any contestation waged by movement activists across sectors is absolutely contingent on 
movement actors accurately assessing what Luders’ “ concession costs” before the fight begins. I 
argue that movement actors must reasonably predict the concession costs ahead of time; 
otherwise, they enter the fight without knowing which strategies to deploy, since, as Luders says, 
different economic actors are more or less vulnerable and concession costs are not static: they are 
variable and also contingent on the ability of actors to deploy disruption costs. If, for example, 
the movement actors’ demand is for single-payer health care, if activists fail to understand what 
it will cost the healthcare industrial complex to concede that demand, they might adopt the 
wrong strategy, applying for example what I call a mobilizing model rather than an organizing 
model. An incorrect power analysis might lead people who want to end capitalism to think that 
small numbers of demonstrators occupying public spaces like parks and squares and tweeting 
about it will generate enough power to collapse Wall Street. Others might think that the good 
frames used for or derived from these occupations will marshal enough emotion to suddenly 
overwhelm lawmakers with the revelation that the system is unfair, and the lawmakers then will 
institute a set of fair rules to govern corporate capital. In a more micro-level setting, if movement 
actors were to demand a more equitable funding of the public school system, but never grapple 
with what that would cost or where the money might come from, they would likely apply 
strategies insufficient to generate the power needed for their claim.  
Because my dissertation is focused on relative success more than on absolute failure 
versus absolute success, most of my cases involve examples of mobilizing versus organizing 
models. But the advocacy model is in some ways even more prevalent in the U.S. today, which I 
propose is part of the reason why we have not replicated the kinds of gains achieved by either the 
65 
 
pre-McCarthy labor movement or the civil rights movement. In the chart below, I characterize 
each model as having a distinct approach to power, strategy and approach to people 
  
Chart #2 Types of Collective Action 
 Advocacy Mobilizing Organizing 
Theory of 
Power 
Don’t have one. 
These groups 
tinker with the 
margins, seeking 
one-time wins or 
small policy 
changes with low 
concession costs 
that do not 
permanently alter 
the relations of 
power.  
Mobilizing groups have a 
limited theory of power, if 
they have one at all. They 
tend to either set goals 
more like advocacy 
groups, with low to 
medium concession costs, 
or routinely “win” 
victories that are actually 
quite porous, for example, 
a policy change with no 
enforcement provisions. 
Organizing groups prioritize 
understanding power analysis. 
They aim to alter the opportunity 
structure to favor base 
constituents and diminish the 
power of their opposition. The 
power theory will involve a mix 
of corporate action and state 
targets and offer an understanding 
of the relationship between 
economic, social, and political 
power. Direct action inside and 
outside of workplaces is likely. 
Strategy Gimmicks, smoke 
and mirrors, paid 
media, lots of 
lawyers and 
litigation. 
A blend of staff and 
volunteers, driven by 
staff, engaging in 
numerous smaller actions 
that prioritize good frames 
and good messaging over 
people. Authentic 
messengers from the base 
selected by staff to be 
displayed to media and 
policy makers.  
Large numbers of people who can 
withdraw their services from 
those who rely on them. Frames 
matter, but the numbers are 
sufficient to create a significant 
earned media strategy. 
People 
Focus 
None Grassroots activists.  
That is, people who are 
already committed to their 
cause and will show up 
over and over and over 
again. Tweeting and 
Facebook are key. 
Organic leaders.  
Base expansion through 
developing the skill of organic 
leaders who can recruit new 
people never before involved, 
independent of staff. Face-to-face 
interactions are key.  
  
My hypothesis is that if we are willing to confine our actions to those campaigns that can 
be won with little power, we can specify a set of actions/conditions that will enable us to win; 
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campaigns with those characteristics will win even if they don’t involve the full organizing 
approach. However, if we face a tougher opponent and set of circumstances, victory will only be 
possible if our side meets conditions that enable it to consistently generate very high concession 
costs, with large and expanding numbers of people as the central power lever. 
To explore these issues, in each of my cases I will assess the power required to win and 
whether or not the groups involved understood the power required. I will determine who was 
involved in conducting the research required for the power analysis and whether or not the 
groups devised strategies that fit the power required to win their demands. In the case of groups 
that involved ordinary people in their strategy, mobilizing and organizing groups, I will assess 
what Ganz calls the strategic capacities of the constituent base, rather than only those of the 
leadership team. One method I will use to assess strategic capacity will be an analysis of the 
group’s willingness and capacity to utilize majority strikes, rather than the symbolic ones that 




CHAPTER 3: NURSING HOME UNIONS, WASHINGTON VERSUS CONNECTICUT 
 
This chapter will analyze two radically different approaches to forming and governing 
unions in private sector nursing homes. As a reflection of how diverse big national unions can 
be, I profile and analyze two local unions that are part of the same national union, the Service 
Employees International Union (SEIU). 
One model, represented by SEIU Local 775, reflects the strategies adopted by the 
national SEIU under Andrew Stern, president from 1996 through 2009, which I argue 
significantly diminish the role of workers in their own emancipation and have contributed to 
labor’s ongoing decline. The second model reflects the origins and traditions of another local—
1199 New England (1199NE), a union still steeped in the CIO-era influences of its founders—
which has achieved the highest nursing-home standards in the nation. For the purposes of this 
paper, I refer to that particular local union and not to any other inside or outside SEIU, even 
those with “1199” in their official name. I argue that 1199 New England’s organizing model is 
similar today what it was in 1968, when the New York–based union began expanding into new 
regions across the U.S. 
I outline two cases of similarly situated nursing-home workers in which these two 
organizing and governing models were deployed, resulting in disparate outcomes. These 
workers, considered low-skilled and easy to replace, labor for some of the same national 
corporate owners in two blue states, Washington and Connecticut. (I agree with Barbara 
Ehrenreich that the term low-skilled is offensive and wrong: How could work with the sick 
and/or elderly be low-skilled?). In Washington, the union’s strategy was to create a partnership 
with the employer that resulted in twenty-three nursing homes being unionized;
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 a small 
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increase in pay; a constrained and limited set of worker protections; including an absolute and 
“permanent” prohibition on the right to strike; and virtually no difference in benefits for union 
versus nonunion workers. In Connecticut, in a comparable period, the union conducted nearly 
sixty successful union elections, utilizing militant trade-union methods including strikes, and it 
achieved strong contracts that substantially increased pay and benefits, and greatly expanded on-
the-job protections, resulting in the highest standards for U.S. in nursing-home workers. 
Each local union includes thousands of workers of other types—primarily from the public 
sector—and each has achieved real gains in the public sector. But until very recently—since the 
writing of this dissertation commenced—organizing and bargaining in the public sector has been 
considered considerably easier than the private sector. My focus here is on the years 2000 
through 2014, when the general rule that the private sector was by far a harder test of 
unionization efforts held true. 
I will argue the approach of each effort was far greater than any state-level factors, and this 
accounts for the difference in outcomes. Outcomes in this chapter focus on relative success, and 
pose the question, what is built or developed from each of the two unions’ “success?” I conclude 
with a consideration of the national SEIU corporate allied-business unionist model for 
contemporary labor organizations and suggest that the relative strengths of the 1199NE model 
are capable of developing powerful member-led unions, the kind of unions needed to rebuild 
labor in a hostile climate. 
 
Local 775, Origins and Approach to Private Sector Nursing Homes 
On November 6, 2001, in Washington State, ballots were being counted on Initiative 





initiative passed overwhelmingly, setting the stage for the creation of a new SEIU union, Local 
775. At the time the ballot initiative passed, however, there was no plan for the creation of yet 
another local in the state of Washington. Washington already had three local unions of the SEIU, 
1199NW (North West), which represented registered nurses in hospitals, clinics, and other 
healthcare settings; Local 925, a local of mainly classified staff at the University of Washington, 
and eventually additional types of workers; and Local 6, which began as a Janitors union, and by 
2001 also had nonnurse hospital and healthcare staff, nursing-home workers, and a smattering of 
other workers. 
The original plan was that after the ballot initiative passed, homecare workers would be 
folded into Local 6, already a local with nonprofessional status nursing-home workers and other 
health-care workers. (There were never enough janitors in downtown Seattle to make it a 
nationally significant focus for Justice for Janitors- janitors in one of the largest area employers, 
Boeing—were direct hires not contractors so they were members of the International Association 
of Machinists, IAM). Before the national union could attempt to organize homecare workers in 
Washington, they had to have changed the opportunity structure of the state of Washington. Like 
in most of the nation in early 2001, homecare workers were considered independent contractors. 
Fresh off the big victory the union achieved in Los Angeles in 1999 (mentioned in chapter two), 
SEIU wanted to now attempt to create a statewide—not municipal, such as in Los Angeles—
strategy. Because David Rolf, the person credited with driving the strategy in Los Angeles, was 
white man and within SEIU, it was considered problematic to make him the first leader of the 
new union in Los Angeles, which was comprised of 74,000 mostly African American and Latino 
female homecare workers. 
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Andy Stern wanted to reward David Rolf for his Los Angeles success, and, as was customary 
under Stern’s leadership, he suggested that Rolf move to Seattle. Rolf initially became staff at 
the Washington State SEIU Council—the political lobbying arm SEIU established in each state 
that works across the local unions. When the longtime leader of Local 6, Marc Earls, announced 
his plan to retire, Rolf was quickly shifted to staff at Local 6 which conveniently already had the 
jurisdiction for long-term care, nursing homes. Without wasting a lot of time, Rolf announced he 
was running for President and put together a slate, inviting an indigenous leader, Sergio Salinas, 
to run with him as the number two spot, the position of Secretary-Treasurer. Salinas had been a 
union leader in his country of origin, El Salvador, where he had actually been jailed for his union 
activism. He came to the United States as a refugee. He started working as a janitor in Seattle, 
became an organizer, and, had broad popular support among the rank and file base.  
Part of the difference in the SEIU model is that often the staffs of local unions are also 
members of it, regardless of whether they came from the rank and file. As such, Rolf had become 
a member when he got sent there by Stern. The plan between Stern and Rolf that Rolf would 
become President with Marc Earls stepping down became complicated when Salinas decided to 
rebel against Andy Stern and David Rolf’s plan. It turned out that Salinas had put together his 
own, different slate, too, which he announced as he filed his own petition for election with a full 
slate on the final day when signatures could be gathered. In essence, he had outfoxed Stern and 
Rolf. 
To quickly fix the urgent problem created by the indigenous leadership, successfully 
rebuffing what they perceived as something similar to a hostile corporate take-over, Stern and 
the national legal team invoked the national union constitution. They created hearings and 
rearranged the structure of other locals in Washington, taking nursing-home and all healthcare 
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jurisdiction away from Salinas and Local 6 by creating a new long-term care local, 775, and 
assigning jurisdiction for non-nurse hospital workers to the local that had historically consisted 
only of registered nurses, 1199NW.
81
 In the end, all long-term care jurisdiction was consolidated 
into a new local where Rolf didn’t run the risk of losing an election; he was declared the head of 
the union because it was new. To date, the Washington local has unionized twenty-three nursing 
homes under 775 contracts, and there has never been a strike in any of them. Several other 
nursing homes were given to Local 775 as part of the transfer of the nursing-home jurisdiction. 
David Rolf was and is a protégé of Andrew Stern; he may be the closest adherent to Sternism 
in the union today. He and Stern sound indistinguishable when they speak of their shared belief 
that unions are a last-century concept. Harold Meyerson, writing in the American Prospect,
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links Stern and Rolf throughout the article: “Rolf studied how Silicon Valley incubated start-ups. 
With Stern, he paid a call on former Intel CEO Andy Grove, that rare Silicon Valley guru who’d 
written critically about American business’s abandonment of American Workers. ‘Grove told us 
he didn’t know enough about the subject to offer specific advice,’ Rolf says. ‘But he did say to 
think about outcomes and treat everything else—laws, strategies, structures—as secondary. That 
made me understand the death of collective bargaining isn’t something we should be sentimental 
about.” Later, in the same 2014 article, Meyerson reports on Rolf’s critics: “Rolf and Stern’s 
attraction to the culture of Silicon Valley, their belief that labor could profitably learn from the 
Valley’s experience with start-ups, and their penchant for business school lingo have only further 
estranged their critics.” Profitably may have been the perfect word choice since both Stern and 
Rolf regularly use the term growth in place of the word organizing.  
Rolf kept his focus in the early years of 775 on a strategy with which he was familiar and had 
prior success with: political deals and homecare workers. In keeping with his frequently 
72 
 
expressed view that collective bargaining is dead and there’s no need to be sentimental about it, 
he had no strategy for the rough-and-tumble world of nursing-home organizing. As Steve Lopez 
discusses in Reorganizing the Rust Belt (mentioned in chapter two), nursing-home operators had 
become first-rate union busters. Lopez, however, was writing this at the exact time, the early 
2000s, describing in detail how another local SEIU union birthed out of 1199—1199P in 
Pennsylvania—was defeating the nursing-home operators in an all-out class struggle. Rolf didn’t 
believe in class struggle, which means he didn’t have a strategy for private sector nursing homes. 
Not until the national union devised a business plan to help the owners of the financially over-
leveraged nursing-home industry, that is. 
The workers in the majority of 775’s nursing homes were eventually unionized through a 
top-down and top-secret agreement as part of a national experiment to partner with nursing-home 
employers in key states. In 2003, the national union staff, under Stern, decided to embark on an 
initiative with nursing-home operators aimed at increasing the pace of growth or density in 
nursing homes. David Kieffer, the director of nursing-home operations for the national SEIU, 
began a series of discussions with CEOs of national nursing-home chains to explore whether the 
corporations were interested in the initiative.
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 No workers were invited to participate in any of 
these discussions, nor were they aware of the meetings. 
Kieffer advanced the national union leaders’ interest, which was growth. The employers 
wanted three things in return for growth deals (for the union this meant card-check or quasi or 
real neutrality in outside the NLRB election-procedure agreements). First, they wanted the union 
to deliver increases in Medicaid spending at the state level, the largest source of their income 
(often called rate reform in policy circles). They wanted tort reform, meaning less liability for 
nursing-home operators if, for example, accidents, deaths, or injuries occurred in their homes. 
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Finally, the employers wanted status quo management rights inside their nursing homes. In 
exchange, they would be willing to offer neutrality in unionization campaigns in some form and 
marginal improvements in the workers’ pay, assuming the union could deliver the increases in 
Medicaid reimbursements to cover the cost. In addition, there was a caveat to the neutrality 
agreement: the employers would select which nursing homes could be organized during the life 
of the accord. If workers at nursing homes not selected by the employer called the union and 
wanted help forming a union, the union would be bound to decline. New Labor has a term for 
when it agrees to create large geographic areas (an entire state, a region of the USA) in which 
workers have no right to form a union, even if they want one: “establishing no-fly zones.” 
In Washington, Rolf embraced the deal immediately, although it would take another year or 
two before the final “Agreement to Advance the Future of Nursing Home Care in Washington” 
could be ironed out; bigger states, such as California, were a priority for the employers (and 
Stern).
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 In 2005 the union and Rolf set to work operationalizing the agreement, but the deal was 
finalized between Local 775 and Washington State nursing-home employers in 2006.
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 That 
same year, 775 lobbied hard and secured sufficient increases in nursing-home funding to trigger 
the local 775’s ability to unionize nursing homes under what was called Phase I of the employer 
agreement. According to the Seattle Times, it was a $20 million transaction; the union had to 
secure $10 million in additional state Medicaid funding and generate a federal match. “In 
exchange, SEIU local 775 got to organize 10 nursing homes, with management’s blessing. The 
750 new workers doubled the union’s nursing-home membership.”
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The same article states that in 2007, the union was to secure $120 million for an unnamed 
number of nursing homes, including funds that had nothing to do with patient care. “For 
instance, about a quarter of the new money in the alliance’s proposal would reimburse for-profit 
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nursing homes for the business and property taxes they pay.” Paul Kumar, the former political 
and legislative director for SEIU’s California health-care local under Sal Rosselli and privy to 
the negotiations, explained the entire national accord as the “wounded duck theory of 
organizing.” By this he meant that the for-profit nursing-home industry had grossly 
overleveraged itself and that the national union’s idea was to cut a deal to bail out what he called 
a “scumbag” industry in exchange for dues payers.
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But the terms of the secret accord between the union and the employers placed severe limits 
on the rights of future union members. The union agreed to prohibit the workers from any form 
of negative messaging or negative campaigning during the life of the agreement. The grievance 
and arbitration clauses are constrained by language stating that any problem not brought to the 
grievance process within fifteen days is null and void. Further, in some agreements, only 
suspension or termination can go to arbitration, which left management as final arbitrator on all 
other issues, just as in any nonunion nursing home. The no-strike clause in the contracts in these 
agreements excluded the two words modifying most no-strike clauses: no lockout. 
The final section of the 775 no-strike clause is highly unusual: 
 
Upon the termination of this Agreement, this Article 23 (No Strike Clause) shall 
remain in full force prohibiting workers from engaging in work stoppage over labor 
contract disputes and the parties shall engage in prompt, binding interest arbitration to 
resolve the dispute. The No Strike Clause shall survive the termination of this 






Workers’ wages in the Washington agreements are considerably below Seattle’s newly won 
minimum wage of fifteen dollars an hour.
89
 And the clauses on wages in the contracts are 
triggered up or down based on whether the union can deliver specified increases in Medicaid 
funding from the state. The final clause of a typical 775 nursing-home contract includes the 
following language: 
 
The Operator, Union and/or Arbitrator shall not establish a collective bargaining 
relationship that would create an economic disadvantage to Operator by requiring 
increases in worker pay, benefits, staffing levels and/or shift ratios that both were not 
adequately reimbursed by Medicaid revenues and prevented Operator’s reasonable 
economic return on operation of the specific Operator-facility covered by this Agreement. 
Operator will not be required to provide financial records to Union or arbitrators. 
[Emphasis added] 
 
Almost fifteen years after launching Washington’s new long term care local, nursing-home 
workers have achieved little more than their nonunion counterparts. The local union, however, 
gained several thousand dues from payers. 
 
1199 New England, Origins and Approach to 
Private Sector Nursing Homes 
 
When the exact arrangement that 775 had accepted was presented to the leaders at 1199 New 
England in 2004, “We told them to go fuck themselves,” says current 1199NE president David 
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Pickus, paraphrasing then president Jerry Brown. When I asked Brown in a recent interview 
what his objections were, he said, “The state is a huge player in nursing homes. It would be great 
if we could make demands for increased nursing-home funding with the industry, to cooperate 
with the employer. So long as we didn’t have to give away the democratic principles of the 
workers running their own union. Our position was we couldn’t sell that which we didn’t own, 
and we didn’t own the workers’ right to make their own decisions in the future. Kieffer and Rolf 
were selling something they didn’t own. We refused to do that.” Brown is now retired, but he 
was the long-time President of what used to be called District 1199 New England, a division of 
the old national union known as 1199. Brown apprenticed directly with and under Leon Davis, 
considered the founder of the national union (see chapter two: Fantasia, Fink and Greenburg, and 
Lopez). 
The two individuals chiefly responsible for creating 1199 were both members of the 
Communist Party: Leon Davis and Elliot Godoff. Davis and Godoff were Russian-born Jews 
shipped to the United States to live with relatives in New York City as young kids during the 
tumultuous Russian revolution period. Both wound up in pharmacy school. Davis dropped out to 
start working with the Trade Union Unity League, an arm of the Communist Party. Godoff 
completed school and became a pharmacist, but he too was quickly caught up in Communist 
Party activism. The two men separately navigated through various splintered attempts to form 
pharmacist unions in New York City, bouncing and being bounced from one purge to the next. In 
1957, they finally met. 
Davis was already president of Local 1199 when he hired Godoff to do exactly what 
Godoff had long wanted to do: expand from organizing only pharmacists into general hospital 
organizing. William Z. Foster, head of the Communist Party during the years that Davis and 
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Godoff were learning their craft, was churning out literature that called on followers to organize 
“every category of workers, not merely a thin stratum of skilled workers at the top.” In his 1936 
Organizing Methods in the Steel Industry, Foster writes, “Organizers do not know how to 
organize by instinct, but must be carefully taught ...” and “Chair-warmers and irresponsibles 
should be made to feel unwelcome in the organizing crew.”
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The methods in which Davis and Godoff were apprenticed were based on a mass-
collective-action, high-participation model anchored in the idea of workers themselves engaging 
in class struggle. Many of Mead’s stages of the development of the I, the Me, and the generalized 
other are evident in the method. Foster argued that “the campaign can succeed only if thousands 
of workers can be organized to help directly in the enrollment of members. This work cannot be 
done by organizers alone… Very effective are small delegations of steel workers from one town 
or district to another and large mass delegations of workers from organized mills to unorganized 
mills.” Among other methods of drawing in new members, music mattered, and so did “social 
affairs such as smokers, boxing matches, card parties, dances, picnics, various sports, etc.,” 
involving the workers and their wives.
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 The Communists understood that workers were 
embedded in an array of important workplace and nonworkplace networks, all of which could be 
best, and to organize on mass scale, accessed only by the workers themselves. Foster describes 
the “list” and “chain” systems,
92
 which are 1930s lingo for building a network of the most 
respected workers inside and outside the workplace who will then mobilize their own networks. 
Davis and Godoff were not enthusiastic about writing manuals. Davis was barely 
functional in written English, and in any case they believed that organizers, paid and volunteer, 
learned in struggle.
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 But a comparison between a fifty-one-page organizing manual
94
 written by 
a longtime 1199 rank-and-file worker-leader, Bernie Mintor, typed up in the 1980s, shows much 
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of the same core technique as Foster’s 1936 Organizing Methods, and includes some identical 
language. Mintor was a rank-and-file worker leader at the Albert Einstein College of Medicine 
who organized his hospital into the union in the late 1960s.
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The method for identifying the most respected workers of each employer has a name: 
leader identification. The methods for persuasion have names too: “Steps to Successful 
Organizing Conversations.” Organizers in the model place very high value on semantics, which 
relates to Mead’s discussion of semantics as significant gestures in a two-way, interactive 
conversation. The process begins with understanding an individual organic leader’s self-interest 
and helping the leader come to their own understanding, through face-to-face discussions, that 
his or her self-interest can only be realized through collective—not individual—action; that is, 
through a union. The entire process of steps in the conversation relate to Mead. If an organic 
leader remains undecided, the next step is taken: “Framing the Hard Choice.” The conversation 




The CIO-1199 model insists that only the workers themselves can identify their leaders. 
Union staff in a private-sector unionization effort are legally barred from entering the private-
sector workplace, which includes the parking lots and cafeterias, so mastering the craft of 
learning who the organic leaders are and persuading them to support the union—so they can 
persuade their fellow workers to do so—is essential to winning the struggle. In a private-sector 
shop, the workers must lead their own “inside” campaigns, almost always in an extremely hostile 
climate. Until very recently, conditions have been different in the public sector; union organizers 
can blend in with the public and routinely walk into most public workplaces to meet up with 
employees themselves, allowing staff to do the work for the workers. The Stern-Rolf model has 
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succeeded better in the public sector arena than in the private sector in part because it didn’t 
require class struggle, merely political behind the scenes financial transactions. 
Jonathan Rosenblum is an experienced observer and participant in this situation. He is a 
third-generation 1199NE-trained union organizer who later went to work for Rolf during Rolf’s 
“start-up” years at 775. He would eventually resign from the local, disgusted by the nursing-
home agreement. Most recently, he was the campaign director of the successful SEATAC $15-
an-Hour Airport campaign. He says, “The first, and in many respects most important job of the 
1199 private-sector union organizer is to unearth who the majority of workers identify as the 
most respected worker in each shift and in each unit.”
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 This takes dozens of painstaking 
conversations, because simple questions like “Who is your leader?” and “Who do you respect 
most?” cannot be asked. The result would be incorrect leader identification, because words like 
leader and respect have imprecise and variously understood meanings. Instead, an organizer 
must ask a long series of questions as part of a longer conversation: “Whom do you turn to when 
you don’t know how to get something done? Why?,” “Whom do you consult if you are worried 
about something at work? Why?” The skilled organizer (whether professional or volunteer) must 
ask dozens of questions like these to identify and understand the organic worker leader in each 
work area and shift.
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On March 20, 2001, months before Rolf was running the ballot initiative to create the 
homecare authority in Washington State in the same year, the largest nursing-home strike in U.S. 
history began.
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 The workers, overwhelmingly women of color, were members of 1199NE in 
Connecticut. When they walked off the job, they already had the highest wage and benefit 
standards of any nursing-home workers in the nation, including a substantial pension (not to be 
confused with a 401(k)), an impressive self-funded health-care plan, a robust employer-paid 
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training and upgrading fund, a two- or three-step grievance and arbitration procedure, and more 
workplace rights than almost any other nonmanagement employee in the United States enjoys 
today.
100
 Jerry Brown, the now retired president for most of 1199NE’s history, said, “The strike 
muscle is like any other muscle, you have to keep it in good shape or it will atrophy.”
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 Since 
the beginning of the new millennium, Connecticut's nursing-home workers have gone on strike 
every year except 2008 and 2011, for a cumulative total of over 100 strikes. The action in 2001 
was a large multiemployer strike; there have also been thirty-eight work stoppages since 2002. 
By constantly engaging in strikes, and by practicing what is called open collective bargaining—
where all workers are encouraged to attend their negotiations—Mead’s role plays are endlessly 
at work in the 1199 model, creating a new sense of the generalized other in relationship to the 
individual. Strikes are Mead’s “critical conditions.” 
 
In the same decade-plus period that Rolf was given the jurisdiction for nursing homes in 
Washington State, 1199NE has run almost sixty successful elections: some big, some small. Like 
the Washington union, 1199 in Connecticut recently signed a multiemployer election procedure 
neutrality agreement—but one negotiated across the bargaining table, with workers in the room, 
in a collective-bargaining process transparent and open to all members of the union. By this 
process, they were able to secure a neutrality agreement, in which the workers surrendered 
nothing and are not bound to limitations in their contractual rights, covering three unorganized 
nursing homes. There are no binding contract provisions or clauses that are “automatically 
renewed,” and the union is not required to lobby for the money to pay the workers. The 




“The parties agree that the Employer will remain neutral and not conduct any 
campaign in any organizing drive conducted by New England Health Care Employees 
Union District 1199/SEIU in any unorganized center [for] long term care or assisted 
living owned or operated by the Employer or any of its related entities now or in the 
future in the State of Connecticut.” 
 
Workers reached the agreement, fighting to expand their union to nonunion homes, 
across the bargaining table, in the final days of 2012. Under its terms, if the union can present 
union-authorization cards from 40 percent of workers from any of the three nonunion facilities, 
the employer must turn over a full employee list and release a letter to all employees declaring 
that during the union’s campaign the employer remain will neutral and will bargain in good faith. 
Any violation of the neutrality agreement goes to “expedited” arbitration, with the final decision 
resting with the arbitrator. The workers at the biggest nursing home under the agreement, St. 
Joseph’s Manor, successfully won their election in July 2014. Despite the neutrality agreement, 
the organizers approached the campaign as seriously as they would have any organizing 
campaign—as a struggle. Rob Baril, the organizing director of the union and the lead on the 
campaign, explained the process: 
 
“We blitzed the home’s workers starting in February. We got a good idea of what the 
issues were and we began to do leader ID by work area. We talked about building to majority 
to fight the boss, and filed for an election with 70% of the workers on a petition. We had 
volunteer member organizers with us in every committee meeting from the same employer. 
They would stand up and say, ‘we won this for you, we expect you to now get strong, be 
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prepared to fight and to strike because we expect you to win a common expiration with us, 
our standards are in jeopardy because you make $3 less than us and you don’t have the 
pension, our future depends on you and you better be ready to stand up and fight.’ ” 
 
Asked why this employer would give a neutrality agreement without asking the workers to 
surrender anything, David Pickus, the lead negotiator in the fight, explained, “We were 
negotiating with five other homes of theirs we already had under contract, so we said, If you 
don’t give us these places, we are going to strike all five homes. They knew from past experience 
we could cause a big problem because we had struck them successfully before.” 
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The Union Difference: What Being a Unionized Nursing Home Worker 
Means in Washington and in Connecticut 
As shown in chart #3, a nursing-home worker in New England, where the minimum wage is 
lower than Washington’s, earns substantially more pay on her first day of her sixth year, and in 
every year of her working life compared with her counterpart in Washington. Three quarters of 
1199-unionized nursing-home workers in New England have employer-paid health care for 
themselves and their families, with minimal copays and deductibles. A majority also enjoy a real, 
defined-benefits pension (“DB” pension). All employees have the right to take sick time that 
doesn’t draw from their vacation time. Finally, they retain the right to strike at the end of each 
contract. Through sustained collective action, including the strike weapon, nursing-home 
workers in New England, have transformed their workplaces and the quality of their lives. 
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In Washington State, where the minimum wage is higher,
102
 negotiated contractual wages in 
most nursing homes are considerably lower than in nursing homes in New England. In addition, 
the contract at many of Washington's organized nursing homes allows negotiated wages to be 
decreased when Washington decreases Medicaid reimbursement rates—guaranteeing operators a 
fixed percentage of revenues from the state while passing the risk of lower revenues on to the 
workers. Moreover, the majority of unionized nursing home workers in Washington have health-
care coverage for themselves only, not for their spouses or children. These bargained-for health-
care plans, as explicitly stated in the 775 union contracts, are to be identical to those of all 
nonunion workers employed by the same owners. Nursing-home workers in Washington also 
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have little opportunity to build retirement savings; they do not enjoy a pension or even an 
employer match on their 401(k). Their contracts specify that their retirement provisions, like 
their health care plans, shall be identical with those of nonunion employees working for the same 
operators.” 
In Washington, 775’s alliance with the employers for a fair election process is controlled by 
the employers and contingent on the union’s making significant gains for the employer in the 
legislature; it places severe limits on the collective bargaining and representation process, it was 
negotiated with no workers in the room, it was confidential,  and it has yielded less than one half 
the number of nursing-home elections as the 1199NE in Connecticut. In an article in the Seattle 
Times,
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 the Washington union’s president David Rolf was quoted as saying, “Wouldn’t it be 
something if people thought unions weren’t about creating problems but they were actually about 
working with management to solve problems? Where is it written that the thing we need to do 




Washington’s Approach Equals Three Sides as Three Sides 
Connecticut’s Approach Equals From Three Sides to Two 
 
In Washington State’s local 775, the employer and the union and the workers are all 
distinct. The union remains a third party, an entity different from the workers, with its own 
interests being advanced through negotiations with the employer to meet the employer’s primary 
objectives, increased revenue, and status quo management rights. The union, in turn, is a 
freestanding entity separate from the workers and has its primary objective met: growth. The 
third group, the workers, gets the least consideration in the negotiations. In this case, there are 
still three sides to the bargain, but the two whose interests lie closer together are the union and 
the employer. These two oppose the primary needs of the workers: stronger shop floor 
protections, a meaningful voice in shop rule-making, and benefits that might lift them out of 
poverty. 
Today, 1199NE continues to run a successful NLRB election program. The workers 
routinely strike and win contract standards better than those of any other nursing-home workers 
in the country; they have converted lousy jobs into fairly decent ones. The only reason that 
1199NE was not placed in trusteeship in 2004—when, on being presented with the framework of 
the Nursing Home Industry Alliance, they told the national union “Go fuck yourselves”—is that 
in 1989, when members of 1199 voted to join SIEU, they forced the national union to sign very 
strategic and legally airtight affiliation language. Under Sal Rosselli, California’s health-care 
workers’ local did not have such language when its own dispute with the national union began 
over this very issue, the Nursing Home Industry Alliance, and it was placed into trusteeship. I 
asked Jerry Brown whether he thought his union would have been trusteed without the presence 
of legal affiliation and jurisdiction language that stipulated that the local union could not be 
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placed in trusteeship without three-quarters of the elected executive board asking to be trusteed. 
He said: 
 
“If we didn’t have strong affiliation language, we would already have been forced to 
merge with the New York mega local right now. The national union would have made 
deals with the nursing home bosses without us. They would have created a new local in 
Connecticut and taken our nursing home jurisdiction away. They’d rearrange everything, 
set up new locals, eliminate jurisdictions; they did whatever the fuck they wanted. And 
they were great about having votes, but they rigged every vote to work in their favor by 
who was allowed to vote. There’s no way we would not have been trusteed.”  
 
 
As these two cases demonstrate, the 1199 tradition is about identifying preexisting 
worker-leaders and connecting with them, then coaching and apprenticing them through the 
inevitable employer fights to come, fights that 1199NE understands can only be won by the 
workers themselves. By contrast, in the Stern-SEIU tradition, the union decides who should be a 
leader based more on community organizing criteria, such as likability; commitment to the 
organization’s agenda, attendance at meetings; ability to follow organizational conversation, 
speak to the media, chair a meeting, and exercise charisma. In the 1199 model, none of those 
factors matter. The only factor that does is that coworkers trust and respect the worker-leader, 
who might not, and often does not, meet something closer to an Alinskyist community 
organizer’s criteria described above. 
According to the former head of the Washington Health Care Association (WHCA)—the 
employers lobbying group, Brendan Williams,
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 “One challenge for the [775] union is [that] 
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they could never get the big players on board, those guys, with the most homes, the national 
players, have so much money they can afford their ideology and ignore the union’s 
partnership offers.” Williams explained that even though he assured the owners that Rolf was a 
decent guy, he could not move them. He encouraged the owners to see “the entrepreneurial 
aspect to it, to set aside ideology and look at the union, they aren’t being ideological, they don’t 
want to bring about the destruction of capitalism, they want to grow just like you want to grow.” 
But by 2007 it appears that the Washington union ceased “growing” in nursing homes because 
the state legislature voted to lock in a multiyear reimbursement rate that was set to last until 
2015. Because Rolf could no longer increase the rates for the owners, he couldn’t draw down 
more election ‘victories.’ 
Conclusion: Robert Michels and Oligarchy versus George Herbert Mead 
and Transformative Participation 
Local 775 has no ability to help nursing-home workers form unions unless they cut a deal 
with the employer of each home. Because private- sector nursing homes are the hardest test of 
social movement work, and since the public sector will soon be as hard as the private sector, the 
local has no strategy.  
In New England, they are having a harder and harder time—the ongoing decimation of labor 
unions across the country and the near-complete acquiescence to the employer-alliance model 
have made the more high participation model more and more challenging. According to the 
current head of 1199NE, David Pickus, “The employers have got it down now, it takes them 
about ten full days to replace the entire staff of a nursing home for good during a strike.” But as I 
will discuss later in this dissertation, by invoking Mead-like interactions with the broader 
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community, I predict there is a way to stay the high participation, broad democracy model and 










CHAPTER FOUR SMITHFIELD FOODS: HUGE SUCCESS YOU’VE HARDLY HEARD ABOUT 
 
This story of five thousand workers at Smithfield Food’s largest production plant in the 
world is a case study of a large, highly transient, ethnically divided workforce who fought for 
and won unprecedented gains in the manufacturing sector in a right-to-work state with the lowest 
union density in the U.S. It examines their organizing strategy, and reveals the key role of 
individual actors, challenging the concept of “leaderless” movements. My study focuses on the 
emotions and ideology that motivated key individuals and guided their understandings of power 
and strategy. I provide evidence that militancy, including a series of wild cat strikes, was central 
to the campaign in question, and allowed the workers to win a union, a strong first contract, and 
raised expectations - gains that have not been achieved with more typical contemporary 
accomodationist union politics, nor in campaigns to increase minimum wages. I describe how 
bottom-up majority participation by the workforce in a fight considered against-all-odds 
motivated and conditioned what became a significant statewide community campaign in a union-
hostile state. I argue that in defeating the company, the workers achieved much more than a 
contract, more than $15 an hour, they won confidence in themselves, including the confidence to 
later help to organize other workplaces. These 5,000 workers are now an important constituency 
in the effort to help change the conversation among thousands of workers in rural North Carolina 
in the 2014 Moral Mondays movement whose leader, the Reverend William Barber, developed 
from seeds planted in this successful union campaign.  
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Two Different Kind of Struggles Get Different Attention 
King County, Washington, has a population of 2 million. Ninety-three percent of its 
people are city dwellers; most of them live in Seattle. The median income is $71,175, and the 
average rent for a two-bedroom house is $1,123 per month.
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 In 2014, there was a successful 
campaign to increase Seattle’s minimum wage to $15 an hour. The story was banner news 
worldwide in print and broadcast media and a cause célèbre for many liberals.  
Meanwhile, without the fanfare of a single national headline, another kind of contract in a 
very different region also introduced a wage of $15 an hour. Bladen County, in southeastern 
North Carolina, has a population of 35,843. Ninety-one percent of those people live in the 
countryside; the rest are in the county’s few small towns. Thirty-five percent are African 
American. The median income is $30,031, and the average rent for a two-bedroom house is $637 
per month.  
In 2008, in the county’s tiny town of Tar Heel, 5,000 workers at the Smithfield Foods 
pork factory voted to form a union with the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW). It 
was the single largest private-sector union victory of the new millennium.
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 It happened in the 
South, in the state with the lowest rate of union membership in the entire country: 3 percent.
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The new, ratified contract guaranteed not only a $15-an-hour wage but also paid sick leave, paid 
vacation, health care, retirement benefits, overtime pay, guaranteed minimum work hours, job 
security through a “just cause” provision, and tools to remedy dangerous working conditions. 
The wage alone far outranks Washington’s; given the dollar’s buying power in Bladen County—
King County workers would have to earn $26.40 an hour to equal it.
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Because the union signed a ‘gag order’ as part of the final deal to reach a ‘fair’ union 
election process, little has been said or written about the campaign since the workers victory. 
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In this chapter I highlight the decisive moments in the campaign where the decisions of 
the key individuals made the difference between winning and losing. I identify these decisions as 
embodying the organizing strategy that differs from New Labor’s mobilizing approach.  
 
Smithfield Foods and Conditions of the Global South  
Within the Global North 
Smithfield Foods is the largest pork producer in the world. It is a vertically integrated 
company that owns tens of thousands of acres of land where Smithfield farmers and contractors 
raise hogs who are then taken to company owned plants for slaughter, production and packing, 
which is then shipped to all 50 states as well as exported to China, Japan and Europe. In the U.S. 
alone, the company markets twelve distinct brands, including Healthy Ones, Margherita, 
Farmland, and Armour. They have another fifty brands globally. Smithfield’s land ownership 
and farms are concentrated in the U.S. south due to lax environmental laws and the lack of 
unions. Two factors expanded Smithfield Foods out of the deep south, the first were a rash of 
acquisitions throughout the 1980s of existing, smaller pork producers, mostly in the Midwest. 
The second was the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. 
NAFTA was conditioned on many domestic rules in the U.S., Canada and Mexico being changed 
to facilitate global capital’s mobility between the three countries.  
One such change was a mandate that Mexico amend its constitution to allow foreigners to 
own Mexican land. Mexico after NAFTA would prove useful to the company because there were 
basically no environmental laws and even less enforcement than the US south. Typical hog farms 
concentrate thousands of animals in small spaces, creating lake-sized waste pools containing a 
toxic brew of blood, bones, and guts mixed with poisons to theoretically stop the waste pools 
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from generating or spreading deadly mosquito-born or other diseases that spread with insects. 
The combination of low to no laws, zero enforcement, and a second NAFTA requirement, the 
ability of Mexican trucks and truckers to drive their rigs across the U.S. border, would make 
Mexico a new, strategic enclave for Smithfield.  
But in the late 1980’s, prior to NAFTA, Smithfield viewed North Carolina as a mini-
Mexico inside the U.S. The workforce had darker skin and spoke English. A big international 
ocean port, a plantation legal culture and lax laws advantaged southeastern North Carolina when 
the company decided to build the biggest hog plant in the world. New York Time’s columnist 
Bob Herbert described the area in a 2006 column, “Spending a few days in Tar Heel and the 
surrounding area — dotted with hog farms, cornfields and the occasional Confederate flag — is 
like stepping back in time. This is a place where progress has slowed to a crawl.”
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 In 1992, the 
plant in Tar Heel opened for production. Thirty two thousands hogs a day are slaughtered and 
processed in this single plant. Five thousand workers staff departments with names like the Kill 
Floor, the Gas Chamber, and the Hanging and Rehanging Rooms. Meat production is considered 
one of the most dangerous jobs in the world, and a Human Rights Watch report in 2005 listed 
five factors that make meat factories deadly to the workers, not just the hogs: Line Speed, Close-




Failure Round I 
In 1993, the United Food and Commercial Workers Union, the UFCW, decided to help 
workers at the new Tar Heel plant form a union. The UFCW was founded in 1979 as the union 
that resulted from several mergers of four older unions, including the Amalgamated Meat Cutters 
and Butcher Workmen of North America, chartered by the American Federation of Labor in 
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1897, which was reformulated by the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the CIO, into a new 
union in 1937 called the Packinghouse Workers Organizing Committee, PWOC.
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 The PWOC, 
a union considered a “Reds” controlled union,
112
 was the union that Saul Alinsky partnered with 
in Chicago in his first-ever community organizing effort called the Back of the Yards Council.
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The UFCW had other Smithfield Foods plants in several Midwestern states already long 
under union contract. But the union presence in Smithfield’s was not a result of contemporary 
organizing by the UFCW, but rather from Smithfield Foods aggressive acquisition during the 
1980’s of smaller companies like John Morrell and Farmland, plants and companies that had 
been unionized by the former Packinghouse Workers Organizing Committee in the decades prior 
to the election of Ronald Reagan and his launch of a pronounced effort to deunionize America. 
But the Tar Heel plant dwarfed all other facilities in size, workforce numbers, and, production 
output. The union understood that its ability to hold or set decent standards in its older 
Midwestern meatpacking contracts would be eroded or threatened if it couldn’t organize a union 
in the shiny new factory, the biggest facility in the world. The plant was so massive that its 
arrival instantly altered the balance of power between the union and company. The plant had 
been open for one year when the UFCW first attempted a union drive in 1994. The UFCW 
approached the organizing drive as if it was still the early 1970s and followed the standard legal 
playbook which requires getting 30% of the workers to sign union authorization cards, then 
filing for an election at the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).  
The company also followed a standard company playbook, though unlike the union, 
theirs was updated for the post Reagan era and systematically broke almost every law on the 
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books including intimidation, threats and even violence. The company beat the union, 704 votes 
for the employer, 587 for the union, in a low turnout election. But Smithfield violated the 
National Labor Relations Act so egregiously that the already underfunded and understaffed 
NLRB managed to prioritize conducting an investigation into election abuses and reports which 
had been filed by workers through the union. Three years later, in 1997, the NLRB concluded 
their investigation and found the company committed a series of flagrant violations in 1994, and, 
ordered a new election to be held.
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The union in those years could gently be characterized as inept. Its leadership seemed to 
have missed Reagan’s election and the big business clarion call to wipe unions out of the private 
sector through union busting, trade deals, automation, and relocation to non-union states. Joseph 
Luter III, the third generation family CEO at Smithfield, met with a senior official of the UFCW 
shortly after the NLRB ruling and made a personal promise in writing not to break the law. The 
union approached the second election with almost the same playbook as the first disastrous 
election, resulting in a second and even more disastrous election defeat, 1910 votes for the 
employer, 1107 for the union.
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New Labor is Elected, Still More Failure Round II 
But by the 1997 election, one substantial factor affecting workers had changed; the first 
contested election ever at the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (AFL-CIO) resulted in new leadership at the top of the house of organized labor. 
Even though the UFCW had campaigned vigorously against the winning slate, clearly aligning 
itself with an older generation of unionists interested in the status quo of slow death, the new 
team at the AFL-CIO was beginning to make changes at the state level in the State Federations 
of Labor, and, even one level down, at the level of the Central Labor Councils. In a last ditch 
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effort, the AFL-CIO in North Carolina, seeing the handwriting on the wall coming in the 1997 
Smithfield election, persuaded the UFCW to mobilize some community support for the workers. 
They assigned Roz Pellas to try to help the union in its Smithfield drive. Pellas was a well-
known North Carolina activist who had recently been hired as part of the new wave of reform at 
the AFL-CIO, and she was assigned to the North Carolina Federation of Labor. 
“We were called in six weeks before the election, and, even though we were able to 
broaden the campaign beyond the plant gates in 1997, by talking to Black ministers, and, tribal 
chiefs, it was too little, too late. They (the union) had never done this before, worker organizing 
and community organizing at the same time. It was simply too late, the approach was right, but it 
has to be from the beginning not slapped on in the end.”
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 Pellas, the only woman who was 
allowed into the National Labor Relations vote count during the 1997 election, described in 
horrific detail the scene during the second election, conducted over three days in 1997, “It was a 
defeat in many ways, not just the numbers, we were being chased down the stairs by goons, the 
NLRB agents were hiding under the voting tables, the company was having people arrested 
outside as they tried to come in and vote, Smithfield had hired and deputized their own police 
force dressed in riot gear and stationed them all around the plant for the election, forcing workers 
to do something like walk-the-plank if they attempted to vote in the election.” Over 100 labor 
law violations were filed by the union against the company resulting from the 1997 “election.” 
Pellas described it as something beyond a defeat, more a beat down of epic proportions; the kind 
of defeat intended to drive futility, along with fear, into the hearts and minds of workers lest they 
ever think about a union again. 
After their drubbing in 1997, the union again walked away from the workers, this time, 
walking away from 1,901 workers who had voted yes, abandoning contact with them. While the 
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union turned to the legal fight, there was an explosion of Mexicans into the region over the next 
decade, the direct result of NAFTA and Smithfield scooping up hog farms in Mexico. As 
Smithfield displaced workers on previously Mexican-owned lands, it dislocated Mexicans in 
Mexico and helped persuade them to cross the border to work in the big, new plant in North 
Carolina. This was a perverse and extreme extension of the concept of Smithfield’s vertical 
integration.
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 This decision to twice walk away from the workers can be contrasted with the 
decision Steve Lopez discusses in Reorganizing the Rustbelt, where 1199P organizers began to 
plan every immediate next step with the workers at Rosemont Pavilion.  
What began as a legal battle over the one hundred labor law violations that had taken 
place during the election became a case study in how the laws are stacked against workers. At 
every turn, the National Labor Relations Board would rule in favor of the workers and against 
the company. And, every time this happened, the company dragged out and stalled an appeal to 
the next level. This legal fight went on for nine years, from 1997 to 2006, until the case reached 
the U.S. Court of Appeals, which also ruled in favor of the workers and against the company. 
Facing only the Supreme Court as their last option, and, with the likelihood the court would 
decline such an appeal based on the bevy of evidence produced against the company, Smithfield 
stopped their endless appeals. After more stalling and legal delays, things as simple as first 
delaying when a hearing would occur due to very busy schedules, then, having the company 
lawyers call in sick the morning of an already delayed hearing, the U.S. Court of Appeals issued 
an unusually strongly worded demand to reinstate workers who had been fired in the 1997 




Key Factors that Conditioned a Win in Round Three 
 I am arguing that four key factors changed in the mid 2000’s that set the stage for a 
victory where none had been believed possible. The four factors integrate structure and agency, 
weaving together a tapestry of factors that alone could not have produced a victory. The mix of 
structural and strategic factors that were decisive to the win include: [In this section I lay out 
what I am arguing are the four key factors that set the stage for a victory. I describe the 
empirical, grounded conditions (a la Gramsci) through which the more general principles of 
organizing I am highlighting came to make sense….] [or something] 
1) A change in the leadership of the national union, which led to a change in the staff 
leadership of the campaign, changes which radically altered the vision of the union, 
including the purpose of the union (ideology) 
2) The role of the workers and the development of a militant, “inside” the worksite 
campaign, placing workers at the center of the struggle 
3) The development of a North Carolina community campaign that changed the frame of the 
campaign and put community leaders as key secondary actors in the fight 
4) The creation of a national consumer campaign against Smithfield, bringing national 
leverage 
The Purpose of the Union Changes 
The National, Elected Leadership 
The first change was in the leadership of the national union. Joe Hansen, originally a rank 
and file meat cutter from Milwaukee, was elected UFCW president in 2004. Hansen represented 
a significant departure from his predecessor, Douglas Dority, the union’s second president who 
was initially appointed to his position by the union’s executive board. Dority was strongly 
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aligned with the business unionist old guard of the national labor movement. During the AFL-
CIO’s tumultuous 1995 election, the first contested election in the organization’s history, he 
acted as chief campaigner for Thomas Donahue, the status quo candidate. In 2003, five unions 
formed a coalition inside of the AFL-CIO called the New Unity Partnership, the NUP. This 
group represented a group of unions that were demanding changes in the direction of the AFL-
CIO, pushing it towards more effective organizing. Dority again refused to enter the rebellious 
team. Upon Joe Hansen’s election, he immediately signaled a change in the union’s image and 
actions by realigning the UFCW’s position in the debate and by joining the NUP leaders. By 
2005, Hansen went from merely aligning with to becoming the leader of the NUP unions who 
would soon break away from the AFL-CIO to form the rival national labor federation, the 
Change-To-Win federation, arguing that much more aggressive organizing was not only needed 
but urgent. These were big changes for the UFCW in a short time period. 
Late in 2004, not long after Hansen was elected to his new post, but seven years after the 
second attempt at a union election at Smithfield in 1997, the National Labor Relations Board 
issued a one hundred seventy five page decision in favor of the workers and against the 
company.
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 Smithfield immediately appealed the ruling, but Hansen began to send organizers 
down to North Carolina, confident that at some point, Smithfield would exhaust all appeal 
options. The organizers he sent were inexperienced with the exception of one skilled lead 
organizer. Despite sending a team, the national union spent one year in a kind of schizophrenia 
about whether or how to commit to a new campaign on the ground, inhibiting any real progress. 
They opened up a small worker center, aimed mainly at mutual assistance efforts for the now 
majority Latino workforce in the plant. By providing basic immigration legal services and 
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responding to other, largely non-workplace issues facing the new Latino population in the area, 
they began to make worker contacts.  
This change in the national union set the context for the UFCW’s decision in 2006 to go 
all-out to win at Smithfield, and, to radically change the strategy. Since Hansen had led his union 
out of the AFL-CIO on a pledge to organize the unorganized, he was under pressure to deliver a 
big organizing win for the union. In January of 2006, four months before a U.S. Court of 
Appeals issued a strongly worded order compelling Smithfield to follow the National Labor 
Relations Board’s legal order, Hansen began a new round with Smithfield with urging and some 
support from the new Change-To-Win Federation. In some ways, this removed internal 
obstacles—including staffing decisions—within the union that might have slowed the campaign 
at Smithfield. A new Campaign Director was hired to run Smithfield, under the aegis of the 
Change-To-Win Federation but with heavy funding from the UFCW. 
The Staff Leadership 
In campaigns to help workers form new unions where none exist, the full-time staff of the 
union determines how union resources will be used because there is not yet a local union run by 
rank and file workers. The staff at this stage, therefore, plays an outsized role in encouraging or 
discouraging worker activism, participation, levels of militancy, and more, in addition to setting 
the framework for what a union means to workers who have never had one. In North Carolina, 
the state with the lowest union density in the U.S., just 3%, no workers interviewed for this 
investigation had any prior involvement in, and, in many cases, even knowledge of such a thing 
called a union. How the staff talks about the union, literally the semantics used, in addition to 
key decisions made, condition the future of what kind of union will be created by the workers. 
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Mead talks about semantics as significant symbols and every successful organizer plays very 
close attention to semantics. 
In the previous attempts to unionize the factory, in 1994 and 1997, it seems the staff was 
inadequate for the task. No matter how many workers wanted the union in the beginning of the 
campaign in 1994, few understood how the employer would respond. How could they? Had they 
been in a union stronghold, such as healthcare in New York City, it might be possible. But in 
rural North Carolina, as workers later described it, many had never even heard of such a thing as 
a union. This situation demanded organizers who had sufficient know-how to be able to teach 
and coach worker leaders through what experience would have led them to believe, given the 
stakes, the location, and more, was going to be a very hard fight.  It was blatantly obvious from 
the scale of the violations of the first election in 1994 that the company would repeat if not 
double down their behavior in the 1997 election. And, with no fines or penalties assessed to the 
employer for their illegal behavior in the 1994 election, there was no incentive against a repeat 
performance. One of many examples of poor decision making was the decision to hold the 1997 
election. One tool a union can utilize heading into an election is to deploy a tactic called 
“blocking charges.” Blocking charges are when a union gathers evidence from workers that the 
“laboratory conditions for the election” have been so tainted as to render the possibility of a fair 
election moot. The NLRB has to react immediately to “blocking charges” to determine whether 
or not to suspend the election. After assessing the more than one hundred and fifty violations 
filed by the union after the election, the sheer number and types of charges that took nine years 
to investigate, it seems clear the union’s staff leadership, had they been experienced, could have 
discussed with the worker leaders an alternate route, filing charges to block the election itself, 
rather than putting the workers through what’s sometimes called a “death march” in union lingo. 
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Overcoming the union’s two prior defeats at Smithfield would surely signal a new day at 
the national union. And, the new union leadership understood that a conventional approach had 
failed twice and would fail a third time, too, if they didn’t change the strategy. Based on the 
repression level deployed by the employer in the first two attempts, they knew they would have 
to bring pressure from outside the workplace to help create room for the workers to sustain the 
campaign on the inside.  By chance, the first person that they wanted to run a new Smithfield 
campaign, an internal candidate, had to back out of the role for family reasons (he couldn’t spend 
the time needed in North Carolina). Their second choice became Gene Bruskin, a long-time and 
respected campaigner working in the union movement. Bruskin’s main identity for decades in 
the labor movement had been as the elected Secretary Treasurer at the Food and Allied Services 
Trade (FAST) Department of the AFL-CIO, where he was mentored by Jeff Fiedler.
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In the book, Restoring the Power of Unions,
121
Julius Getman credits the leaders of FAST 
generally and Fieldler, the elected President of FAST and Bruskin’s mentor, specifically, with 
helping to invent the modern comprehensive campaign, experimenting through the 1980’s on 
blending high levels of worker engagement and agency along with non-worker pressure into one 
effort.
122
 Crucially, the comprehensive campaign model that FAST was developing in the 1980’s 
was not simply a corporate campaign. Corporate campaigns typically downplay if not outright 
ignore the workers in the effort to use a leverage strategy against an employer. Comprehensive 
campaigns, by contrast, place equal priority on what’s called the “inside strategy,” meaning the 
workers inside the plant, and, combine that with the “outside strategy,” meaning other forms of 
leverage.   
Bruskin is a working class Jew who was raised in Philadelphia. “I definitely describe 
myself as a leftist and have since the 60s, I am a child of the 60s anti-war, anti-racist, anti-sexist 
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movements. I didn't get involved in the labor movement for ideological reasons—in 1977 I was 
driving a bus because I was doing community theater and needed an income and we went on 
strike to demand a union election and they put me in jail. My politics were central to everything I 
have done in the labor movement.”
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 By the time he was hired to run the Smithfield campaign, 
he had been a founder of another organization, U.S. Labor Against the War, formed in 2003 as a 
reaction to George Bush’s war against Iraq. He had worked on Jessie Jackson’s Rainbow 
Coalition campaign effort in the early 1990s, and done extensive solidarity work with liberation 
struggles in Central American, South Africa, the Middle East, and the Philippines. I argue 
Bruskin’s leftwing politics significantly informed the organizing strategy he used, a strategy that 
kept the focus on the workers themselves engaging in class struggle. 
Describing his entry to the Smithfield fight, “I came in as an outsider. I didn’t know meat 
packing. Fiedler said, ‘give it to Bruskin.’ So I made a deal with them [the UFCW] which was I 
will go on loan to the UFCW if you want me to do this, I am going to hire my own staff, put 
together my own Smithfield team, control my budget, and you can’t take my people away from 
the campaign for any reason, I don’t care if you have nine decertification campaigns going 
someplace else, you can’t touch my team.”
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 When he met with Joe Hansen, Hansen told 
Bruskin, “Luter (Smithfield’s CEO) will never give in, I’ve talked to him, he will never give us a 
deal.”
125
 Bruskin thanked Hansen for “giving me the chance to organize the biggest meat 
packing plant in the world. I wanted to say, ‘I’d do this for free,’ but I didn’t, I just thanked 
him.” Bruskin’s years of work with Fiedler orientated the subsequent campaign, a campaign 
where Bruskin would at times have to beat back the union’s attempts to downscale, downsize, 
and diminish the worker’s role in the campaign. It was Bruskin’s long experience in unions that 
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gave him the foresight during his personal hiring negotiations to place a fortress around his staff 
and negotiate some autonomy that conditioned the subsequent campaign.  
Workers as Primary Actors 
“They pissed off the wrong motherfucker.”
126
 
Kieth Ludlum, Smithfield Employee Fired for Union Activism 
 
Bruskin was put in charge of this campaign at the height of the debate between unions in 
the AFL-CIO and the break-away unions of the Change-To-Win Federation. Most of CTW’s 
leaders were being heavily influenced by SEIU, especially when it came to central questions of 
worker agency in campaigns. As I will describe in this section, there was growing pressure on 
Bruskin to stop focusing so much on the workers. I begin this section by describing the context 
of how intense the previous fights were, and, just how skilled some of the workers leaders 
became because of their experience in struggle.  
A nine-year legal battle culminated in early 2006. On May 5
th
, the U.S. Court of Appeals, 
DC Circuit, issued an order for the “Enforcement of an Order of the National Labor Relations 
Board.”
127
 The strongly worded eleven page ruling affirmed the NLRB’s one hundred seven five 
page order issued on December 16
th
, 2004. The December 16
th
, 2004 NLRB order was itself a 
result of the employer appealing the initial decision in favor of the workers, a four hundred plus 
page decision by what is called the NLRB’s Administrative Law Judge or ALJ on December 
15
th
, 2000. Administrative Law Judges hold hearings that are much like a trial, but within the 
National Labor Relations Process, where both sides present their cases, with witnesses, lawyers, 
evidence, etc. Though the workers “won” at this first stage, which the employer had already 
slowed down by taking an extra-long time in scheduling hearings, providing required documents 
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and more, the employer appealed. Four years later, the workers won again. And, the employer 
appealed, again. Two more years later, the workers won for the third time and still no election 
nor any action at all took place with the workers due to company’s effective legal strategy; stall.   
In 2002, long after the initial trial was concluded, after the case had been heard and was 
working its way through employer appeals, a whistle blower emerged. A manager quit, a 
manager who had been in the human resources department at Smithfield and who had been part 
of the team that disciplined and fired union supporters. Even though the trial had been wrapped 
up two years earlier, the union engineered for the manager to present testimony, under sworn 
oath, before a Congressional committee. She gave alarming details in her testimony including 
that Smithfield told her to engage in illegal activity or she herself would be fired.  
The former human resources manager, Sherri Buffkin, told the U.S. Senate Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee in 2002. “I’m here because Smithfield Foods asked 
me to lie on an affidavit and made me choose between my job and telling the truth. I’m here 
today to tell you how Smithfield Foods sought out and punished employees because they were 
union supporters, and that the company remained true to its word that it would stop at nothing to 
keep the union out.”
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 While this evidence came outside of the earlier trial court process inside 
the NLRB, because it was sworn under oath before Congress, and, because the manager testified 
that her own affidavits used by the employer in the trial were falsified, this testimony was 
referenced by the subsequent legal orders. 
The contents of the eventual order took one hundred and seventy five pages because the 
employer had violated so many laws, each one of which was investigated. For example, in the 
order itself, in section one, the company had to “cease and desist” a series of behaviors. There 
were so many “cease and desist” orders that the NLRB judge exhausted the number of letters in 
107 
 
the alphabet, starting over after “z” and creating “aa,” etc. On page fourteen, starting with letter 
“a”, which stated, the employer shall cease and desist from “Threatening employees with plant 
closure if they select the Union as their collective bargaining agent,” and going all the way 
through “z” to letters “ee,” which read, “In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or 
coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights.” Letters “x” through “aa” offer sobering 
insights and evidence of what the employees had faced in the 1997 election, with orders for the 
company to “cease and desist from” 
“x”  Threating employees that wages would be frozen if the Union were elected as the 
collective bargaining representative; 
“y”  Assaulting employees in retaliation for their union activities. 
“z”  Causing the arrest of employees in retaliation for their union activities. 
“aa”  Threatening violence in retaliation for employee activities.  
 
In language related to the above letter ‘y’, the document reads,  
 
In the cafeteria after the ballots in the 1997 election were counted and it became 
apparent that the Union had lost, [manager] Null and Plant Manager Larry Johnson told 
Anthony Forrest, an observer for the Respondent, “to go kick Chad Young’s ass.” 
Forrest then approached Young, and pushing and shoving began in the cafeteria. 
 
Young had been an observer for the union and the employers physically beat him in 
public, just to make the point that not only would the workers lose the election, but union 
supporters would get beat up in front of coworkers, and lose their job. Later in the NLRB order, 
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the judge describes how each of ten workers were illegally fired, and, stipulates the terms for 
their rehire, and, an order to “make them whole,” meaning pay any loss of back wages from the 
nine years in between. Most of these fired workers had long since found alternative employment, 
died, or, moved.  
By June 27
th
, 2006, Smithfield was forced under threat of the US Court of Appeals to 
post a legal “Notice to Employees, Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of 
Appeals, Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.” This notice was posted at 
every time clock and in every break room. Moreover, because of the companies glaring 
violations, the NLRB made Smithfield mail this to every single employee who had been 
employed from 1997 to the present. In addition, the NLRB ordered the company to have an 
actual NLRB agent enter the factory and, over the course of several days, read the order out loud 
in employee meetings. Though the U.S. Court of Appeals ordered a new election, the union 
understood that a third election without a pre-agreement for employer neutrality, union access to 
the inside of the facility, or some kind of accord limiting their anti-worker behavior would be 
futile. The union’s goal became securing a “card check and neutrality agreement” whereby the 
employer would legally recognize the union as the certified collective bargaining agent once a 
majority of workers had signed union authorization cards.  
The conditions at the Smithfield Tar Heels factory were so bad before the union that some 
workers joked that there was 100% turnover every day. A New York Times reporter, Charlie 
LeDUFF, went undercover and worked in the Smithfield factory in 2000, for what became part 
of a Pulitzer Prize winning series on race in America. Quoting from LeDUFF’s article, 
“Slaughtering swine is repetitive, brutish work, so grueling that three weeks on the factory floor 
leave no doubt in your mind about why the turnover is 100 percent. Five thousand quit and five 
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thousand are hired every year.”
129
 LeDuff reported that Blacks and Latino’s got the dirtiest jobs, 
with the Latino’s being the absolute bottom of the dirty jobs ladder, along with prisoners in full 
prison uniforms often allowed to work just prior to their release, to earn a little money. 
According to union reports, the turnover at Smithfield actually was nearly 100% each year. They 
had received the “Excelsior Lists” three times; employee lists that employers must give to the 
union when the NLRB has declared an election will take place. Five thousands employees were 
different each time, save for 200 names that overlapped. In the first election in 1994, a majority 
of the plants employees were Black. By the 1997 election, some 35% to 40% were Latino, the 
rest divided up with Blacks, Indians (Lumbee, mostly) and whites. The Center for Immigration 
Studies reported that during the 1990’s, the Latino population in North Carolina ballooned faster 
than any other state in the U.S., a 394% increase from 76,726 to 378,963.
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By the time the union received the list again in 2006 as part of the court order, roughly 
60% of the plant was Latino.
131
 And by the time of the election, the Latino number would fall 
again to 26%.
132
 High turnover is often used as an excuse for union defeat, or union inaction, but 
high turnover had little to no effect on the results in these elections. The workforce was primarily 
African American in the first election and that did not lead to a yes vote, despite the common 
moniker of academics (including Bronfenbrenner) that Blacks vote for unions.
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According to 
the Congressional testimony of the former manager Buffkin, it was the employer’s intent to 
replace Blacks with Latino’s with two objectives in mind: (1) to keep the workforce divided with 
constant racial instigations and overt segregation, and, (2) the employer believed they could 
more easily control undocumented Latinos.
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 While the employer succeeded at driving racial 
division between 1997 and 2005 in the  absence of a union campaign, a key to the union’s 
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success would be first earning legitimacy with each major constituency in the plant, and then, 
bridging the divide and sowing unity and solidarity.  
Gene Bruskin learned early in his tenure as campaign director that the employer’s 
calculation about the timidity of the Latino’s was wildly off base. Immigrant rights organizations 
had declared May 1, 2006 to be a national “strike” by immigrant workers. A few weeks before 
May 1, Latino worker leaders approached the union to tell them they planned to participate in the 
national strike. This would be the first walk out on the new staff directors watch, but the second 
in three years. “The workers decided to strike and asked for our help to organize a large march 
and we did what they asked,” according to Bruskin. While this meant union organizers were 
encouraging the May 1 walkout, there’s no doubt that an earlier wild cat walk out in 2003 by 
Latino cleaners had nothing to do with the union; the union had no presence at all during the 
2003 action. 
 For May 1, the union was laying low, waiting for the US Court of Appeals ruling. The 
UFCW assembled a meeting with workers, the main Latino radio station DJ, Catholic priests in 
the area, and the soccer club President, to make a plan. Bruskin set the stage for many 
subsequent responses to such actions by directing staff to order 5,000 t-shirts that said, 
“Immigrant rights are worker rights.” They also made a leaflet linking Cesar Chavez to Martin 
Luther King, Jr., to distribute along the march. On May 1, over 2,500 Latinos refused work and 
joined even more in a march that by local standards was the largest people could remember in 
Tar Heel. They returned to the plant the next day, and, the employer, hoping to not alienate them 
just as the courts were sputtering out their legal orders for a new union election, actually waived 
employer action against this group of Latinos. By late June, after the NLRB forced management 
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to post, mail and discuss their many violations of the law, conditions inside the plant would pick 
up where the May 1
st
 action had led off, and, slowly escalate for the next 18 months. 
Included in the U.S. Court of Appeals order was a demand that the employer offer ten 
workers illegally fired in the campaigns in the 1990’s their jobs back. The order also included 
making the workers “whole,” which means financially compensating them for loss of wages. 
Order number 1 was the cease and desist order mentioned earlier. Order number 2 was: 
 
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. 
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer Lawanna Johnson, Keith 
Ludlum, George Simpson, Chris Council, Fred McDonald, Larry Jones, Ray Shawn 
Ward, Margo McMillan, Tara Davis, and Ada Perry full reinstatement to their former 
jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, offer them substantially equivalent positions, 
without prejudice to their seniority and other rights or privileges previously enjoyed. 
 
Of the list of ten employees, nine accepted the financial compensation and never returned to 
Smithfield. One worker, Keith Ludlum, wanted his job back. 
Ludlum was fired from the Smithfield plant during the ’94 election, taken out in 
handcuffs.
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 Even though the NLRB ordered that he be reinstated in time for the 1997 election, 
the company refused to reinstate him.
136
 His termination and the company’s refusal to follow the 
first order for reinstatement were rolled into the longer legal battle. Ludlum is white, a North 
Carolina native, and a Desert Storm veteran who, to the shock of just about everyone, accepted 
his offer to return to his job in 2006. By then Ludlum had a new life and was making good 
money as a construction contractor, much better money than he would make walking back into 
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nonunion Smithfield. But Ludlum had unfinished business at the plant. In his own words, “They 
pissed off the wrong motherfucker.” After a pause, he said, “Not sure I should be quoted saying 
that? But when you escort people out with sheriff’s deputies, in handcuffs, we tend to not accept 
that real well. They really pissed me off.”
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On his first day back inside the plant in early July of 2006, Ludlum had a sense of 
confidence that came with the court order from the U.S. Court of Appeal, DC Circuit. “When I 
first went back in, there was no inside campaign, so we started it. The company wasn’t reacting. 
First I figured out some relationships inside, who was relating to who, then I had to make the 
company react. I had to scratch their underbelly. I wrote Union Time across my hard hat. I had a 
mission. They had a mission. The next day, I did it on my raincoat, and, they came after me for 
that. I had to do things so that the other workers could see me winning the battle against them. I 
had a federal court order and I knew the company had to be careful.” Within weeks, he began 
leading direct actions with first dozens, and eventually hundreds, of his coworkers, including a 
sit-down action demanding clean water for the workers inside the plant. From my interviews 
with Ludlum, it was clear his knowledge of labor law, gleaned from the first organizing 
campaign and the subsequent legal fight over his termination, was an incredible asset on the 
inside of the 973,000 square foot maze of a plant.  
“I remember everything, his hat, his raincoat, I remember it all,” Ollie Hunt says, “I came 
to work at Smithfield right after Keith was reinstated. I was right there running hogs stationed 
right next to Keith.” Ollie Hunt is a Lumbee Indian who grew up in Rowland, North Carolina, 
about 40 miles from the factory. His father is pure Lumbee, his mother is white. “I grew up in a 
town with one red light and as a kid I worked cropping tobacco and picking cucumbers.” He has 
two daughters and one son. “My first girl is named Miami Raynie Hunt after my wife, Amy’s, 
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favorite country song; “Miami, My Amy.” The song, by Keith Whitley, was #14 on the Country 
charts and remains their favorite. His wife is Lumbee Indian, too, she’s a youth development 
specialist who has gone back to school to become a Guidance Counselor. “Where I was from, I 
never heard of a union.”
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Within days of Keith’s return, Ollie, Keith and a third emerging union leader, Terry 
Slaughter, all stationed together in the Livestock department, began to plot their course to a 
union victory. Livestock was a key department, because if workers in Livestock stopped letting 
the hogs off the trucks, not only did the line stop, but they could cause a massive traffic blockade 
on major interstate highway. The workers all talked about how easy it is to block the highway. 
With 32,000 hogs a day coming in on trucks, the tactic was guaranteed to work.  
Terry Slaughter was the crew shift leader in Livestock, making assignments about who 
took which station, where, and, generally keeping an eye on the flow of the hogs. This wasn’t a 
management position, but it did mean he knew a little more about hog flow, workers schedules 
and more. Slaughter is Black, from North Carolina originally though he grew up in New York 
City before moving back home to North Carolina. Unlike Keith and Ollie, unions weren’t a 
foreign concept to Terry and he knew people in New York City who had been in the healthcare 
workers union and also in city government unions. He’d left New York to try his hand 
someplace more affordable, where he might get a little house. 
 Slaughter, Hunt and Ludlum would build an inseparable bond during the campaign. As 
Ollie said, “Me, Slaughter and Keith, we had a tight relationship, people would see the white, the 
Black and the Indian, and management knew trouble was coming.” In a factory where workers 
were segregated by department, room, race, language and more, with incredibly loud machines 
running at all times, people were isolated to an unusually high degree. But Livestock workers 
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had to walk through the entire length of the plant to get to their job. This gave them a second 
privilege as power workers; they could see people, and talk, as they walked into and out of the 
plant. It took almost 40 minutes for Hunt, Slaughter and Ludlum to park and walk inside the 
length of the factory to get to the back of the plant to their jobs in Livestock.
139
They would soon 
turn that already-long walk into a saunter, doing union work along the way to and from their 
jobs, which only the worker leaders could do, of course, since staff were barred from going 
anywhere near this factory. More than one hour of face-chat time each day.  
Bruskin says once the leaders established this first small team of worker activists inside 
the plant, they began to map and chart the entire factory, something the union had never 
attempted in the earlier campaigns. The sheer size of the plant was daunting, trying to draw a 
literal map, let alone chart which workers worked where, with who, when, and who related to 
whom and why, was another matter. The Livestock workers were key to helping map the place, 
and, to charting social networks among the workers. They spent the summer and fall escalating 
‘in-plant’ direct actions, and, beginning to build a statewide community support effort and a 
national coalition that would soon launch a consumer campaign against Smithfield, all under the 
banner of Justice@Smithfield, complete with a website, facts about the employers track record 
against its workers, an endless litany of environmental law violations, CEO profits, and, just 
about as good a profile on a company ever done in such a campaign. Top notch research and 
strategic leverage had been one of Bruskin’s expertises coming into the fight, and FAST had 
already conducted years of in-depth research on every aspect of this company. They were 
marching at shareholder meetings, creating on-line petition campaigns and more. The 
Justice@Smithfield campaign was generating national newspaper headlines, as well as local 
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headlines. Workers were constantly challenging the company’s authority inside the plant, 
including sitting down in the plant and backing up the line, the highway, and more.  
By the fall of 2006, there were good union committees being built among the Latino 
departments and also in the Black departments. Bruskin was trying to figure out how to begin to 
build solidarity between Blacks and Latinos and this was harder than usual because management 
had almost perfected the science of fomenting racial hatred inside the plant. The three weeks the 
New York Times reporter spent undercover in the Tar Heel factory led to a searing journalistic 
indictment of company inspired hate. He reported how the whites and Indians hated the Blacks 
and Mexicans; the Mexicans hated the Blacks; the Blacks hated the Mexicans, and the boss 
drove hate.
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Bruskin decided it was time for a Black-Brown weekend picnic among key leaders. 
People were ready to meet and talk as one factory, to emerge from their departmental ethnic 
enclaves. And, just as the plans for the weekend BBQ were launched, Smithfield launched an air 
strike.  
In October, the employer sent several thousand letters to Latino workers saying that they 
needed to prove their immigration status by providing social security numbers that match birth 
certificates. The letters, according to Smithfield, were the result of Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) officials contacting Smithfield and requesting that the employer verify that 
the employees on payroll could prove their legal status by verifying their social security 
numbers. Not surprisingly, and, also likely not a coincidence given the renewed union organizing 
drive and the headway the union effort was making among all of the workforce, this employer, 
known for rogue behavior since the plant opened, took a sudden interest in complying with a 
law, a law that could sow fear into the heart of more than half the factory. By early November, 
the employer sent 550 “no match” letters, informing workers they were unable to verify their 
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social security numbers from the documents provided. And, they fired two dozen workers based 
on bad paperwork. The 550 letters sent a signal that mass firings of Latinos were coming.  
On November 17
th
, 2006, over one thousand Latinos staged a wild cat strike and walked 
off the job, temporarily shutting the plant down, again. Bruskin’s deeply rooted values were 
perhaps best depicted by his response to this action,  “I am on the job for seven months, and 
about to drive down to North Carolina to meet with some workers when I get a call from an 
organizer freaking out, ‘Gene, they’ve just shut the plant down, the Latinos walked out. What 
should we do?’” His reaction to the call underscores the central importance of top staff 
leadership. Bruskin’s response could easily have been, “get them all back to work as fast as you 
can,” (exactly what Bruskin’s supervisor demanded) or “run the other way,” or worse, “hold a 
press conference condemning rogue behavior.” But Bruskin, with his leftist roots, reacted by 
ordering all staff to get “one thousand bottles of water and 100 pizzas to the workers, fast!”
141
 
It’s still hot in southeastern North Carolina in November. 
A handful of non-Latinos walked out in solidarity, workers like Ludlum. According to 
Slaughter, “These firings and then the walk out was a wake-up call to us Blacks in the plant, 
watching Brown people get taken off the line and fired and then others walking out over it sort of 
shook us, like, hey, what are we waiting for? What are we doing about the conditions here? It 
was almost embarrassing how little we were doing.”
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The walk out generated headlines all 
through North Carolina, but also in the New York Times, whose headline declared how unusual 
it was for non-union employees, let along employees with documentation issues, to wild cat in 
the U.S.
143
As soon as the walk-out began, creating a crisis for the employer, the Bruskin and the 
worker leaders decided to dispatch a Catholic Priest, Father Arce of St Andrews Catholic 
Church, to mediate and negotiate with the employer. Smithfield refused to meet with union staff 
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or union-identified worker leaders, so the union found a perfect alternative to handle the 
negotiations, a religious leader who had credibility with the Latinos but was not seen as the 
union. Father Arce was, however, receiving coaching from the Latino members of his parish who 
were also union leaders now acting as brokers between the union staff and the Catholic Priest.
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The worker’s demands were that everyone who walked out be allowed to return to work 
the next day with no reprisals, that the company stop firing people, and that the workers be given 
more time to prove their status. When Father Arce first came out of the meeting with the 
employer with a ‘promise’ from the employer on all demands, the Latino parishioners turned 
union leaders sent him back inside to get it all in writing. They were schooling the Priest that the 
company was not to be trusted. Bruskin understood at the time the pivotal importance that for the 
first time ever, the employer was actually negotiating with employees; the fact that it was with a 
Catholic Priest was immaterial to Bruskin. The mere act of getting recalcitrant employers to 
begin to learn to bargain with employees can be an important first step towards later negotiations 
because the concept has been established.  
On the heels of this walkout, Bruskin and key worker leaders, the very ones who had just 
met for the Black-Brown BBQ, agreed that they needed a way to get the Blacks activated and the 
Blacks  and Latinos acting together. Their idea was to make a demand for Martin Luther King 
Day to be an official holiday at the plant, with paid time off for those who requested it and, 
double time for everyone who had to work shifts that day. The union immediately began to 
produce literature in Spanish and English, with Martin Luther King Junior’s picture on one side, 
and, Cesar Chavez on the other, describing the common values and the liberation efforts of these 
two leaders. Additionally, the demand for Smithfield to honor MLK day was the kind of demand 
the union activists could use to rally the broader community to their cause inside the plant. By 
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the day of the nationally recognized holiday, a majority of workers had signed a petition 




The company finally reversed course but did so in a manner that disguised the workers 
victory; Smithfield announced a new policy to give all workers in all their facilities nationwide 
the MLK holiday, denying their decision had anything to do with worker demands. The euphoria 
was short lived. Two days after Martin Luther King Jr’s national holiday, on January 23
rd
, the 
employer let ICE into the plant and the uniformed-clad immigration officials removed twenty 
one more Latino workers off the lines, in handcuffs, clearly heading for deportation. Anxiety 
moved throughout the plant. By the weekend, the news of the workers having been shipped to 
deportation facilities far from North Carolina had spread along with the fear that any one of 
hundreds if not thousands of employees would be next.  
Rather than have people slink away one by one, worker leaders decided to shut the plant 
down, again. But this time, in an act of defiance as they packed up and left. On Sunday, January 
28
th
, over two thousand Latino’s walked off the first shift and shut the plant down 
immediately.
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 But this time, people left for good. There were no parking lot negotiations 
between Catholic Priests and the employer. “La Migra” or immigration was clearly returning 
soon to deport more workers. Whatever trust the employer might have earned with the 
November decision to allow the workers back into the plant had been permanently ruptured. By 
this time, with almost daily and daring actions by workers on the inside and the employer 




The North Carolina Community as Key Secondary Actors 
“The first time I remember getting called from the union was when the ICE had just 
raided and deported some Smithfield workers. I was driving back from Tennessee that day, 
where I had just been part of starting a new faith formation called ‘the Word and the World,’ an 
effort to bring together the seminary, the sanctuary, and, the streets. To make ‘The Word’ more 
meaningful to the world we live in.”
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Reverend Nelson Johnson, Beloved Community Church, Greensboro, N.C.  
 
The pace of the worker campaign inside the plant was overwhelming the union staff, but 
still insufficient to bring the employer to the table. Bruskin sought out national allies to launch a 
national consumer campaign branding Smithfield Pork as the white meat that came with human 
blood through human sacrifice. A young North Carolina organizer named Libby Manley had 
been an intern on the campaign before Bruskin decided to make her position fulltime, assigning 
her to engage the North Carolina community in the campaign. Because the UFCW had pulled out 
of the national AFL-CIO, the national AFL-CIO wouldn’t assign Pellas again to the campaign, 
but Pellas was committed to the workers and the campaign, no matter what official fissures were 
happening at the national level. Back in the 1997 campaign, Pellas had tapped any and every 
religious leader she knew in North Carolina. Reverend Nelson Johnson had attended college with 
Roz Pellas two decades earlier and they were still friends. Reverend Nelson would emerge as a 
central player driving the North Carolina religious leaders’ response to the workers campaign. 
He understood that framing was going to be key if the workers stood a chance and his earliest 




“First of all, I think community is a framing for all the issues we face, and in this case 
the leading edge of the issue at Smithfield was labor. By calling this a community 
struggle, we began to change the frame and break down the structural division and set it 
up so that if justice is the issue here, than everyone in the community is invited to be a 
part of the campaign. So labor isn’t an ‘other,’ some ‘northern-based’ thing, some ‘anti-




Reverend Johnson decided that the Smithfield workers campaign would be a good North 
Carolina project for his new effort, the ‘Word and the World.’ He hosted a meeting of religious 
leaders from around the region and invited a longtime North Carolina farmworker leader, 
Baldemar Velasquez,
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 to come to the meeting to educate the religious leaders about two issues; 
unions and Latino immigrants. Reverend Johnson’s network was almost exclusively a Black 
preacher network. Immigration was so new that people in the region didn’t understand it. Sarita 
Gupta, the head of Jobs with Justice, the group that would coordinate the national consumer 
boycott, reflects, “It seems hard to believe now, but in 2006, we’d try to talk about the immigrant 
rights sub-struggle taking place in this union fight and people would look at us and say, ‘Huh? 
Immigrants, in North Carolina, in a factory?’ People weren’t quite processing the rapid growth of 
the immigrant workforce in the U.S. south. And, the union was struggling with how to manage 
the conversation around immigration. The Smithfield management was as sophisticated as any 
we’ve seen in pitting people against each other.”
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 Reverend Johnson understood what Gupta did, and Velasquez, that the Smithfield fight 
could be a break-through in many ways for North Carolina in Black-Brown relations, in addition 
to being a potential break-through for the national union in the meatpacking industry and also the 
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South. Reverend Johnson made a point of inviting a longtime colleague of his to attend the 
weekend meeting, a little-known pastor from Goldsboro, the Reverend Dr. William Barber. 
Today, Rev. Barber is regarded as the founder and a key leader of North Carolina’s Moral 
Mondays movement. Back then, he had just made a successful run for president of the state 
branch of the NAACP. He beat a do-nothing incumbent who had routinely accepted financial 
contributions from Smithfield Foods during the horrific period of deportations, firings, and racist 
company shenanigans.  
One of Rev. Barber’s first public acts as president was to refuse a check for $10,000 from 
Smithfield, informing the company that the NAACP would no longer be complicit in the 
company’s abuse of the workers’ human rights. He became a key figure supporting the 
Smithfield workers in their unionization effort and used the campaign against Smithfield to help 
renew a moribund NAACP chapter. Suddenly the workers had a historic civil rights group with 
considerably legitimacy in North Carolina helping to lead the charge, in addition to the emerging 
religious leader’s coalition. Reverend Barber has a narrative of his own about why the third 
election worked: 
 
 “Once the union understood that we had to run a campaign where race was a central 
issue, where race and class were given equal weight and the intersectionality of the two 
was lifted up, and we reframed the fight as a moral fight, we won in just two years. 
People trying to win these fights with morality or race off the table, versus front and 






Reverend Johnson, intent on making the Smithfield campaign a North Carolina community 
fight, proposed that the first action by religious leaders inside of North Carolina would be to hold 
twelve simultaneous pickets at North Carolina’s homegrown and very successful grocery store 
chain, Harris Teeter.
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 He and the team of religious leaders picked these dozen Harris Teeter 
stores based whether or not they had large numbers of Black customers, and, if they had a 
willing partner in their religious network, a partner that could generate sufficient people to lead 
the protests. Harris Teeter’s current website reflects the image conscious nature of the grocery 
store, something the local pastors already understood. The grocery store boasts page after page of 
“famous celebrities” who shop at their stores, including Dick Cheney, Tiger Woods, Tom 
Brokaw, and Wayne Newton, to name a few of the many. The picketers declared that Harris 
Teeter stores needed to stop selling Smithfield’s products until the company began to treat the 
community right. The decision to target North Carolina-based Smithfield pork in North 
Carolina’s home bred and popular chain grocery with North Carolina preachers calling on the 
company to be kind to “the community” was an instant success. Harris Teeter, which had a board 
dominated by evangelical conservatives, immediately began calling Smithfield to demand they 
“get these people out from in front of our stores.”  
 According to Bob Geary, a veteran North Carolina journalist who logged over two dozen 
stories about Smithfield
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 and is currently a columnist at the North Carolina Indy Weekly, 
“Nothing made a difference with the union campaigns all those years until they brought the 
campaign to Raleigh [the state capitol]. No one goes to Tar Heel, it’s all by itself this giant plant 
in a tiny town. Smithfield had no incentive not to fight. When they [the union] made it statewide, 






Adding Leverage: the National Consumer Boycott 
Making Real Partnerships with National Groups 
The workers inside were firing on all pistons. The North Carolina community was 
engaged and upping their involvement in the fight. The company wasn’t moving. By this time, 
the union had abandoned any real hope for securing the card check agreement they had set out to 
win. Bruskin discussed how difficult it was to win the argument against an election with the 
liberal allies, particularly with sympathetic journalists. By this point in the fight, the union was 
trying to get the company to negotiate a neutrality agreement of some kind, some terms in 
writing guaranteeing that the company wouldn’t violate the workers’ rights again when they 
attempted to form a union through what would be a third election.  
Bruskin wanted an all-out national escalation. His first request was to the UFCW. The 
UFCW represents the retail workers in some large grocery stores across the country.
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 Bruskin 
thought if the fifteen biggest UFCW grocery store local unions across the country began to take 
action, the company would understand that the fight was leaving the North Carolina border. But 
there was a problem. The UFCW locals basically did nothing. A few tried to help, most took no 
action at all, no matter what the request. According to Bruskin, “I just wanted the heads of the 15 
biggest locals to write a Dear Grocery Store letter to the grocery store owners saying, ‘we want 
to talk about this one product,’ but the retail locals were weak, always trying to make nice with 
the employer, and they were siloed internally from the meatpacking division. So we gave up.” 
Bruskin decided to turn to Jobs with Justice (JwJ) to lead the field mobilization of the national 
escalation.  
Sarita Gupta, Executive Director of Jobs with Justice, said that it was in part Gene 
Bruskin’s style, in addition to Joe Hansen’s arrival at the helm of the UFCW, that allowed local 
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North Carolina leaders and groups like hers to take ownership of the effort together: “The 
campaign was really different in the sense that the union actually turned entire pieces over to 
allies, invited us to the table, and challenged us to get it done.”
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 After the Taft Hartley Act was 
passed in 1947, unions in the U.S. were barred from calling boycotts or secondary boycotts. But 
community groups, religious organizations and other non-union groups are able, as consumers, 
to call for consumer boycotts. One of the most effective tactics that the national Jobs with Justice 
deployed in the national consumer strategy was the campaign to target Food Network celebrity 
chef Paula Deen. Deen, wildly popular at the time, written up in the New York Times and 
elsewhere for her butter-heavy southern cooking, was hired by Smithfield to promote their 
products. It is the kind of opportunity creative activists look for, and, the idea to get Paula Deen 
to drop Smithfield’s products and sponsorship unfolded.  
Deen was on a national tour promoting a brand new cook book. Jobs with Justice tracked 
Paula Deen’s schedule of public appearances and began mobilizing their activist network in the 
places where they had enough strength for folks to picket and handbill Paula Deen. According to 
a Jobs With Justice (JwJ) internal report and evaluation of the Smithfield campaign, the Jobs 
with Justice coalitions “publicly confronted Paula Deen at events in Washington, DC; Portland, 
OR; Seattle, WA; Louisville, KY; and Chicago, IL. JwJ also intervened in numerous radio 
interviews by having community allies call-in and ask specific questions about the situation with 
Smithfield workers at the Tar Heel plant, most noteworthy was during the Diane Rehm show on 
NPR.”
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 When Deen came to Chicago to promote Smithfield products, the city where Oprah 
Winfrey produced her show, over two hundred union sympathizers turned out to protest, 





The header, “Deen Appearance Has Lots to Chew On,” was followed by opening 
lines which were, “If Paula Deen were everybody's grandma, every meal would hit the 
spot, puppies would get along with kittens and there'd be peace in the world. The genial 
face of Southern cooking on television's Food Network, Deen conveys a country-fried 
charm that seems to solve our ills with a slice of peach cobbler, although that probably 
wouldn't have worked with the band of union protesters who dogged her Chicago 
appearance.” 
That headline alone, and, the “birddogging” the protesters engaged in at an event for Deen 
that drew 3000 fans, according to the article, wouldn’t end in Chicago. 
According to the Deen public appearances website, the union knew she was headed for 
Orpah Winfrey’s show. Bruskin, “We had Lelia McDowell, an experienced communication 
strategist with a social justice perspective, she’s this really smart and radical Black 
communications consultant; she was so radical I couldn’t get the union to hire her, and, she was 
incredible. So she takes the headlines we got from the Chicago Tribune, with 200 people 
protesting Paula Deen, and, starts faxing it to Oprah Winfrey’s people till finally she gets 
someone on the phone. She says, basically, ‘hey, I want to tip you off, I don’t want Oprah to get 
in any trouble but if Paula Deen comes on and promotes Smithfield Hams, Oprah’s wading into 
the biggest labor fight in the country and we all want Oprah to help Obama win, not get caught 
up in this big labor fight.” Though the union wanted Deen’s appearance cancelled, the 
compromise was that the Oprah Winfrey show forbid Deen from saying the word Smithfield, 
and, they prevented her from using Smithfield products. The reason Smithfield was underwriting 
Deen was for her to use her biggest public appearances to promote their hams. There was 
nothing bigger than the Oprah Winfrey show using its clout to shut down the Smithfield’s 
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promotion. According to legal documents, the company had pre-ordered 10,000 special hams for 
the show, none of which were sold. In fact, these same legal documents identified this one event 




The RICO Suit and the Election Procedure Accord 
The union had endured and managed a nine year legal fight that had finally culminated in 
2006. But the company found yet another way to attempt to use the law to destroy the workers 
legally. On November 27
th
, 2007, eighteen months after the U.S. Court of Appeals ordered the 
company to cease and desist two alphabets worth of illegal behavior; ten months after a third ICE 
immigration raid that led over two thousand Latino workers to wildcat strike and shut the plant 
down as they quit en masse in a defiant action;
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 Smithfield filed a racketeering lawsuit against 
the union and the union’s allies. This was unprecedented at the time and was seen as the opening 
of yet a new legal front to defeat unions; Smithfield devised an unusual angle deploying a set of 
laws originally devised to prosecute organized crime and the Mafia, the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act, RICO. The company asserted that the national consumer boycott 
of their products amounted to ‘economic warfare.’
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 Smithfield alleged that the union was 
attempting to “extort” the company to get a card check and neutrality agreement. With the help 
of discovery and subpoenas, the union analyzed the plan had been hatched by Richard Berman of 
the union website ‘The Center for Union Facts,’ a leading proponent of the effort begun in 2013 
to legally label worker centers and other community based organizations essentially as “unions.” 
Bruskin reports,  
“Smithfield hired the person that drafted the original law in the 1970s as their 
consultant.
162
 They spent, according to them, $25 million on legal work against us. In one 
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year, from when they filed the RICO suit until when we settled, there were over one 
million pages of materials subpoenaed from us, we had to take our hard drives from our 
desktop computers and our laptops and hand them over. Berman described the tactic in a 
memo as, ‘the nuclear option.’ In one year, which was being expedited by the judge, all 
the depositions, pre-trial motions all happened. The case was ridiculous, but every time 
we tried to get the suit dismissed, the judge let the company continue.”
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The contrast between the pace of activity between Smithfield’s legal team on the RICO suit 
with that of the nine year NLRB suit is like the contrast between a modern race car and a horse 
and buggy (in the rain). The RICO judge drove a fierce timeline for Smithfield, an unusually 
short timeline for cases of the scale of the RICO allegations. The RICO suit made many claims, 
an example of which was the company’s allegation that the union had been particularly effective 
in the Paula Deen campaign. Smithfield said the union had “deprived Smithfield of an 
incomparable marketing opportunity” when it convinced the Oprah Winfrey show to refuse to 
allow Paula Deen to “promote Smithfield’s products before millions of viewers.”
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Because RICO suits were designed to shut down individual family members involved in 
organized crime, and their organizations, RICO suits name and sue individuals, not just 
organizations. The Smithfield suit was filed against the key people and groups the company 
decided were the lynchpins in the effort, including naming: UFCW, the United Food and 
Commercial Workers Union; CTW, Change to Win Federation (the at that time new rival to the 
AFL-CIO); Research Associates of America (the 501c3 organization that was formed after the 
CTW split from the AFL-CIO to house the research team that was FAST, the Food And Allied 
Service Trades, the entity for whom Bruskin worked); Jobs with Justice; Gene Bruskin; Joseph 
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Hansen; William T. McDonough; Leila P. McDowell; Patrick J. O’Neill; Andrew L. Stern; and, 
Tom Woodruff (organizing director at CTW).  
The suit had an instant chilling impact on the campaign.  The high level players inside the 
UFCW who were uncomfortable with the intense and militant workers activism on the inside of 
the plant used the RICO suit as an excuse to damper down the direct actions in the plant. The 
more traditional thinkers inside the UFCW used the RICO suit to attack Bruskin’s strategy at 
every level. Tensions were flying. Bruskin, the workers and their allies wanted to ramp up in 
response, the older guard types wanted to pull field resources and shift them to non-worker 
leverage strategies. Concurrently, the individuals named in the RICO suit were all coming to 
terms with the reality of significant personal liability if they lost the case as the purpose of RICO 
is in part to bankrupt corrupt individuals. Bruskin pushed hard against the effort to shut the 
campaign down, arguing they clearly had the company feeling desperate. These decisions about 
pedal-to-the-metal or full-brakes aren’t uncommon in big union campaigns, and in this case, the 
strategy to fight-on and uptick the pressure was being driven by an avowed leftist as the old 
guard in the union took a position of surrender. Complicating matters more, a new generation of 
unionists birthed at Change-to-Win but schooled originally in Andy Stern’s SEIU
165
 took a 
position somewhere in the middle: continue the corporate campaign but shut down worker 
organizing and shut down the community campaign in North Carolina. Why? What is the 
thinking behind that? Bruskin’s early-on individual negotiations about the terms under which he 
would accept the position, that they didn’t control him so they couldn’t fire him, were paying off. 
But his opponents inside the union were succeeding at ramping back some financial resources to 
the point where his daily battle became not just fighting Smithfield, but also fighting people 
inside the union.  
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For the next half of a year, there was internal dissention over strategy and months of time 
lost, once again, to subpoenas and evidence gathering. The “heat” in the campaign was being 
ratcheted down against Bruskin’s better instincts, but it wasn’t being closed down. During this 
time they managed to pull off a big “inside-outside” action day at the Smithfield Foods annual 
shareholder meeting, protesting on the inside with ministers and community supporters from 
across the country on the outside.
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 On the eve of the start of the RICO suit trial, in an-all night 
negotiation that ended thirty minutes before the courthouse opened its doors, the union and the 
company reached an agreement to hold a union election with pre-negotiated rules, the most 
important of which would become the union’s right to have access to the inside of the plant, and 
the naming of a “monitor” with strong enforcement mechanisms whose job was to be at the plant 
for the election cycle to “referee” the period leading up to the election. Each side agreed to cease 
certain activities; for example the employer dropped the RICO case and agreed to take down an 
anti-union website it created called www.smithfieldfacts.com;  and the union surrendered the 
words “Justice@Smithfield” and along with the words, suspended the national corporate 
campaign. The deal on the courthouse steps was signed and ‘ordered’ as a settlement by the 
RICO judge on October 27
th
, 2008. The Presidential election was eight days away, November 
4th. The election in the plant was set for the week of December 8
th
. 
By the time of the court steps settlement, the tea leaves, including all polls, were showing a 
Democratic Presidential victory. Big, vertically integrated multinational companies, often with a 
history of supporting Republicans, sometimes find unions helpful when Democratic 
administrations take office, using the union itself as a conduit to the administration on key 
issues.
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 For the once-again majority Black workforce in the plant, the fact that a Black man was 
the first Democrat in 36 years to win the popular vote in North Carolina against-all-odds was a 
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huge validation that Black people in North Carolina really could overcome stiff odds and a 
plantation culture. After the election one worker wore a hand printed T shirt: “If we can change 
the White House we can change the hog house.”
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 The union ramped up the “against all odds” 
message between the Presidential election and the union election, just one month later. On 
December 10
th
, the United Nation’s International Human Rights day annually, the workers voted 
‘yes’ to unionize the plant, 2,041 to 1,879.
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 Obama barely won North Carolina, and made 
history. The Smithfield workers barely won their election, and made history one month later. 
Their win represented the single largest private sector unionization effort in the new millennium. 
 
Conclusion: Worker Struggle Builds Resiliency,  
the New Local Union, #1208 
 
“It’s been a busy year in the hog market. Pork prices way up, bacon seems to be everywhere, 
ice cream, milkshakes, even Las Vegas martinis.”  
Kai Ryssdal at NPR’s Marketplace, December 26
th
, 2013  
 
According to UFCW national executive vice president Pat O’Neill, the most important 
long-term development from the campaign is that today there is a local union that is already 
helping non-union workers in a nearby poultry plant to form a new union in Bladen County. 
“What’s important is that we have a local union that’s actually organizing unorganized workers,” 
he says.
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 At least equally important is the internal organizing work spearheaded by the local 
union, a program that has achieved a steady membership of 80 percent in this right-to-work state. 
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And, they’ve done it because, in the words of the once-fired-worker-turned-local union 
president, Keith Ludlum,  
“We’ve created an organizing culture. I meet every single new [employee] hire at the 
orientation and talk about the struggle to win the wages, benefits, and rights we’ve won. I 
tell every worker that the first thing the boss knows going into our contract negotiations 
is what percentage of workers are in the union—anything less than 80 percent and the 
employer won’t be taking our concerns very seriously. Keeping our internal membership 
high isn’t just my job, it’s everyone’s job here, just like helping the workers down the 
street at the Mountainaire poultry plant, where 2,000 workers work under horrible 
conditions. The first thing those workers say when we talk to them is, We want the 
Smithfield contract.” 
 
By defeating the company, the workers achieved much more than a contract, they won 
confidence in themselves. Including the confidence to drive down the street to an unorganized 
chicken factory to help teach 2,000 workers exactly what will be required to beat their employer. 
Through the vicious fight inside the plant, the workers learned to take on controversial right-
wing wedge issues like immigration and even gay marriage. These 5,000 workers are now key to 
the effort to help change the conversation among thousands of workers in rural North Carolina. 
Reverends Barber and Johnson both note with home-state pride that the workers are regular and 
consistent participants in what’s become a 2014 movement called, “Moral Mondays.” Barber 
believes the fight at Smithfield helped lay the groundwork for North Carolina’s newly elevated 
consciousness about the urgent need for unions: 
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 “We learned to trust each other during the Smithfield fight; we deepened our ties 
considerably, like when we held simultaneous actions in twelve cities in North Carolina 
all at once, something that could only happen because the leadership of the union 
campaign at the time trusted the NAACP and Black Church network to lead the effort. 
The union had no capacity on its own to do anything like that without us.”  
 
Sarita Gupta, “The Smithfield campaign was our campaign as much as the UFCW, the 
NAACPs, and the North Carolina religious communities. JwJ felt that way, that campaign was 
really our victory in a deep way, in a deep heart way that you don’t always feel on campaigns. 
The UFCW were really smart in creating and structuring the fight in such a way that groups 
could feel ownership and get credit for the work we were doing. It felt like a real joint campaign 
and that often doesn’t happen.”  
Ollie Hunt has become a fulltime staff organizer of the new local union. He is working 
with the Mountaire poulty workers, helping them to form their organization. Hunt says, “I know 
people, cousins, who work at Walmart distribution centers, and I am telling them all about it. My 
parents wanted me to go to college, I want my kids to go to college, too. But what if they don’t? 
If you’ve got kids, you expect the best for them but things don’t always work out the way we 
think. The workers in the poultry plant, who could be my kids in the future, they drive two hours 
a day to earn $250 per week with no health insurance and the company is building a $5 million 
dollar expansion in their plant.” Delcia Rodriguez, a former worker in the Mountaire plant and 
originally from the Dominican Republic, was fired by the employer at the poultry plant when she 
had an industrial accident that caused her to miscarry her fetus. At 23, she’s now been hired by 
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the local union to help the her former colleagues at Mountaire. She reports that everyone in the 
poultry plant is scared, but they all want “what Smithfield workers got.”  
What they got was the equivalent of a $26.40 wage in Seattle while Seattle’s low wage 
non-union workers got far less. And, they’ve developed a worker-led unified movement among 
previously warring ethnic factions. They’ve become a base of workers in a key national electoral 
swing state with the lowest unionization level in the US who are taking on wedge issues not as 
outsiders, but as home grown North Carolinians, and who are helping their next door neighbors 




CHAPTER 5 MAKE THE ROAD NEW YORK 
 
The room went uncharacteristically silent after the two leaders in the front of the room, 
Amador Rivas and Augusto Fernandez, posed the question, “What do you think it means?” The 
leaders seemed at ease with the nervous looks and fidgeting that often accompanies silence in a 
large group. Then, from the back of the room, a commanding voice boomed out, “I think it 
means us. We are the ones who are an army of the good. Every day we fight to hold politicians 
and bosses accountable for the wrongs they inflict on our community.” A round of applause and 
head-bobbing followed, signaling that the woman in the back of the room was speaking for 
everyone.  
The scene was a “Trabajadores en Accion “(Workers in Action) meeting at the Bushwick 
office of Make the Road New York (MRNY). Over fifty people were present for this gathering, a 
weekly event where MRNY members and prospective members meet to analyze the previous 
week’s activities and plan future actions.  The prompt that led first to silence and then to 
reflection asked those at the meeting to interpret the meaning of a quotation from Juan Bosch, 
“No hay arma más potente que la verdad en los manos de los buenos” (There is no weapon more 
powerful than the truth in the hands of the good.) 
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   Such prompts are a regular feature of 
MRNY’s public meetings, which are conducted in Spanish. First, everyone present introduces 
themselves, stating whether they are first-time visitors or members (and if so how long they have 
been part of MRNY).   Then the leaders open the discussion with a prompt designed to spark 
discussion that everyone can participate in—longstanding members and newcomers, old and 
young, men and women. The prompt is also intended to ensure that the meeting agenda includes 
a "big picture" question along with minutia like who will sign up for leafleting (a key form of 
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outreach for MRNY) in the coming week, evaluating what did and didn’t work at the last big 
public event or direct action, or who will volunteer to cook for the next meeting.  
About two hours after the meeting began, Augusto, who was co-chairing the meeting as part 
of such a leadership development assignment, asked for "silencio" and then approached each 
person in the room to ask them,  "Que le gusta sobre este reunion and que no le gusta?"  [What 
do you like about this meeting and what do you not like?]   When he got to the third person, the 
front doors to the room opened and a few members began to carry in enormous pots of rice and 
beans.  
The fragrant smell wafting through the room was a challenge for Augusto at this point—
almost two hours after the meeting began, but he pressed on with his questions undeterred. The 
answers he got were all variations on a theme:  People liked being able to participate in the 
discussion and having a clear agenda; what they didn’t like was "that this meeting is going on too 
long, look—see—our dinner is here and we should be eating it.” This exposed the time-intensive 
aspect of MRNY’s "high touch," participatory decision-making process.   
MRNY is the largest non-union membership organization of immigrants in New York City, 
with over 15,000 dues-paying members, an annual budget of over $13.5 million, and 155 full-
time staff.
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  Membership requirements include a one-time dues payment of $120 for those 
members over 21 years of age, and newly established annual dues of $20.
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  Members who have 
paid their dues can participate in meetings. MRNY has experimented considerably over the past 
decade with what constitutes being eligible to be a voting member and what, if any requirements 
there should be, to take advantage of MRNY's legal services and English-as-a-Second-Language 
classes - which also include political education and leadership skills. To become a voting 
member mostly has and does require a higher threshold, namely attendance at two meetings a 
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month.  As they organization has evolved, most of what they call their ‘survival services’ have 
become free for the entire working class, not just their members. Deborah Axt points out that, 
“In addition to realizing that because much of our survival services are supported with public 
money that requires them to be open to anyone in need, we also see this as our contribution to the 
broader working class.”
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 In addition, all voting members must participate in a series of 
workshops during their first year in the organization. Workshop topics include:  “Understanding 
Sexism,” “LGBTQ Tolerance,” education on each issue area in the organization, and a session 
on effective recruitment. (This last workshop is crucially important, since MRNY members do 
most of the recruitment of new members.) 
MRNY was formed in 2007 when two organizations— Make the Road by Walking and the 
Latin American Integration Center – agreed on a merger.   Make the Road by Walking had been 
founded in 1998 by Andrew Friedman and Oona Chatterjee to advocate for immigrant welfare 
recipients in Brooklyn. Friedman and Chatterjee had met as law students at New York 
University, and both were frustrated by the idea of legal work that involved defending poor 
people one at a time. “We thought if poor people had power, they would need fewer lawyers,” 
Friedman recalled. 
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 At the time of the merger, Make the Road by Walking had a $2.5 million 
dollar budget, 43 full-time staff, and one office in Bushwick, Brooklyn.
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The Latin American Integration Center (LAIC) had been formed in 1992 by a group of 
Colombian immigrants in Jackson Heights, Queens, New York City's “La Pequeña Colombia,” 
to promote mutual aid and citizenship assistance for Columbian and other Latin American 
immigrants.  LAIC’s founding director, Saramaria Archila, was a Columbian human rights 
attorney in Colombia who had fled her country in response to threats on her life by the right-
wing paramilitary.  Upon arrival in New York, speaking no English and with professional 
137 
 
credentials that were not recognized in the United States, she found herself cleaning houses like 
many Latina immigrants until she helped found and then became a paid staff member of LAIC.  
In 2001, LAIC hired Saramaria’s niece, Ana Maria Archila, to open a new office in Port 
Richmond, Staten Island.  Archila had emigrated from Colombia in 1997 at age 17 and joined the 
LAIC staff after she graduated from college.  In Port Richmond, she organized citizenship and 
adult literacy classes; later she succeeded her aunt as LAIC's director when Saramaria died from 




MRNY has won a series of significant victories involving immigrants, poor people and low-
wage workers during a time when many other organizations were experiencing setbacks and 
defeats.  In this chapter I document MRNY’s work and explore the factors contributing to its 
growth and success. 
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   One such factor is the favorable political environment of New York 
City, which has higher union density than any other major U.S. city
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an enduring social 
democratic tradition rooted in its labor history
180
and a relatively immigrant-friendly political 
culture.  These conditions make New York fertile ground for the kind of immigrant rights and 
worker rights organizing to which MRNY is dedicated.  But these same conditions are also 
present for all the other similar organizations and campaigns in New York City, yet none can 
claim as strong a record of accomplishment as MRNY, which has amassed a larger staff and 
budget than any comparable organization in the city.  
I identify three specific factors that have contributed to MRNY's extraordinary record of 
success.   The first is what Ganz calls strategic capacity.  MRNY has adopted a highly 
collaborative organizational model that reflects exactly the kind of approach Ganz described at 
the UFW, with  "leaders who take part in regular, open and authoritative deliberation and are 
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The second factor is MRNY’s highly deliberative and participatory organizational style—
referred to internally as a "high touch" process. This is similar to Francesca Polletta’s
182
 analysis 
of participatory democracy and prefigurative politics.  Polletta particularly emphasizes the 
importance of process for strengthening internal solidarity and enhancing the political impact of 
social movements.  As I document below, MRNY operates along lines very similar to the 
participatory democratic model she outlines. Moreover, efforts to win and enforce progressive 
change, whether through the courts, the ballot box, negotiated contracts, or legislative bodies can 
only succeed in the long term if large numbers of ordinary people are participating at levels high 
enough to enable them to hold institutions accountable.  
The third factor is the organization’s multi-issue character. MRNY's strengths have enabled it 
to operate effectively on a range of issues, including but not limited to workplace justice.  As 
MRNY Deputy Director Deborah Axt, an attorney and former union organizer, and MRNY 
founder Andrew Friedman have noted, “Make the Road differed from many worker centers in 
the breadth of issues it addressed that were not directly related to worker or workplace 
organizing, and in its broader use of in-house legal, education, and other services.”
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A broad 
issue spread with open and democratic organizational structures helps increase motivation 
among leaders and members alike because different individuals will feel passionately about 
different issues.  
I argue that MRNY is not an advocacy group. By advocacy, which I defined in chapter two,  
I mean groups like the Center for Constitutional Rights, the American Civil Liberties Union or 
Greenpeace, groups that merely campaign on behalf of some broad societal goal and/or on behalf 
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of a constituency or constituencies.  By contrast, Make the Road’s members are central players in 
campaigns and have decision-making power in such key areas as hiring and firing staff, 
approving budgets, and deciding on the direction and priorities of the organization. They also 
understand that mass collective action is a key source of leverage. Another sign that Make the 
takes an organizing approach is that they are not simply trying to win specific legislation or 
material benefits, but they also try to make long-term, structural changes in the power structure 
of the wider society, shifting the balance of power toward the organization's base constituency 
and away from the forces that oppress them. I will provide of examples how this works later in 
this chapter. 
Despierta Bushwick (Wake Up! Bushwick) 
Make the Road’s initial workplace justice efforts were limited to a direct action approach 
to on-the-job grievance handling, though the grievances are limited to wage and hour violations, 
taking advantage of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FSLA). When an employer refuses to pay a 
member or denies them overtime, at least minimum wage, or shorts their hours, they are teamed 
up with other MRNY members who en masse go to the worksite and demand the money with a 
shame-based solidarity protest. But if the employer ignores the direct confrontation and refuses 
to pay, Make the Road’s attorneys go after the employer legally. This program has long been the 
most important recruitment tool for Make the Road’s worker justice campaign. Deborah Axt, 
another co-executive director, and a former union organizer and attorney by training, explains 
that that this program has deep value beyond recruitment. “These individual and small scale 
fights matter a great deal because the members can get involved and exercise, test, and improve 
upon their leadership immediately. It’s like having dozens of mini campaigns going on all at 
once all the time.” 
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By 2004, Make the Road decided to try something new in their worker justice 
campaigns—unions. It was a bold move, with a high risk of failure: Union election victories are 
hard to come by in any sector, given the incentive for employers to systematically violate the few 
remaining worker protections under US law. But given the sheer numbers of individuals 
experiencing wage theft, Make the Road wanted to scale up. If the workers could form unions, it 
would give them access to on-going assistance and potentially raise their wages and living 
standards above the poverty line. Make the Road sought a union partner. Enter the RWDSU. 
The RWDSU under Stuart Applebaum’s leadership joined up with Make the Road to 
attempt the near-impossible—win in marginal retail in the shadows of a big city in the Bush era. 
The Despierta Bushwick (Wake Up! Bushwick) campaign was born. According to Ed Ott, 
distinguished lecturer at CUNY’s labor school, and the former long-time Executive Director at 
the NYC Central Labor Council, “From almost day one, Make the Road caught the attention of 
NYC’s unions because the group’s leaders understood that a union contract could be a 
tremendous tool for their members. This union friendly approach and their demonstrated ability 
to turn out large numbers of their members for events in NYC set them apart from every other 
group in NY.”  
 
The first tactical move for Make the Road was to map a geographic boundary of two 
blocks in either direction of Knickerbocker Avenue—an area where the organization had strong 
roots. Over the course of six months they knocked on just over 6,000 doors talking with residents 
about the conditions workers along Knickerbocker Ave were facing. Many of these residents had 
first-hand experience in the stores as either workers, friends of workers, or family of workers. At 
the end of each conversation, the canvassers asked the resident to sign a pledge card stating that 
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they would boycott any store that didn’t respect its workers. The canvassers also gathered 
information from each resident about which stores they patronized on Knickerbocker as one way 
to gauge the potential impact of consumer pressure. 
 
While Make the Road talked with folks off of Knickerbocker Ave, the RWDSU 
organizers were talking to workers on Knickerbocker Ave. The collaborative team began to work 
with the Attorney General’s office to file unpaid wage claims. The tactic was to ratchet up the 
amount of back pay claims an employer might face should they resist the no-cost alternative of 
dropping the claims in exchange for an agreement to not fight the unionization effort. At the 
time, the Attorney General was Elliot Spitzer, who proved sympathetic to the effort. 
 
In August of 2005, with back to school shopping about to begin, Make the Road sent a 
letter to two of the chains on Knickerbocker that typified the strip—FootCo and Shoe Mania. 
The letter notified the store owners that unless they were prepared to sign an agreement that 
would commit them to cease their unjust practices and permit their employees to make a decision 
to unionize free from intimidation or harassment; they would call for a boycott at a press 
conference. Shoe Mania shut down, almost certainly a response to the union threat. But FootCo 
responded immediately and by the campaign’s end, the workers had formed a union with the 
RWDSU and negotiated a collective bargaining agreement covering 110 workers across ten 
stores that included health insurance, paid sick and vacation time for all workers, and a $3.00 an 
hour raise. The FootCo contract would be renegotiated successfully until the company 




Beyond FootCo, there were several other results from Despierta Bushwick. MRNY built 
deep relationships with key staff at city and state agencies that would enable them to engage in 
what they call strategic sweeps. A “sweep” is where Make the Road and one of their union 
partners—typically RWDSU—gather information from workers in an industry and a targeted 
area and provides it to enforcement agencies, which swoop in and cite multiple employers at 
once. In May of 2008 and again in June of 2009, MRNY played a crucial role in getting the NYS 
Attorney General’s office and the NYS Department of Labor to go after grocery stores for 
systematically stealing the wages of grocery store baggers. The result was substantial back wages 
payments, such as at C-Town in Queens which had to pay baggers over $300,000 in back wages, 
Pioneer Grocery in Brooklyn which had to pay over $160,000 and Key Foods in Brooklyn who 
owed over $44,000 to baggers. Prior to the sweeps, the employers typically made the workers 
sign agreements claiming they were independent contractors, paid them no wages and only tips, 
and yet treated them just like employees (including assigning them other jobs, like cleaning, and 
firing them if they wouldn’t comply). MRNY’s large membership helps the generally 
underfunded state agencies launch what feels like a sting operation against unscrupulous 
employers and the impact ripples out well beyond the shops that get fined   
 
But even after a couple of years of strategic sweeps, which significantly elevated the 
scale of their success, MRNY was getting increasingly frustrated by the inadequacies of the laws 
they were enforcing. So they decided to attack the deficiencies in the law. As Deborah Axt said, 
“For the many workers in the informal economy and the non union economy, we are trying to 




Wage Theft Legislation 
MRNY has been active in campaigns to rectify minimum wage and other workplace 
violations throughout its history, winning over $25 million in back pay and wrongfully denied 
government benefits settlements between 2007 and 2010 alone.
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   Frustrated by the slow pace 
of the legal process and the persistence of wage theft in the low-wage labor market despite the 
many highly publicized efforts to combat it, in early 2010 MRNY members decided, in 
committee meetings and eventually in a board meeting, to launch a campaign to strengthen the 
state law.
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   This gave rise to a successful coalition effort to pass the New York State Wage 
Theft Protection Act (WTPA), which was signed into law in December 2010 and took effect on 
April 9, 2011.  
The new law increases criminal and civil penalties for minimum wage and overtime 
violations from 25 percent to up to 100 percent of back wages, along with additional penalties of 
up to $10,000 for employers who retaliate or threaten to retaliate against workers for 
complaining about wage theft.  The new law also strengthens employer payroll record-keeping 
requirements and requires more detailed written notice to employees regarding pay rates and 
deductions than before, including a new provision that these notices must be in the employee's 
primary language. While this victory may seem modest, its thrust is important for an organizing 
organization because it directly enhances the ability of ordinary workers to understand their 
employers’ actions and also provides access to enforcement mechanisms – similar to those in 
union contracts. By forcing employers to document pay rates and deductions in each paycheck in 
the native language of the employee, the law enables workers themselves –with assistance from 
the MRNY staff in some cases – to fight back if the employer has cheated them out of the pay to 
which they are entitled.  Thus the law “makes the hammer of reach and enforcement much 
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bigger”as Axt put it in an interview. “Our members are really proud of this victory and are now 
involved in outreach and education to all sorts of organizations across the city who we are 
teaching how to use the new tools afforded by the law.” 
In 2014, the organization successfully fought for yet more improvements to the Wage Theft 
Prevention Act, including enhanced anti-retaliation provisions, increases in the liquidated 
damages provisions from $10K to $25K, and an expansion of the Act’s language to incorporate a 
new focus on the construction sector.
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Secure Communities Campaign 
On November 22, 2011, Mayor Bloomberg—flanked by members of Make the Road—
signed a City Council measure ending the City’s cooperation with federal ICE authorities. Unlike 
the WTPA, which was developed and passed in less than a year, this campaign took years of 
careful work. “When we first decided to launch this campaign, everyone said, ‘You are fucking 
crazy,’” recalled campaign leader and MRNY Deputy Director Javier Valdes, a longtime 
immigrant rights advocate formerly on the staff of the New York Immigration Coalition.  
In early 2009, Peter Markowitz, director of the Immigrant Justice Center at Cardozo Law 
School and a trusted collaborator of MRNY, approached the group with a plan to challenge New 
York City’s cooperation with ICE.  Because this campaign idea did not originate directly from 
the base, MRNY staff conducted a membership survey to see if the issue mattered enough to 
members to warrant a shift in organizational priorities. 
In response, members described cases of family and friends being deported after arrests for 
minor infractions, and in some instances even when they were found innocent. At the time, 
Rikers Island prison officials were holding immigrants suspected of being undocumented for up 
to 48 hours after their scheduled release and turning them over to ICE officials to be 
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“interviewed.” Between 2004 and 2008, over 13,000 undocumented immigrants had been 
shipped from Rikers to detention facilities outside of New York (Bernstein 2009). According to 
Valdes, Rikers officials were deceiving immigrants into thinking they were going to meet with 
an attorney about their case, rather than with an ICE official.
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  The interviews would begin 
with innocuous questions that were intentionally misleading, to encourage detainees to reveal 
how they had gotten to the United States.  As the survey documented, MRNY members saw this 
as an urgent issue and this soon led to Board approval for the campaign. 
Along with the New Sanctuary Coalition and the Northern Manhattan Coalition for 
Immigrant Rights, MRNY demanded that Rikers Island officials be required to explain to 
detainees in very explicit terms that these “interviews” were not with friendly attorneys.  In June 
2009 the campaign scored its first victory when the city’s Department of Corrections officials 
agreed to provide a written form in multiple languages to every detainee at Rikers before the 
interviews, explaining that the interviewers would be ICE officials, and detailing what could 
result.  Rikers officials were also required to get signed consent forms from any detainee before 
any such “interviews.” could occur.   
By February 2010, thirteen more groups had signed onto the campaign.
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  MRNY then 
successfully drove what had become a large coalition effort that eventually persuaded newly 
elected Governor Andrew Cuomo to announce in June 2011 that Secure Communities would not 
be implemented in New York State (Reddy 2011). Six months later, on November 22, 2011, in a 
move that gave new meaning to Thanksgiving for many New York City immigrants, Mayor 
Bloomberg signed City Council Bill 656, which prohibits the Department of Corrections from 
using city funds to detain immigrants, effectively ending the City’s collaboration with ICE.  
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Concurrent with the three-year-long Secure Communities campaign, MRNY also led several 
other successful efforts that had a significant impact on public policy.  Among the results were 
the 2009 Language Access in Pharmacies Act requiring that 3,000 chain pharmacies in New 
York City provide translation and interpretation services; the 2010 Multiple Dwellings 
Registration Act which strengthened enforcement of tenants’ rights; Governor Cuomo’s 
Executive Order #26, signed in fall 2011, extending to all of New York State an earlier MRNY 
victory requiring city agencies to provide interpretation and translation services; and the 2011 
Student Safety Act, making police and in-house school discipline more transparent.  
MRNY was active on many other fronts in this period as well.  In 2010 the organization 
negotiated a settlement with the retail chain American Eagle over discrimination against 
transgender employees. That same year MRNY’s Youth Empowerment Project successfully 
blocked a city plan to cut funding for subsidized student Metro Cards.  And MRNY filled forty-
two buses with protestors for the May 1, 2010 immigrant rights march in Washington, D.C.—the 
largest turnout of any single group in the nation.
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By 2014, despite real reductions in the number of immigrants being detained, MRNY took 
further action and succeeded at getting the New York City Council to pass a law banishing the 
ICE officers from Rikers Island altogether. The law was passed in October 2014 and took effect 




How does Make the Road get so much accomplished?  A large part of the answer hinges on 
what Ganz calls strategic capacity. MRNY's original five-member Strategic Leadership Team 
(SLT) included three women and three people of color, one of whom, Ana Maria Archila, is an 
immigrant.  Javier Valdes was born in the United States but when he was three months old his 
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parents' visas expired and the family, originally Argentinian, moved to Venezuela. Valdes 
returned to the United States at age eleven when his father, a civil engineer, was hired at Texas 
A&M—a job that allowed him to obtain permanent resident status. Archila and Valdes both went 
to college in the United States and both took jobs in progressive organizations soon after 
graduating. Oona Chatterjee was born in the United States to Indian immigrant parents.  She was 
influenced by family stories about the fight for Indian independence; similarly Archila and 
Valdes were shaped by their parents' experience of fleeing repression in Latin America (in 
Colombia and Argentina, respectively). The other two SLT members, Andrew Friedman and 
Deborah Axt, are white and U.S. born, but also had politically progressive parents.
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Though Friedman, Chatterjee, and most recently Archila have moved to a new national 
organization that is attempt to nationalize the success of Make the Road, all five of these 
founding SLT leaders are passionately devoted to their work, exemplifying another aspect of 
Ganz’s strategic capacity, namely motivation.
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  And, they still share office space. Valdes and 
Axt remain in the top leadership, with other newer team members stepping into today’s SLT. 
The following excerpts from interviews with SLT members illustrate their level of motivation:  
Friedman: “We lose before we even start if we remain risk-averse.  We constantly take risks 
here!” 3-17-11 
Archila: “I fell in love with the folks I was teaching and knew I was hooked.” 
Chatterjee: “We want to build power. We want to be consequential in everything we do and 
move the ball forward.” 3-17-11 
Axt: “We are not so good at slow, methodical approaches. This is both a strength and a 
weakness—we tend to go head-long into an effort.” 4-7-11 
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Valdes: “It's a magical space here. The level of commitment to the cause, I have never 
experienced it anywhere as much as here—it's not just the leadership, it's everybody. Every 
member and all the staff know this institution matters.” 11-28-11 
The relationships among and between just about everyone I observed start and end with 
respect for each other vertically and horizontally. For Ganz, this combination is key to the 
success of organizations fighting for social and economic justice. The frequent use of the word 
love (Chatterjee, “we love each other here;” Valdes, “we are rooted in love and community 
here”) reflects the deep commitment of the SLT to a highly participatory and equally diverse 
membership. 
The full-time MRNY staff as a whole is also highly motivated, with a group of talented, 
accomplished organizers that work around the clock with extraordinary dedication. As Table 1 
(prepared as part of a grant proposal submitted to the Ford Foundation) shows, the staff is also 
extremely diverse in terms of gender, race and ethnicity.
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Table ??.  Make the Road New York Staff, by Gender, Race and Ethnicity
194
 
 Underrepresented Racial and 
Ethnic Minorities 
Total 
Female Male Female Male 
Board of Directors/Trustees 9 7 10 11 
Professional Staff 48 17 61 22 
Support Staff 8 3 8 3 
 
Participatory Democracy and Make the Road’s “High Touch” Model 
Polletta argues that participatory democracy strengthens social movements and their 
organizations.  Among "people with little experience of routine politics, making decisions by 
consensus and rotating leadership has helped create a pool of activists capable of enforcing the 
gains made by this movement and launching new rounds of activism.  Participatory democracy’s 
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potential benefits… cannot be reduced to “personal” or “cultural” changes. They go to the heart 
of political impact,” she argues, adding: "Participatory democracy… can advance efforts to 
secure institutional political change… [and] can be strategic."
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MRNY has adopted a detailed and transparent decision-making process.  Most decisions are 
made by consensus, and rotating leadership is standard practice at meetings.  The MRNY 
"Decision-Making Authority" document (available to members in both Spanish and English) 
specifies in detail how people are chosen for every role and every sub-body in the organization, 
and specifies the authority embodied in each role and sub-body.
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MRNY has committees focused on key programmatic areas, including both core issues that 
have long defined the organization's agenda like immigrant rights, civil rights, affordable 
housing, workplace justice, and environmental justice, to more ad-hoc committees devoted to 
campaigns like those described earlier such as Wage Theft and Secure Communities.  Each 
MRNY member is involved in one or more of these programmatic committees, all of which hold 
weekly meetings concurrently at MRNY’s four offices in Port Richmond, Staten Island; 
Bushwick, Brooklyn; Jackson Heights, Queens; and Brentwood, Long Island. As Javier Valdes 
explained, “The weekly meetings serve the same purpose as church, it’s a ritual…. it’s the same 
time, the same day, every week, in the same office.” He added, “Having access to the 
membership so frequently provides a constant opportunity for growth and political education. 
The members all run the meetings and … spend time every week thinking about the agenda and 
about how to run an effective meeting.” 
Members actively participate in the process of hiring new staff, and are included on hiring 
committees and interview teams.  After multiple and sometimes grueling interview rounds, 
finalists are asked to demonstrate their skills in front of members by either facilitating a meeting 
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or running a workshop.  As Sabrina Harewood, a 20 year old Afro-Caribbean member of the 
LGBT working group explained, “We want to see the potential staff facilitate a meeting… we 
want to see how they respond to members' questions, if they can teach us anything new, and how 
they get along with people.” 
 MRNY's "high touch" decision-making process is also illustrated by the “Trabajadores en 
Accion” meeting described at the beginning of this chapter.  In 2009, as part of a comprehensive 
strategic planning process, MRNY adopted a new set of leadership development protocols for 
both volunteer members and staff. Members who want to become leaders meet one-on-one with 
the organizers responsible for each programmatic area, and carry out a series of assignments (in 
this case, learning to run a large meeting).  This is one of several prerequisites for running for 
election to the MRNY board of directors—a very active and hands-on board of directors, the 
majority of whose members are elected from the membership.  
  MRNY’s self-understanding is predicated on the idea that its success depends on its ability 
to recruit, develop, mobilize and retain members.  In many respects, then, it exemplifies 
Polletta’s model of participatory democracy. But the deep commitment to democratic practice 
and leadership development is also a source of tension and what co-founder Andrew Friedman 
refers to as “democracy fatigue,” describing the more than thirteen regular weekly meetings—all 
of which require tremendous energy and attention. There is, according to Friedman, a dull but 
persistent discussion of the endless search for fewer and shorter meetings. Friedman absented 
himself from this fatigue by creating the Center for Popular Democracy, a national group without 
the kind of day-to-day base accountability that Make the Road still maintains. But Javier Valdes 
(who would later replace Andrew as a co-executive director) and others involved in building 
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MRNY’s member participation program insist that any compromise in the highly participatory 
nature of the organization would weaken the organization’s effectiveness. 
Future Challenges 
MRNY has its critics, as became apparent at a December 2011 press conference about the 
proposed New York State Dream Act, where one youth group—the New York State Youth 
Leadership Council (NYSYLC)--accused Make the Road of insider politics and deal cutting.
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MRNY leaders and some other groups in the coalition countered that the issue in contention 
(whether to support the New York State bill’s limited expansion of state-based financial aid to 
undocumented youth) had already been resolved in previous meetings.  When asked about such 
tensions in coalition politics, MRNY staff and leaders defend themselves with the claim that they 
put considerably more into coalitions than they get out them.  
MRNY officially withdrew from the New York Immigration Coalition, a move that led some 
coalition members to accuse MRNY of arrogance and of being unwilling to share power with 
others. Yet at the December Dream Act press conference mentioned above, the New York 
Immigration Coalition defended MRNY against the youth group’s accusations.  MRNY’s 
success does open it to the danger of becoming arrogant and isolated, as is the case for any group 
that quickly pulls ahead of its peers. Indeed, a similar dynamic emerged when the rapid growth 
of the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) outpaced many other unions in recent 
decades.  
The special burden of the most successful organizations across all sectors is to maintain their 
own momentum while exercising a kind of solidarity that lifts the floor of success across the 
entire progressive social movement spectrum.  
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Aside from such external accusations of insider dealings—accusations that typically arrive 
when one organization gains considerably more power and therefore access to the power brokers 
than its counterparts— there was an important critique written about MRNY by former staffer 
Steve Jenkins.
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 Jenkins criticized MRNY as being an advocacy organization that is limited in 
its ability to build worker power essentially because they are not a union. Jenkins cited MRNY’s 
early worker rights campaigns as examples of the difficulty that face advocacy organizations, 
and suggested that unions had greater ability to build effective worker leverage against 
employers and were therefore a superior organizational form. However, Jenkins ignored the fact 
that many unions engage in an equally leverage-less form of activity often called “hot shop 
organizing,” which means organizing isolated workplaces in response to immediate worker 
discontent (rather than as part of a broader industry-wide or regional organizing strategy).   
One of his key claims is that reliance on foundation funding - which is characteristic of 
MRNY as well as other worker centers and community-based organizations for which dues 
income is limited - creates dependency on philanthropic elites that set strategic and tactical limits 
on the types of activities the organization can undertake.  Jenkins contrasts this to the case of 
labor unions, which are funded almost exclusively by members' dues and thus enjoy more 
autonomy.  However, I argue he all but ignores the fact that unions’ strategic and tactical 
repertoires are also highly constrained by such mechanisms as the no-strike clauses in collective 
bargaining agreements, to which dues "check-off"—the source of almost all union revenue—is 
tightly linked (see the Washington nursing home contracts referenced in chapter three). In 
addition, unions have deep institutional ties to political and economic power-holders that limit 
their effectiveness. The SEIU, where Jenkins now works, frequently limits the options available 
to its members by signing organizing rights accords with employers which mandate that the 
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union must stand down on legislation, organizing, bargaining and other forms of activism in the 
name of targeted base expansion (chapter three).  In addition, many union leaders restrain their 
own rank-and-file members and leaders from engaging in direct action, based on strategic 
decisions that involve cooperation with key employers. This parallels the constraints faced by 
groups dependent on foundation support that Jenkins highights.  Risk aversion and a lack of faith 
in the intelligence of ordinary people is the key issue here, for unions and other types of worker 
organizations alike. 
Jenkins' argument that unions are the superior organizational form becomes even more 
problematic in the context of the contingent labor force and the informal economy, which 
includes a rapidly growing number of workers who are excluded from the laws governing 
collective bargaining and for whom developing alternatives to traditional unionism is urgent. As 
MRNY's Deborah Axt states, “We are trying to fill in the holes of what a collective bargaining 
agreement can get workers for the workers who don’t have a collective bargaining agreement. 
For the many workers in the informal economy, we are trying to put as many pieces together as 
we can to offer protections as if they had a contract.” Moreover, MRNY is doing something that 
many unions who are parties to collective agreements fail to do, namely keeping their 
membership base active and engaged and therefore able to enforce the agreement.   
Hard-won union contracts are enormously important, but are only effective if the  
membership is sufficiently organized to enforce them through building robust governance 
mechanisms and running majority strikes.  The rule making provisions in the Wage Theft 
Prevention Act described earlier are evidence that non-union groups can also fight for provisions 
which advantage stronger enforcement mechanisms. Like union contracts, such legislation 
demands enforcement by a base of actively engaged people, informed by an accurate power 
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structure analysis.  Workers’ leverage is not a function of the legal structure they do or don’t 
incorporate under, but rather the extent of the active participation of the members. 
The high participation nature of MRNY’s “high touch” model separates them from most 
unions and from the many advocacy groups in which “membership” is nothing more than 
subscribership. MRNY’s ability to engage its members in active civic participation is palpable at 
legislative hearings, on street corners and marches, in the 42 buses they sent to Washington D.C. 
to demand immigration reform, and at its many press conferences. In these and other settings, the 
words and actions of organic members of the community not only move foundations to write 
checks, but also inspire the mainstream media to write stories highlighting key issues and 
sometimes even win concessions from employers and the state. 
 Ten years after Jenkins published his critique, he clarified his views in an interview with me:  
 
I was writing for a world where unions are either ignored or reviled and where the 
most basic market analysis that a first-year union researcher would undertake was ignored in 
favor of proclamations about the power of oppressed workers.  And if I criticized MRNY, it 
was simply because I worked there and thought that was the most honest and effective way to 
make the point I was making.  In actuality, they would have been at the bottom of the list of 





 It is true that MRNY has not had to confront the kind of opposition that organizing unions 
routinely face.  However, such unions are themselves a rare phenomenon within the 21st century 
labor movement, which includes many "do-nothing" unions
200
that at best engage in defensive 
struggles.  Relatively few unions are actively organizing the unorganized.  Those that attempt to 
do so often face fierce resistance from employers, who routinely threaten workers with loss of 
their livelihood, divide them along racial and ethnic lines, and more.  But such opposition is by 
no means limited to unions. Any organizing organization that is seriously contending for power 
faces formidable threats. Immigrants (including many MRNY members) regularly confront 
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livelihood-threatening measures, such as the threat of deportation.  People of color routinely 
encounter police brutality, disenfranchisement and mass incarceration.  
Underlying all of MRNY’s issue work is a commitment to building a high participation 
organization. What MRNY calls their “high touch” model, with a dizzying array of weekly and 
bi-weekly meetings, creates meaningful points of entry and leadership development for their 
thousands of members. Committee meetings share commonalities: dinner is cooked by members 
at the office and served near the meetings’ end, often by teams of members carrying army-sized 
pots of beans and rice; they are facilitated by the members; and debriefing and discussing recent 
actions are a common feature along with planning for upcoming actions. In addition, MRNY has 
conditioned the many services it offers, from legal help with bad landlords to bad bosses, ESL 
classes, citizenship classes and more, on members participating in at least two activities per 
month, creating a sustained participation level where activism constitute a kind of dues.  
Building, sustaining, and expanding high participation is crucial to just about every 
strategy available to the left. From disruptive strategies like protests, civil disobedience, 
blockades, occupations, boycotts and strikes to electoral strategies, winning and enforcing strong 
union contracts, and even legal strategies, the most important factor in winning versus losing in 
the movement has long been people power. MRNY’s diverse issue mix, including workplace and 
non-workplace issues, covers just about every issue bearing down on the lives of workers and the 
poor, enhancing recruitment.  
Their high-touch model fast tracks the development of large numbers of rank and file 
leaders, which enables large turn-out at actions. Some critics complain that bargaining with the 
state is less exciting than bargaining with bosses, but under neoliberal capitalism, the so-called 
private sector boss is indistinguishable from the state. With unions representing 6% of the private 
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sector workforce and shrinking and a rapid expansion of the informal economy, fighting to create 
and improve existing regulations is every bit as relevant as fighting to expand and improve 
unions. And, the power to enforce laws or union contracts is the same: robust, democratic, high 




CHAPTER 6 CHICAGO TEACHERS UNION, BEFORE AND AFTER 2010 
 
“We’d done our homework; we knew that the highest threshold of any bargaining unit 
that had ever voted one way or another on a collective bargaining agreement was 48.3 percent. 
The threshold we were arguing for was three-quarters. So in effect, they wouldn’t have the right 
to strike even though the right was maintained. And so in the end game, the CTU leadership took 
the deal misunderstanding and probably not knowing the statistics about their voting history.”
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Jonah Edelman, cofounder, Stand for Children, “On Their Plan to Cripple the Chicago 
Teachers Union” 
 
“I thought to myself, they are fucked. When the legislature passed SB7 saying the 
teachers needed a 76 percent turnout for a strike authorization vote, I thought, they are so 
fucked.” 
Keith Kelleher, president, SEIU Healthcare Illinois 
 
“I remember waking up the first day of the strike and thinking what was all the deafening 
noise? It was incredible, and it was the sound of cars three blocks away honking and beeping in 
support of the teacher’s picket line at my neighborhood school. We could suddenly visualize that 
this was our city, our streets; Chicago had never felt this way in my lifetime.” 
 
Amisha Patel, parent and executive director, the Grassroots Collaborative, Chicago 
 
On September 10, 2012, Chicago’s teachers walked off the job in the largest strike of the 
new millennium. Against the backdrop of a well-funded effort at the national and local level to 
demonize teachers and their unions for the ills of public education, the union enjoyed 
unprecedented backing from parents, students, and the broader Chicago community.
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 Over nine 
days, teachers and their supporters in the community trounced one of the best-known big-city 
mayors in the country, former White House chief of staff Rahm Emanuel. With the parents of 
more than 400,000 school-age kids scrambling to maintain their own jobs and schedules, a 
mayor appealing to the parents, in paid ads and press conferences, to turn against the teachers, 
the teachers sustained majority support throughout.
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 Not only that: two years later, two major 






U.S. unions have all but abandoned the strike; the incidence of strikes and number of 
workers on strike are at an all-time low,
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 so what explains the popularity of this strike with 
teachers, parents, and the broader public? Does the success of the teachers’ strike during a period 
considered hostile to all workers and brutal to teachers and public-service employees suggest that 
other U.S. workers could effectively use the strike weapon? What lessons can be drawn from the 
example of the Chicago Teachers Union? 
As Francis Fox Piven and Richard Cloward have analyzed, the ability of workers to 
withdraw their cooperation from the interdependent relationship of power is, in part, contingent 
on workers understanding their contribution to the interdependent power equation. Teachers and 
educators (including para professionals, clinicians such as social workers, school nurses, social 
workers and more), do understand their contribution to the education and development of today’s 
K-12 children. I argue that teachers and all educators are what I call are mission-driven workers. 
Surely, they labor for a material reward that enables themselves and their families to pay their 
bills, but they labor for something deeply purposeful, they are called to their labor. Enabling 
mission-driven workers to strike requires a very particular set of circumstances, of context, 
because mission driven workers understand that the withdrawal of their labor has an immediate, 
direct impact on those they are called to serve: for teachers, America’s children, teens and young 
adults.  
When Chicago’s teachers and educators went on strike, the strike authorization vote was 
23,780 yes-to-strike to 482 no-to-strike votes, out of a total universe of 26, 502 members of the 
union. 
206
 One of the most dominant themes in my interviews with rank and file teacher leaders 
was their disbelief, after twenty five years of never having been on strike, that their students, and, 
their students’ parents, would fervently lend them support. When Chicago’s teachers struck, it 
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was a total disruption of the “production process,” not a merely symbolic action so common 
today. Sociologically speaking, the Chicago strike brought a major United States city to a 
grinding halt. The strike impacted over 400,000 households, snarled traffic for days, and brought 
an end to business-as-usual. It was a massive exercise of power.   
 The American Federation of Teachers was born in Chicago in 1916 when four local 
teachers’ unions in the region merged to form a national organization. Two decades later, in 
1937, the Chicago Teachers Union (CTU) was founded; it would remain the largest and most 
influential local union in the AFT until the 1960s, when the New York City local eclipsed 
Chicago’s in power and influence over national union policy. Not only was Chicago an early 
leader in teacher unionism, but a signature legacy of the CTU during their many decades of 
dominance in the national union was its defeat of the Communist Party in its own ranks and 
those of the national union. Smashing the Communist influence was a preoccupation of the CTU 




By the late 1960s, the Communists were out of the union and things were changing. The 
second Great Migration saw waves of African Americans moving to Chicago. Though the 
number of black teachers was expanding with the growth of Chicago’s black population, they 
faced systemic racism inside the Chicago public schools (CPS) through certification and testing 
requirements designed to keep blacks on the rolls as substitutes, not full-time teachers. The 
momentum of the Civil Rights movement and the rise of Black Power emboldened a wildcat 
strike by black teachers that would shake up the union in 1968. The result was two key 
constituencies coming together for the first time: African Americans substitutes aligned with 
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Irish-American teachers to form the United Progressive Caucus (UPC). The UPC controlled the 
union for decades, and in that era, Chicago’s teachers went on strike nine times.
208
 
The 2012 Chicago Teachers Union strike was the CTU’s tenth since 1969, but its first in 
twenty-five years. During the administration of Harold Washington, the nation’s first big-city 
black mayor, the union, which had helped to elect him, led four strikes, including its longest 
strike ever: twenty five days
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 in 1987, just six months into Washington’s second term. As 
George Schmidt, the union’s unofficial historian, tells it:  
“Harold Washington was the most anti-CTU mayor in Chicago history, if we 
measure his years by the number of strikes we were forced to go on. We first elected 
Harold against the white supremacists and racist attacks, but the minute he became 
mayor, he began establishing policies and appointing people who would force us to strike 
in defense of our rights.”
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The teachers union had endorsed Washington, but as is common today, this endorsement 
was not a guarantee of friendly labor relations between educators and his administration.  
From Militant to Milquetoast 
The twenty-five years between that marathon 1987 strike to the strike in 2012 represented 
a steady decline from a once mighty and militant union to a weak, concession-prone union-in-
name-only. The CTU began surrendering its members’ rights under a wave of anti–teacher’s 
union legislation, much of it Chicago-specific rather than Illinois-wide, that presaged the national 
attack on teachers’ unions, including the subsequent federal law called No Child Left Behind. 
Chicago’s students and teachers became the guinea pigs for a relentless assault of efforts to 
“reform” both education and unions—few of which changed actual outcomes in student 





 In 1988, on the heels of the 1987 strike, the first of a series of legislative changes 
was approved: the Chicago School Reform Law. The law was sold as a pro-community 
decentralization effort, and it resulted in several key changes to long-standing policy: Local 
School Councils (LSCs), consisting of one principal, six parents, two teachers, and two 
community members, were created and empowered to hire school principals and make budgetary 
decisions; principals no longer received tenure; and principals were empowered to hire and fire 
teachers. Hiring principals and hiring and firing teachers and setting budgets had previously been 
centralized functions of the Board of Education. The law explicitly barred teachers from running 
for the council as either community or parent members, despite the vast number of teachers who 
were both. Part of what makes teachers so interesting in the production process is that often they 
are also parents and community members. The law, therefore, redefined them as workers devoid 
of their status in society; teachers as a kind of third party constraint to their students, stripped of 
parenthood, stripped of neighborhood, a new constraint in the name of community control. 
The slow downhill slide of the union’s relevance became an avalanche after the death in 
1994 of Jackie Vaughn, an African-American teacher, UPC leader, and CTU president. Tom 
Reece, who assumed the presidency from what had been his number-two spot in the hierarchy, 
was strike and conflict adverse.
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 There was opposition to Reece’s candidacy from a slate called 
the Caucus for a Democratic Union or CDC. Most members of the CDC had also run in 1988, 
but at the time calling themselves the Teachers Action Caucus Two (TAC2).  This presence of 
internal oppositions is important because Robert Michels
213
’ suggests that a signal of oligarchy is 
the absence of internal parties, or, caucuses. Reece was busy increasing pay and expanding the 
payroll, but not doing much else. The opposing slate alleged vote rigging
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, but entrenchment 
and low voter turnout helped the UPC incumbents retain their positions.  
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Although Chicago has never had an elected school board, the presence of the nominating 
committee interfered with Mayor Daley’s ability to control decisionmaking at CPS. Additionally, 
the grassroots reform groups who had been proponents of the 1988 Chicago School Reform Act 
concluded that the law hadn’t led to greater parental involvement, one of their goals. Finally, a 
fiscal crisis—which some in the union allege was completely manufactured— prompted a new 
effort in the state legislature to “fix” Chicago’s schools, one more sweeping and more explicitly 
aimed at weakening the union.  
In 1995, the Amendatory Act, aimed at amending the Chicago School Reform Act, had as 
its bull’s-eye the teachers and their union.
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 In the name of the alleged fiscal crisis, and with 
Illinois having trifecta Republican control meaning the Governor and both legislative chambers 
belonged to the same conservative party, the law permitted privatization within the Chicago 
public school system for the first time, encouraging the private contracting out of many 
functions, from the cafeterias to janitorial services and more. This legislation laid the 
groundwork for a concept that was then brand-new: charter schools. (At the time, only two states 
had adopted charter schools, Minnesota (1991) and Texas (1995).
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 As part of the provisions of 
the Amendatory Act, teachers lost the right to collectively bargain over the length of their day, 
their schedules, and class size, conditions long considered central to their quality of work and 
home life.  
Daley reasserted total mayoral control by abolishing the nominations commission and 
shrinking the Board of Education, which the earlier law had expanded, changing its name from 
the Board of Education to the Reform Board of Trustees. The education model had shifted 
decidedly to a business model, one that entirely eliminated pedagogical experience from the 
requirements for the CPS’s top staff positions. A chief executive officer (CEO) replaced the 
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superintendent; similar title changes across the hierarchy changed the language of school 
governance to that of business administration. Finally, Mayor Daley took defensive action 
against a struggle that was unlikely to emerge in that era of the teachers’ union: he had language 
added to the law that for the first time made strikes illegal. The actual wording banned strikes for 
eighteen months; that was the period of time the mayor thought he needed to implement the 
whole law, with its radical curtailment of teachers’ rights.
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 Reece, the new union president, 
wasn’t yet a well-known quantity—if he had been, Daley might have realized that the anti-strike 
provision was a waste of ink and political capital. Reece got busy claiming PATCO meant that 
workers should never strike again.
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 Daley had given Reece an opportunity to galvanize teachers 
for their right to strike but instead Reece took this as political cover for his own anti-strike 
orientation. 
It would take several years under the new pro-privatization, pro-charter, anti–teacher and 
teachers’ union CPS administration before a serious challenge to the UPC and Reece emerged 
inside the union. In the 1998 union elections, a caucus calling itself the ProActive Caucus of 
Teachers, or, PACT, ran a slate to take control of the CTU, winning the union’s high-school 
seats but failing to win the union’s officerships and other executive board positions. Still, a 
challenge to the UPC had begun. Meanwhile, the first Chicago public school CEO, Paul Vallas, 
made changes in the schools that were as swift as they were sweeping. He was taking advantage 
of every corner of legislative permissibility, and deal-cutting with CTU leader Reece along the 
way.  
The teachers were getting contracts with reasonable raises and not much else. This was in 
part, if not entirely, because the price of their raises were their acquiescence to the creation of 
charter schools in 1996, the mass privatization of many other city services that had previously 
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provided non-teachers with decently paid union jobs, and in Vallas’s assumption and 
implementation of monarchical powers—to disband local school councils, fire principals, and fire 
teachers en masse in schools he deemed to be “failing.” Soon, he changed the justifying term 
“failing school” to “educational crisis school.” By 1996, he’d changed that to “on probation,” 
adding to his powers the ability to fire the school’s entire staff. In 1996, he put 109 schools on 
probation, creating the first reserve pool of teachers in the district. Though initially these 
displaced teachers were paid for up to twenty months if they remained in the pool, the move 
marked the beginning of a challenge to teachers’ seniority. Then Vallas changed the name of his 
game again, to “intervention,” and the reserve pool grew as he claimed the power to selectively 
fire teachers inside a school and to cut the reserve-pool pay period from twenty months to ten. 
Remarkably, this entire era is considered an era of labor peace with Chicago’s teachers union. 
In 2001, the year of No Child Left Behind, two changes set the stage for yet more 
upheaval: Mayor Daley grew disgruntled with Vallas, whose assumption of so much power 
publicly challenged his own. Daley preferred “his” people to genuflect, and Vallas had to go. 
That year also, the PACT Caucus finally succeeded in wresting the union from the control of the 
UPC. According to George Schmidt, “Reece was double-dipping by this point, because he was 
serving as president of the Illinois Federation of Teachers and the president of the CTU. It was to 
the point of corruption.” In May of 2001, Debbie Lynch and the PACT slate swept all the top 
offices and executive board seats in CTU— the first time that UPC had been out of office since 
the late 1960s. The difference between the slate she ran in her failed bid in 1998 from her slate in 
2001 was Howard Heath, a black teacher she picked as her number two. The addition of Heath, 
along with the mounting chaos being created by Vallas, assured PACT’s union election success. 
One month later, Mayor Daley would nominate Arne Duncan, Vallas’s chief of staff, as the new 
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CEO of the Chicago school system. Duncan was a Harvard grad who had been playing 
professional basketball in Australia for four years. His education experience was minimal: he’d 
been the director of a small nonprofit that was working on educational achievement issues.
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Arne Duncan’s strategy with the union was to foster collaboration with Lynch, its new 
leader, courting her, calling her often, and immediately bringing her into his fold. By 2002, the 
Civic Committee of the Commercial Club of Chicago, the most powerful big-business group in 
the city, had released a report titled “Left Behind: Student Achievement in Chicago’s Public 
Schools.” The report identified “school unions” and “politics” as the chief factors in poor student 
performance in a school system where 85 percent of the students participated in the school lunch 
program
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 and 9.4 percent were white. The report made two key recommendations: merit pay 
for teachers and the creation of 100 new charter schools in Chicago. CTU president Lynch’s 
comment to the press was “Collaboration is best done with, not outside of, the CPS.”
221
 As a 
reward for the new union leader’s commitment to collaboration, Duncan cut a deal to bargain 
over the school day, followed by him almost immediately getting Lynch to agree to lengthen the 
school day. By 2003, CEO Duncan, like his predecessor, had renamed the program by which the 
authority of the local schools council was to be undermined: “renaissance schools.” 
“Renaissance” described a school that was closed and whose staff was fired, but that was then 
“reconstituted” in the same building, with selective firing or keeping of teachers—at Duncan’s 
will. Lynch brought a contract before the teachers that fall that was initially voted down, 
overwhelmingly (more evidence that Michels’ oligarchy did not exist in the CTU). When the 
members trounced her contract, she was sent back to the bargaining table to come back with 
more and in her second settlement, the teachers narrowly approved a marginally better deal. 
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By the spring of 2004, teachers were fed up with Lynch’s collaborationist model and 
decided that the change they voted for had been ineffective. They handed the leadership back to 
a UPC slate, headed up this time by an African-American special-education teacher named 
Marilyn Stewart. George Schmidt said that Stewart talked a good line and said the things 
teachers wanted to hear—an apparent reprieve from the one-term PACT-Lynch experiment 
favoring collaboration over confrontation—but Stewart didn’t act tough. Shortly after her 
election, in June of 2004, Duncan announced the Renaissance 2010 plan, whose centerpiece was 
lifted from the pages of the Commercial Club of Chicago’s 2002 report and which called again 
for the creation of 100 new charter schools.
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 The plan would be paid for by the closure of 
twenty of the twenty-two schools on Chicago’s south side. The union did not protest. In fact, 




Change Begins, From the Outside In 
Two long-time community organizations in Chicago weren’t waiting for the teachers’ 
union to sort out their internal affairs or opinions at the end of a decade of massive disruptions in 
the lives of Chicago’s school kids, parents and teachers. The first to take action was the Chicago 
Coalition of the Homeless, who attempted to thwart the charter plan, or at least stall it, by filing 
suit in Circuit Court in September of 2004, generating headlines as they linked the effort to 
privatize schools to broader gentrification and the demolition of Chicago’s public housing. Two 
months later, Parents United for Responsible Education (PURE) and the Kenwood-Oakwood 
Community Organization (KOCO), a direct-action organization founded in 1965 by religious and 
community activists, started a fight-back when they brought hundreds of parents and students to 
a Chicago Public School board meeting to protest the plan to close all but two of their twenty-
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two neighborhood schools. KOCO’s members, like the Chicago Coalition for the Homeless, had 
already experienced displacement of one sort, as many of Chicago’s public-housing apartments 
were being torn down. At that November 2004 meeting, after being completely ignored by the 
CPS board, the KOCO’s chair, Jitu Brown, announced loudly to the packed room and to the 
board, “Oh, now it’s on! We were trying to be civil, but now it’s going to be civil 
disobedience!”
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 The resistance campaign led by Chicago’s community based organizations 
succeeded in getting the plan moderated, shrinking the initial closings from twenty to twelve, but 
it was clear more battles were coming. By 2006 Jitu Brown, already seen as a leader in the 
struggle against the school closings, went from chairing the board of KOCO to being a full-time, 
paid education organizer.  
Ten schools on Chicago’s South Side had been saved, but by the 2005-2006 school year, 
more than a dozen had been closed, along with another two dozen throughout the city. Each 
closing provoked site-based protests, but there was no effective citywide challenge. Chicago’s 
long history of Alinskysim had created strong neighborhood-based organizations, but these had a 
political and policy vision which stopped at their tightly drawn and highly turfed-out 
neighborhood boundaries.
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 The organization that was citywide and crossed all neighborhoods, 
the teachers’ union, was barely audible. But among the ranks of the teachers being impacted by 
school closings, a new generation of activists was individually aligning with various 
neighborhood groups across the city. When Englewood High School and De La Cruz Middle 
school were threatened with closure, and Senn High School with a complete revision of its 
mission,  individual actors among the teachers—Jackson Potter at Englewood and his friend Al 
Ramirez, Norine Gutenkanst at nearby Whittier, and Kristine Mayle at De La Cruz, and 
eventually Jesse Sharkey at Senn, who was mobilizing a Save Our Senn (charter threat) effort—
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began to coalesce into a broader teacher’s movement. Potter was on the board of directors of 
another of Chicago’s important neighborhood groups, the Pilsen Alliance, and Gutenkanst was 
an active member. The Pilsen Alliance was based in and identified with the Mexican 
neighborhood, just as KOCO had a black base and leadership. Ramirez and Potter devoted 2007 
to making a handheld amateur video about the school closings, going around the city 
interviewing teachers, parents, and kids. By late 2007, these teachers had formed a citywide 




The Caucus of Rank-and-File Educators (CORE) Forms 
Out of the 2007 study group, whose first collective read was Naomi Klein’s The Shock 
Doctrine
227
, two more important groups were developed: the Caucus of Rank-and-File Educators 
(CORE), inside of the Chicago Teachers Union, and soon after that the Grassroots Education 
Movement (GEM), a CORE-inspired coalition created with community-based organizations to 
fight school closings, gentrification, and racism.
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 The Shock Doctrine had just been published, 
and Klein was shaping an analysis about mass school closures, capitalism, and racism. 
According to Kristine Mayle, a middle and elementary school special education teacher and 
currently the union’s elected financial secretary, “We were going to neighborhood groups and 
saying, Look, we are talking about little human beings, about kids; we are teachers and you are 
our natural allies; we can’t do this alone.”
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 With each school closing, the ranks of teachers 
frustrated and angered were growing. By the time CORE was formalized in early 2008, many 
more were actively participating in the study groups, including Jesse Sharkey and Karen Lewis. 
At this point, rather than fighting school closings or challenging the CPS, Marilyn 
Stewart, the union president, was focused on a single goal: taking total control of the union. 
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Stewart had been reelected in the spring of 2007 partly because of her tough talk in public, but 
mainly because of the absence of any coherent challenge. The PACT, the one caucus that had 
defeated the UPC in 2001, was engaging with Stewart in  internal union politics.  Petty cronyism 
and self-absorption ruled the day. Stewart had already brought her vice president up on internal 
charges and removed him from office, and now she was bent on removing other potential future 
challengers to her seemingly entrenched reign.  
According to Jackson Potter, CORE’s initial mission was “to do what the union should 
have been doing all along, acting like a union in the face of massive upheaval.”
230
 The CORE 
study group was now being augmented by other activities. Since Potter’s school had been 
converted to a charter (half became a charter and half a charter-like ‘Team’ school), and with the 
resources of the ten months of paid ‘reserve’ time provided by CPS, he decided to study istory at 
the graduate level.
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 He began to read about the recent actions of the British Columbia 
Teacher’s Federation (BCTF), including an illegal strike in 2005 widely considered to have been 
won primarily because the teachers had spent several years developing mass support among 
community-based groups before they walked off the job in defiance of a recently passed law that 
defined them as “essential employees,” which in Canada eliminated their legal right to strike. 
The source of the stories was Substance News, the long-time internal opposition newspaper, 
another challenge to Michels’ iron law of oligarchy. The internal opposition paper had long 
publicized internal opposition as well as militant teacher activism from around the world. Potter 
raised the idea to CORE that they should pool their money and get a plane ticket to bring the 
head of the British Columbia Teachers Federation to come to Chicago for a day to educate 
CORE members about how the Canadian union had won their strike, beat back court injunctions, 





The CTU had officially disbanded their committee on school closings in 2007, clearing 
the path for CORE’s ascent as the place to go for those concerned about Arne Duncan’s plans. 
The teachers, many of whom had been engaged with local neighborhood groups in site-based 
fight-backs prior to this, saw the simultaneous formation of GEM as an extension of their 
foundational understanding of “what a union should be doing.” According to Mayle, “We shared 
an underpinning, a common analysis about class, race and public education, and that common 
analysis lets us work it out when things get tricky.” GEM and CORE grew and developed 
simultaneously while the official union bureaucracy was unraveling. There was no initial plan to 
contest for union office, but rather to see the new caucus as one that could make the existing 
union leadership do what it was, in these activists’ minds, “supposed to do.” In the fall of 2009, 
CORE teacher activists and GEM nonteacher activists attended every single school board 
meeting, each time amassing more recruits to their cause and challenging the school board. 
Meanwhile, the union bureaucrats were busy bringing each other up on charges. 
GEM decided to organize a public community forum on school closings, to be held in the 
end of 2009, when the CPS planned to release the school closings list. CORE activists would use 
the forum to deepen their fight against school closings and to strengthen and expand their ties 
with the broader Chicago community, and also to recruit and expand their base among the 
teachers. Because Chicago’s community groups had for so long lived in the legacy of Saul 
Alinsky and provincial neighborhood isms, GEM and CORE taking this effort citywide did 
signal a change in the Chicago norm. Their momentum was building nicely, but an external 
factor wasn’t cooperating—Chicago’s weather. On the day of the forum, a blizzard struck. There 
was a debate about whether or not to cancel the event, but its organizers decided to move 
forward. More than 500 people came out despite the blizzard. Several weeks later, the Chicago 
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School Board trimmed back the planned closure list. Expectations were suddenly raised that 
teacher-and-community coalition could beat city hall.  
That spring, CORE held a convention and began to solidify its structure. They set 
affordable dues: $35 per person per year. They ratified a mission statement. And they continued 
attending CPS school board meetings. They began discussing the potential for a discrimination 
charge against the CPS administration based on the fact that most of the teachers being impacted 
by the closures were black. The number of African-American teachers was declining rapidly as 
the turnaround schools hired Teach for America recruits and younger teachers, changing the 
demographics of Chicago’s teaching force, bringing down the pay scale, and, perhaps most 
importantly, rupturing the tradition of teachers who lived in the same neighborhoods in which 
they taught. By June, CORE had decided to file a formal complaint at the Equal Employment 
Education Commission (EEOC). Though this challenge would later be dismissed, the organizing 
and media around the EEOC complaint increased CORE’s base among black teachers and helped 
CORE build a relationship with the union’s black caucus. The EEOC complaint and several 
other school and teaching profession–specific fights that CORE led during the summer of 2009 
were part of an ever-expanding reach by CORE into all aspects of the union, pushing beyond the 
school-closings battles.   
In October of 2009 a union-wide election was held for the union’s pension board trustee 
seats. Potter and a few others decided to campaign as a test of CORE’s ability to mobilize 
enough of a citywide school-based teacher vote to win an internal union election. The CPS CEO, 
previously the head of the Chicago Transit Authority, never previously considered a stepping 
stone to heading the schools, had already taken a wrecking ball to the Chicago transit workers’ 
pension, so having smart and fighting teacher leadership on the pension board mattered in and of 
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itself and could be used as a test of CORE’s mobilization capacity. When the CORE candidates 
narrowly won both trustee seats in a tight race, caucus members began to have a very different 
discussion about how to challenge the Arne Duncan Renaissance 2010 plan: this time, they 
would challenge their inept union leaders for top offices.  
 
The Slate of Candidates Emerges 
In the August  of 2009, CORE held a nominations convention, so that caucus members 
could decide who amongst them would run for the union’s higher offices. According to George 
Schmidt, there was internal competition for each position, and members were allowed to listen to 
candidate speeches and ask questions of the potential candidates: “My only question that day in 
2009 was to ask how are you going to prepare the union for the strike we are going to have to 
have in 2012 to get a contract?” CORE members chose their slate: Karen Lewis for president, 
Jackson Potter for vice president, Michael Brunson for recording secretary, and Kristine Mayle 
for financial secretary. In response to a credentials challenge from the old guard of the union, 
Potter had to withdraw: the  union’s constitution states that no member can run for elected office 
who has not been a continuous dues-paying members in the three prior years; Potter had a lapse 
in his dues from the year he’d taken off after his school had been closed. Though some in the 
union and active in the caucus, like Schmidt, thought Potter should challenge the ruling, Potter 
decided not to give the old guard any potential negative talking points about the CORE slate in 
general. And although he was off the slate officially, his role as a key strategist and chief 
influence in the union never faltered.  
The architects of the slate paid close attention to developing a team that would represent 
the broad diversity of the union, including in grade level and type of teacher; race and ethnicity; 
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age and experience; untenured and long-tenured status. The top of the ticket, Karen Lewis, was a 
woman whose black father and white Jewish mother had both been public school teachers in 
Chicago (as is her husband). Lewis herself had been the only black woman in her 1974 
graduating class at Dartmouth. She had taught chemistry in Chicago high schools for twenty-two 
years.
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 She had been a member of the union’s black caucus prior to getting involved with 
CORE, but she had no deep experience with the union. With the exception of Chicago’s mayor, 
Rahm Emanuel, it’s hard to find anyone in Chicago who doesn’t have great things to say about 
Lewis. Schmidt, CTU’s informal historian and a long-time leader who himself once ran for 
president, in an unsuccessful bid to rid the union of the UPC, describes the Lewis appeal:  
“Karen is half Jewish and half Black. She speaks better Yiddish than Rahm. She’s 
a Nationally Board Certified Teacher. She’s so intense and so thorough; the level of her 
intelligence is incredibly high. When Jean Claude Brizard became the CEO of the CPS, 
there was this policy forum organized by the Chicago Tribune, with one of those 
backdrop banners ‘Chicago Issues Week.’ I was taking pictures for the magazine, and 
Brizard, who speaks with a Haitian accent, comes on stage and Karen rattles off some 
long greeting in French to him, and he just stares at her, turns out she knows more French 
than him. It’s just Karen stuff, so complex and so intelligent.”
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To become a National Board Certified Teacher, the highest possible certification 
available in K-12, teachers subject themselves to a rigorous process of exams over several years 
with an intense focus on best practice and pedagogy. Lewis is the only teacher union leader 
anywhere in the US with this distinction.
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 Jesse Sharkey, the Vice Presidential candidate, like Lewis an early member of 
CORE, was also raised by a teacher, his single mother. And like Lewis, Sharkey was a top 
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student and graduated from an Ivy League school, Brown University. Unlike Lewis, Sharkey is 
white and grew up in one of the whitest regions of the U.S., rural Maine, where his mother was a 
back-to-the-lander. Sharkey was in high school in Maine during one of the most contentious 
strikes in the latter half of the last century, at the Jay Maine Paper Mill. The strike made a big 
impression on him; he later wrote his undergraduate thesis on it. He was a student activist in 
college and upon graduation went to work as a union organizer. His first move was to attend the 
AFL-CIO’s Organizing Institute (OI), a program that taught the fundamentals of how to win a 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) election. Successful graduates of this three-day 
program are placed with a union to apprentice their skills, and Sharkey was placed with the 
United Steelworkers of America.  He worked as a young organizer on the ALCOA campaign, 
one of the larger union victories of that era. The person who led his apprenticeship was Bob 
Callahan, who would go on to become the national organizing director at SEIU under Andy 
Stern.  
Sharkey tired of the hot-shop model at the Steelworkers, which followed easy but often 
pyric wins rather than strategic and power building organizing. In 1993 he quit and moved back 
to Providence, where he went to work for the local union 1199 New England, where he was 
mentored by a long-respected organizer named Stan Israel. Eventually, he returned to school to 
get his teaching degree, then moved to Chicago when his fiancée was offered a job at In These 
Times, a progressive magazine. He began teaching high school social studies in the fall of 1998. 
In March of that year he was struck by a massive brain hemorrhage and was hospitalized in 
critical condition. Sharkey says that this experience changed his view of life and of the things 
that matter. After returning to work, he became a union delegate, but he was not particularly 





Jackson Potter’s parents are activists. When Potter was growing up, they were considered 
left-wing and identified themselves as Reds. His father is a labor lawyer, his step-father worked 
with the Teamsters for a Democratic Union (TDU), and his mother is a lawyer who has long 
worked on progressive causes.
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 Their son attended K-12 in the Chicago public schools and 
while in high school helped lead a school walkout for more equitable school funding. He 
attended the University of Illinois at Urbana, and then transferred to the University of Illinois in 
Chicago; he did his graduate program at the University of Chicago. He was a student activist all 
through college, working with Students Against Sweatshops and on anti-Iraq war efforts, 
campaigning against the UI mascot ( an Indian chief), and working for increased minority 
student recruitment. When he returned to the Chicago area to finish his university years, he got 
involved in antigentrification campaigns around campus, working with the Pilsen Alliance, the 
neighborhood group that later allied with the teachers against school closings. Potter became a 
history teacher and, like Sharkey, a union delegate turned serious union activist when his school, 
Englewood High, was threatened with a closure—a campaign Arne Duncan won, leaving Potter 
and many others out of a job. Potter and a colleague, Al Ramirez, are widely credited with being 
the cofounders of CORE, and Potter is often referred to as the lead strategist. Madeleine Talbot, 
a long-time and successful community organizer in Chicago, refers to him often as “brilliant”—a 
word she uses sparingly.
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Michael Brunson and Kristine Mayle had much less union contact or experience before 
they were elected to top union office. Brunson, who is black, was an elementary school teacher 
on Chicago’s South Side and was better known for his activism on and with the Local Schools 
Councils (LSCs). His first involvement, like Mayle’s, was with CORE in 2008. Though he had 
been teaching for many years, his education activism had been with community groups, not with 
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his teachers’ union. Brunson met the CORE activists because the community organization he 
was working with at the time began getting involved in GEM. Mayle is white and is the youngest 
of the Lewis team. She had barely begun her teaching career when her school, De La Cruz, was 
targeted for closure. She hadn’t had long experience suffering under a bad union, and she 
emerged as a top leader in CORE, known for her tenacity, smarts and energy and a commitment 
to build the kind of union that could stop school closures. 
 These CORE candidates had ten months to campaign before the every-three-years 
election in May of 2010. CORE’s strategy was to continue what they had been doing, contesting 
the Renaissance 2010 plan, working through GEM with the community, and building a more 
systematic approach to developing their potential teacher voting base. With 600 schools, a 
universe of almost 30,000 voters, and few financial resources, they went to work in the biggest 
schools, those that would have the most votes in the election. In January of 2010, CORE, 
working with GEM, hosted their second wintertime forum on school closings, with 400 in 
attendance. As the May election neared, the union’s old guard was both fracturing into sub-
candidate slates, thus weakening their hand, and was throwing one obstacle after another in the 
way of the competition—including asking the administration to ban teachers from campaigning 
in any way in or near Chicago’s schools. A different slate, the PACT slate, took the CTU leaders 
to court to get them to stop interfering in the election, but it was CORE who benefited the most 
from PACT’s legal victories, as CORE had the most extensive grassroots operation by the spring 
of 2010. In part because of all the shenanigans taking place, all of the caucuses running against 
each other and against the current office holders, the UPC, met before the election and agreed 
that if the UPC did not win on the first round—which would require 51 percent or more of the 
vote—all other slates would line up behind the number-two slate in an effort to remove the UPC 
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from office. And on May 21, that is exactly what happened. With nearly 18,000—more than half 
of Chicago’s teachers—turning out to vote, the UPC got 32 percent of the vote to CORE’s 31 




Reflective of the smart strategy and careful planning CORE had displayed since its 
founding, they had planned a Save Our Schools Rally for May 25, between the first election and 
the planned runoff date. CORE members moved this rally through the union’s House of 
Delegates, to make it officially a CTU rally, and this was a master stroke: the literature for the 
Save Our Schools Rally was covered with CORE’s logo, giving the slate additional visibility 
beyond their own campaign literature leading up to both elections; the universe of activists who 
would be motivated to recruit attendees for the Save Our Schools Rally would be larger than the 
typical universe of people involved in an internal union election; the rally cemented the image of 
CORE as the people who were already fighting for real change in the education system, not just 
electoral power; and, in case of a runoff, the rally would give them a huge visibility and 
credibility boost just days before teachers returned to the polls. The SOS event was the biggest 
rally in Chicago in many years, with more than 5,000 marchers. According to Madeline Talbot, 
“Some teachers organized this rally to fight school closures, in May of 2010, and I couldn’t get 
to it, and then I started hearing from people that it was the best fucking rally they had ever been 
to, and that was CORE.”  
On May 31, CORE posted a 2 ½ -minute video clip of their rally, encouraging all of their 
supporters to take to social media to share it. In the clip, Lewis and Sharkey are seeing marching 
among the thousands who took to downtown Chicago. At the end, text comes up reminding 
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teachers to vote in the runoff on June 11.
240
 On June 11, the online version of Substance, the 
Chicago Teacher Union’s alternative weekly newspaper since the late 1960s posted the results:  
“CORE not only won the top four offices in the union, but the other nine citywide 
offices, and all of the vice presidencies for high schools (six) and elementary schools 
(17). By the time the final vote counts were announced in the early hours of June 12, it 
was clear that CORE had completely defeated the United Progressive Caucus (UPC) and 
the six-year CTU president Marilyn Stewart.”  
In her acceptance speech, Karen Lewis framed the crisis in a way no union president had 
since the 1988 Chicago School Reform Act, the act which began the attack on the schools:  
“Corporate America sees K-12 public education as 380 billion dollars that, up 
until the last 10 or 15 years, they didn’t have a sizeable piece of. This so-called school 
reform is not an education plan.  It’s a business plan…15 years ago, this city purposely 
began starving our lowest-income neighborhood schools of greatly needed resources and 
personnel. Class sizes rose, and schools were closed.  Then, standardized tests, which in 
this town alone is a $60 million business, measured that slow death by starvation. These 
tests labeled our students, families, and educators failures, because standardized tests 
reveal more about a student’s zip code than a student’s academic growth.”
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Lewis was reclaiming the identity of teacher as not just worker, but teacher, parent, 
community member, citizen activist.  
From Milquetoast to Militant  
The Chicago Sun Times telegraphed the changed union with this headline: “New CTU 
President is a Fierce Foe of Daley’s Agenda.” On June 15, just four days after the reform slate 
swept into office, the Chicago School Board held an emergency meeting and voted unanimously 
179 
 
to give the CPS CEO unilateral authority to lay off teachers and increase class size. This move 
the union interpreted as the first in a long series of welcoming gestures that would continue all 
summer. Within two days of the board’s meeting, racing the clock against summer vacation, the 
new leaders sent out an urgent alert that read, in part, “The Board will work overtime this 
summer to ensure their demands are met. They assume that teachers, PSRPs, parents, and 
students will be “on vacation.” The last thing the board wants us to do is to continue organizing.” 
Attached was a sample Excel spread sheet and a plea that members gather the name, email, and 
phone numbers of not only every teacher but also every parent, with instructions to send the 
completed spreadsheet to the new leadership.
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 The newly elected slate hadn’t yet taken the 
reigns of office—that wouldn’t happen officially until July 1, per the union constitution
243
—but 
they were immediately shifting the vision and work of the union by including parents as a core 
constituency. 
The union did not have an organizing department, but it did have a lot of staff, as well as 
plenty of field representatives. One of the first acts of the new officers was to reduce their own 
salaries considerably, aligning them with teachers’ salaries; they also eliminated the excessive 
personal spending accounts of the previous officers. These savings alone freed up enough money 
for them to begin to cobble together their union’s first organizing department. But unlike such 
departments in most unions, this one was created only for the purpose of internal organizing, to 
work with the existing members and help rebuild the union. The new leaders were keenly aware 
that they had less than two years before the union’s current contract expired, and less time—
eighteen months—before they would be sitting at the negotiations table; unions typically begin 
contract negotiations many months before a contract expires. They had inherited a vast 
organization—albeit one untested and unassessed—of teachers from each school. Hundreds of 
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these were elected delegates, the shop stewards of teachers’ unions, that function as problem 
solvers at the shop floor (or individual school) level. But because the CTU had been mostly 
consumed by internal warfare for years, no one really understood the quality of the delegates the 
CORE leaders were inheriting.  
Norine Gutekanst left teaching and took the role of organizing coordinator, heading up 
the new department. Though she had been a key CORE activist, unlike Sharkey she had no 
formal training as a union organizer. She quickly hired Matthew Luskin, who had been the 
organizing director from 2003 to 2010 at SEIU’s public-sector Illinois (and later mega) local for 
home-care and child-care workers. Known for most of those years as Local 880, this union was 
later renamed HealthCare Illinois and then expanded to represent the same classes of workers in 
Indiana, Missouri and Kansas. The local, according to its president, Keith Kelleher, was “always 
considered one of those ACORN locals”—a reference to the local unions inspired or formed by 
Wade Rathke. Kelleher describes their model as a “community organizing model, very 
grassroots based, with a lot of door knocking, workers being responsible for their drive and not 
just in name only, but with heavy preparation and training.”
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 Because of Luskin’s experience, 
he and Gutekanst functioned more like co-coordinators in the design of the new department.  
They saw their chief work as focusing on the delegates: winning them over to the new 
strategy would be key to their union’s immediate future. They recast the delegates from 
“information conduits” to school leaders—leaders who would need to very quickly begin 
organizing and mobilizing in the schools. According to Luskin, “Our model wasn’t about the 
staff picking leaders, it was about winning the debate about our future with the existing leaders 
in each school; we had to win the debate about our new strategy among the rank and file.” The 
fight was being positioned as an all-out high stakes, high risk battle royal.  
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Organizers went from school to school attending as many school meetings as they could 
and blowing the debate about strategy wide open. Luskin recalls that they’d start by saying, “If 
any of you think the next contract is about a percentage-point raise, tell us, because we think we 
know it’s about the future of public education as we know it: that’s what’s on the table.”
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 If the 
labor movement’s instinct has been to reduce demands in order to sound reasonable, the new 
CTU took the opposite approach: they led every meeting with school-based discussions of 
billionaires, banks, and racism. Mass political education of the existing base was their primary 
focus. Along with all of CTU’s leaders, they were creating a sense of urgency, a burning 
platform, and framing the choice ahead in very clear and unambiguous language.  
Because CORE had won a commanding victory, every single officer was a CORE slate 
member, including the many lesser ones—area vice presidents, vice presidents for every type of 
school and grade level, etc. All of these newly elected officers were on the same program, 
unified in their vision, making the work of “winning over the delegates to the new strategy” a 
union-wide effort at every level. CTU delegates meet on the second Wednesday of every month 
to make union policy. Under the previous leadership, these meetings had low attendance, so low 
that they wouldn’t always make quorum. And when they did, often the old UPC leaders would 
talk for so long at the microphones during the “officer reports” at the meeting’s beginning, that 
delegates would leave in frustration, which was just what the leaders wanted them to do. 
Verbosity was a useful tool to keep inconvenient delegates—such as CORE members—from 
raising issues from the floor. Then came CORE’s  clean sweep election, and,by the time the new 
school year began in September of 2010, the meetings were packed, with 800 teacher delegates 
walking in hoping to better understand their new union and begin to implement an entirely new 
program. Those monthly meetings came to resemble an entire union convention.  
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Union vice president Jesse Sharkey explains that CORE had an activist rather than a 
shop-floor model. It was consistent with the model Luskin brought from his SEIU years, but 
formed that way for different reasons and with different origins. Some of CORE’s members had 
been elected as delegates in their schools, but most were just free radicals. “I would defend that 
model because during that time there were a lot of political defeats,” Sharkey says. “We needed 
to create a space that was inspiring, where we could co-think and where we could get excited 
together, so at the end of a meeting it wasn’t just telling people to go back to your buildings and 
work with your coworkers. People were learning politics, people were getting excited; we did a 
lot of things in early 2010, in 2011, and leading up to 2012 to get people excited about taking 
back Chicago.”
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 During the first year, eight of the long-serving field representatives left, 
mostly through resignations and retirements. These changes gave the new leadership yet more 
resources for creating new departments in the union and re-creating old ones, such as 
communications and politics.  
That September, the teacher’s union was experiencing revolutionary changes on the 
inside, throwing off the shackles of the UPC, which had held union office in a one-party rule for 
thirty-six of the previous forty-two years. Outside the union, the entire city was hit with the 
equivalent of a massive earthquake when Mayor Daley announced he would not seek an eighth 
term.
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 Mayors named Daley had held the office for forty-two out of the past fifty-five years. As 
Amisha Patel, executive director of the Grassroots Collaborative in Chicago, recalls it: 
 “When Daley announced he wasn’t running, we had a window where everyone 
began excitedly discussing what we could do in this new moment in our city. We had a 
mayoral forum called New Chicago 2011, and 2,600 people showed up and the energy 
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was rocking. Even though Rahm’s announcement a few weeks later crushed that moment, 
we had cracked open the idea that Chicago could be different.” 
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Getting 2,600 people from across the city to attend a mayoral forum is even more 
impressive when you consider that not only had the mayor’s office been functionally a family-
run business for generations, but also that the long history of Chicago’s community organizing 
sector was steeped in the traditions of Saul Alinsky. No city has been more impacted by 
Alinskyism than Chicago, and the resulting culture for more than a half-century was one of 
racially segregated neighborhood-based organizations existing inside tightly drawn 
neighborhood boundaries, all political imagination choked by the idea that one’s own little ward 
was the universe.  
“The Daley legacy was so deep because people thought Chicago could never change, so 
having even a little space of time where there was uncertainty allowed groups to cross old lines 
and sit down in one big room and imagine a different kind of Chicago,” Patel says. Patel, a 
Chicago native, left the city to attend Stanford University on a full scholarship. Her parents were 
both born in India, and she represents another aspect of the changing Chicago. After becoming a 
student activist and getting involved in progressive issues in the San Francisco Bay Area, she 
was settling into the idea of never enduring a cold Midwestern winter again. Then one day, while 
she sat enjoying the warm California sun and contemplating various career options with 
progressive groups around the Bay, she had an epiphany, one that felt to her the way people have 
described feeling the call to religious duty. “I thought, Wait a minute, why not Chicago? Why 
not go home where there’s so much work to be done? The Bay Area is full of progressive 
activists.” So Patel did go home and went to work for SEIU’s government workers’ union in 
Chicago—a different local union than the one Luskin worked for, although the two met many 
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times. At SEIU, Patel was constantly trying to do coalition building with Chicago’s communities 
in an effort to develop fairly traditional union-community labor alliances. In 2006, along with 
others, including ACORN and a few unions besides the major player, SEIU, she took part in the 
successful campaign to pass Chicago’s 2006 Big Box ordinance, which forced warehouses like 
Walmart’s to substantially increase base pay to $9.25 an hour—an early forerunner of later 
minimum wage movements. In 2007, she was ready to do something focused more on shifting 
Chicago’s community-organizing sector from turf-based to citywide thinking. By 2010, when the 
teachers’ union and city hall were opening up in new ways, her Grassroots Collaborative was 
perfectly situated to become a key partner in that change.
249
 
Throughout the fall of 2010, the CTU’s new leadership was engaged in endless 
skirmishes with the Chicago public schools CEO, including a successful campaign to reverse 
most of the 1,700 layoffs the CEO had implemented in direct violation of the union contract. 
Using the powers vested in him by the emergency meeting held just after CORE swept into 
power at the teachers’ union, he had ignored contractually negotiated seniority, and the union 
won in court. There were plenty of hints that the stakes in the next contract were going to be 
dialed to “highest risk.” And when Rahm Emanuel resigned from his post at the White House in 
mid-October, returned to Chicago and quickly mobilized the signatures he would need to file by 
November for the February 2011 mayoral election, hints of high risk turned to something more 
closely resembling a visit from the Angel of Death. For two years, Emanuel had been deeply 
involved with a fellow Chicagoan, Secretary of Education Arne Duncan, the original architect of 
Chicago Public Schools Renaissance 2010, the program that had in many ways provoked the 
birth of CORE. Within weeks, Emanuel’s campaign team developed an ad in which the 
candidate took aim at Chicago’s teachers, chiding them for not working enough hours in the day 
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and promising that as mayor, he would make it a top priority to lengthen Chicago’s school day. 
Unknown to anyone at the time, the anti-teacher Emanuel TV ad had been scripted in part by the 
Stand for Children campaign. Jonah Edelman, the group’s founder, was later busted snarkily 
boasting in a video clip at the 2011 annual elite one percent gathering called the Summer Aspen 
Institute that Stand for Children had “duped the Chicago teachers into accepting a deal that 
would mean they could never go on strike.”
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The union was firing on more cylinders than a Porsche, trying to shift the CTU’s 18-
wheeler bureaucratic administration, which had long since stopped functioning in any 
meaningful way. Behind the scenes, as they tried in rebuild themselves while putting out fires 
like a fall 2010 legislative assault on public pensions—including those of teachers—Emanuel 
was home campaigning and putting a bull’s-eye on the CTU with what Edelman called “the 
talking points we wrote” which Emanuel “repeated about 1,000 times.” Stand for Children had 
also begun their stealth strategy of working to buy off the Democratic state legislative leadership, 
aiming to introduce a bill that would severely curtail the teachers’ union by the time Emanuel 
took office and before the teachers’ current contract expired. When Emanuel won on the first 
ballot in February 2011, averting a runoff, it was as if the fiercely anti-union Stand for Children 
had won the office, in a city with total mayoral control of the school board.  
 
Emanuel Ups the Ante, Shifts the Power Equation,  
and Doubles Down the Challenge 
Political parties and people who sweep into office with something of a mandate hit the 
ground running: they begin asserting their agenda during the outgoing administration’s lame 
duck period. CORE did it at the teachers union after trouncing the entrenched old guard. And 
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Emanuel did it after winning the mayor’s seat in a one-round fight. As Edelman tells the story, in 
his workshop on how to bust teachers’ unions even in Democratically controlled states: “So in 
this intervening time, Rahm Emanuel is elected mayor, he won on the first ballot, and he strongly 
supports our proposal…that was another shoe that dropped on the Chicago Teachers Union 
because they didn’t support him.”
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 The Stand for Children legislative proposal would again 
strip teachers of the right to collectively bargain over schedules—an item that had been 
negotiable historically, was stripped away by the 1995 Amendatory Act, and then in 2001 was 
reinstated as a negotiable item, but under a compliant union that quickly negotiated a deal to 
lengthen the teaching day. Now it was taken off the table again, because a less compliant 
teachers’ union was in power. But the Stand for Children legislation did far more than that: it 
included a frontal assault on tenure that would empower principals to hire and fire teachers and 
also mandated that at least one-quarter of the decision to fire be based on student test scores. 
Each of these measures took aim at unions. And the final provision of the proposed legislation 
was an attempt to bar teachers from striking. Stand for Children started the bargaining with an 
outright ban, but counted on “compromising” with a deal that would allow a strike, depending on 
what they believed would be an impossible criterion: 75 percent of all teachers would have to 
show up at the polls for a strike authorization vote to be valid.  
Edelman’s description of this deal making is illuminating, revealing not only that 
Emanuel was using all his muscle behind the scenes, but also that the two statewide federations 
of teachers were working against the new Chicago leadership. The Illinois Federation of 
Teachers (IFT) and the Illinois Education Association (IEA) dominated suburban and rural 
Illinois, which was largely white; their leadership, who found strikes an unappealing concept at 
best, were selling out the kids of Chicago, who were mostly black, and the union that ultimately 
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protected those kids’ interest. Karen Lewis was known for her intellect—she had taught 
chemistry and was a master of pedagogy—but as head of the CTU she quickly made her first 
serious gaffe. Set down in a climate of backroom deal making, counseled by the statewide 
teachers’ lobbyists, Lewis was told to take the deal. The biggest error she made, as she fully 
admitted later, was going into these meetings alone, without having sufficiently consulted CTU 
or CORE. With all the other teachers’ unions signing on, she went along. The CORE caucus 
essentially censured Lewis for this breach, publicly and privately, challenging her authority and 
forcing her to announce that she made a mistake and that there was no way the Chicago Teachers 
Union supported the deal, but the damage was done. The legislation, called SB7, passed 
unanimously just before Emanuel’s swearing-in ceremony, measurably shifting the power 
equation of the coming fight. 
This was CORE’s first exercise in holding union leadership accountable, and it was a 
breakthrough of sorts. Most caucuses that engage in electoral work either disband until the next 
election cycle or toe the party line once their party is in power. But CORE didn’t start out as an 
electoral caucus; it was formed by progressive teachers to pressure the CTU to “act like a real 
union.” and they felt that their new leader had just violated this principle in a way that was likely 
to have dire consequences for the rank and file. It was an important lesson: for Lewis, for the 
executive officers, for CORE, and for CTU members. Lewis’s willingness to publicly apologize 
to those members was something of a novelty fairly unusual among union leaders at her level. 
And CORE’s powerful message that she should never make such an error again helped the 
caucus reestablish itself as a voice independent of the leadership, including the leadership that 
had emerged from CORE itself. Meanwhile CORE and Lewis were able to quickly mend their 
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relationship and return to the business at hand, staying focused on building their power against 
the threat from Emanuel, which now loomed larger than ever. 
Emanuel wasted no time using his victory. By June of 2011, he had appointed an all-new 
Chicago school board and a new CEO of schools. The board’s first action was to vote to repeal 
that year’s 4 percent raise, the final annual raise stipulated by the contract that had been agreed to 
before CORE took the CTU leadership— often referred to as the Olympics contract, because 
Mayor Daley gave it to the teachers when Chicago was under a public microscope in its bid to 
host the summer Olympics. (Chicago wouldn’t be selected, but before that happened, even under 




Now, for any of the teachers who doubted that the new mayor was coming for them, the 
unilateral repeal of the scheduled raise made their future crystal clear. Emanuel’s arrogance 
erased almost all memory of the setback CTU president Lewis suffered in the SB7 negotiations, 
and though nobody in the new leadership wanted to see the teachers lose their raise, the repeal 
unified Chicago’s teachers behind them in a way they could never have dreamed. The anger and 
the unity became palpable inside and outside of the union. Emanuel looked like a bully right out 
of the starting gate. And his behavior would only get more aggressive. 
In early September, he made good on his campaign ad by launching his promised push 
for the longer school day, basing his argument to the public on the hours Chicago’s teachers 
spent with kids in the classroom, without mentioning the hours they worked outside it, preparing 
lessons, grading homework, attending meetings, and performing other tasks that benefited their 
students. He then summoned Lewis to his office to discuss extending the school day. It was her 
first closed-door meeting with the Mayor. 
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Lewis may have erred in the SB7 negotiations, but what she did after this meeting was 
considered a stroke of genius. When she left Emanuel’s office, the press asked what happened. 
Lewis did what she has come to be known for doing: telling them exactly what they asked to 
know. Long-time ACORN leader Madeline Talbot tells the story: 
 “Lewis … said Emanuel said, ‘Well what the fuck do you want? And Lewis said, 
‘More than you’ve fucking got.’ People were really angry that Emanuel started off the 
cussing, that a white man shouldn’t talk to a black woman leader that way, but they were 
really happy that Karen continued it—that Karen gave it back was just great.”
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That fall, the CTU began to signal that they would be trying out a different kind of 
contract negotiation. Through the house of delegates, they launched a survey and invited union 
members to participate in drafting the union’s contract proposals. Negotiations had been 
scheduled to start in early 2012. Union members hadn’t experienced a contract campaign in 
several decades. According to Sharkey: 
 “The old guard were Shankerites, basically unrepentant business unionists who 
thought that contracts were tough sometimes but we could win them by having a big hand 
on the table and making deals by talking tough, but we began to ask aloud, How’s that 
going to work with Rahm? He’s not coming to make deals, he’s coming to fight.”  
The new leaders were changing the conversation about how a contract should be won, 
and they were acting like a union in involving all the members in the discussion. The Occupy 
movement had just surfaced on the heels of the spring 2011 uprising in Wisconsin, which was 
led by Midwestern teachers with ties to Chicago. Every month, the CTU and CORE mobilized 
activists to attend the CPS school board meetings and to challenge the board during the open 
public comment on the agenda, which is required by law. The fall of 2010 was colored by CPS 
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administration-prompted skirmishes, the fall of 2011 with skirmishes prompted by the CTU and 
aimed at getting teachers ready for direct action. At the December 2011 meeting, the teachers 
used the #OWS (Occupy Wall Street) tactic Mic Check: one person says something and 
everyone else repeats it, as into a megaphone powered by human voices. After the Mic Check at 
the school board meeting— “These are our children, not corporate products!”—the board left the 
room and shut the meeting down.
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 The teachers and their allies were successfully finding their 
voice and practicing direct action; business as usual would not be happening. 
 
Mass Political Education and Structure Tests 
In January of 2012, with negotiations imminent, it was time for the teachers to assess 
their internal strength after eighteen months of new leadership. Sharkey describes the strategy: 
 “We decided to hold a mock strike vote and we did it over three days. We had 
charted the entire union; we had charts all over the walls taking up entire rooms in our 
offices. We had a forty-person team working the vote and the district supervisors were 
the key people in the room with the staff  [there were forty-nine district supervisors, 
appointed teachers who earned a small stipend for the job, which was to stay in touch 
with the delegates in their turf between meetings],
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, and we planned it so that right in 
the middle of it was our monthly house of delegates meeting, so we could announce how 
it was going on evening two and give out assignments to every school delegate for the 
third and final day of voting.”  
Staging the three days of voting around the house delegates’ meeting, when 800 teachers 
from across the city come together, was part of the ongoing campaign by the union’s leaders to 
both teach and empower their members to own the union, to take responsibility for it, to see 
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themselves as the leaders of the union, all 800 of them. Sharkey adds, “Coming out of the mock 
vote, we did identify the schools where we had weaknesses.” This knowledge prioritized the 
union’s task for the next few months, letting the leadership zero in on the areas where schools 
had one of three scenarios: either the delegate wasn’t a real leader, clearly the case when the 
teachers in a school didn’t turn out to vote; the delegate was opposed to the idea of a strike, 
requiring the development of different leadership beneath the elected delegate; or the school was 
missing a delegate altogether. Once the need for internal structure work was laid out, the CTU 
moved on to its next potential base of support, the general public.  
In February, the union released its opening salvo, a policy paper that framed its demands 
for the coming contract negotiations and also clarified its public message. The report was titled 
“The Schools Chicago’s Students Deserve, Research-based Proposals to Strengthen Elementary 
and Secondary Education in the Chicago Public Schools.”
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 Its top ten recommendations were:  
1. Recognize that Class Size Matters (countering the message that size doesn’t matter) 
2. Educate the Whole Child (stressing the importance of art, gym, theater, dance, music, and 
other key electives and activities) 
3. Create More Robust Wrap-around Services (such as free transit fares and more school 
nurses) 
4. Address Inequities In Our System (described as de facto apartheid) 
5. Help Students Get Off To A Good Start (calling for access to pre-kindergarten and all-
day kindergarten) 
6. Respect and Develop the Professionals (lift all salaries, hire more classroom aids) 
7. Teach All Students (addressing the need for bilingual and special education) 
192 
 
8. Provide Quality Facilities (citing the need for asbestos abatement and other repairs, 
especially those affecting health and safety), 
9. Partner With Parents  
10. Fully Fund Education  (improve funding formulas and increase funds available) 
The media received this report with open arms, primed by their respect for Lewis, who 
had established herself as a credible media source. Even more important, so did Chicago’s 
general public. In the eight months since that memorable “fuck-you, well-fuck-you” press 
moment, pitting the image of Emanuel, snarky white male graduate of a rich suburban school 
against that of Lewis, tough black, female student, teacher, and leader from the inner city. Lewis 
had used her national board–certified pedagogical expertise to turn all of Chicago into her 
classroom and teach her entire community the ABC of what was really happening to the city’s 
school system. She had created a master narrative, issuing daily press releases that the media 
were gobbling up. As Madeline Talbot put it: 
“Karen was black, smart, and bold, and that alone made her newsworthy in a city 
not known for straight talkers; she was taking Rahm on every day on every topic, she had 
earned the media’s trust as a person who told the truth; and for more than half a year she 
had been putting out an analysis, a frame about the schools that was never there before, 
and Chicagoans began to understand education differently.”
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Lewis also had an email blast list and would send out a short fact about education every 
day. The list was for anyone who wanted to be on it; it included media, civil society leaders like 
Talbot, and, of course, teachers.  
Negotiations were already under way. The CTU leadership hadn’t merely given the 
members the right to participate in developing the contract proposals, they had also greatly 
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expanded the size of their bargaining team and the rules for negotiations. Traditionally, the 
bargaining team had consisted of the union’s president, a lawyer, and just a few others. The 
union’s constitution and bylaws are virtually silent on collective bargaining, except to say, 
“During major negotiations, [the president] shall be accompanied by at least one other officer or 
member of the Executive Board.”
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 Lewis described launching her team in an article for the 
education blog Rethinking Schools:  
“We said, ‘OK, but we’re bringing 50 people with us.’ They said, ‘Oh, no, we 
don’t do that.’ But we told them this is a new administration and we do things 
differently—we don’t do things under cover of darkness. We want people to see and hear 
what really goes on so they can make good choices and so they can communicate back to 
our members. The difference is we’re rank and file—we feel the members should make 
the decisions about what we should do.”
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That wasn’t the only change the new leadership made in the negotiations game. In the 
past, the CTU, like most unions, had agreed to a formal set of ground rules; these had included a 
gag rule, which had prevented the union team from talking with union members about what was 
going on at the table. Such ground rules are typical even though they are not required by labor 
law, being considered permissible but not mandatory; they reflect a business unionist approach to 
collective bargaining.
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 That approach is not quite universal: chapter three describes how the 
local union 1199 New England has never agreed to ground rules and doesn’t believe in them.
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In the early stages of the Chicago negotiations, neither the CTU nor the CPS was 
bargaining very seriously, and there weren’t many meetings set; each side believed that slowing 
the process down would work to their advantage under the new rules passed in SB7. 
Management, as represented in Jonah Edelman’s extensive comments, was sure that the union 
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didn’t really understand the rules very well, an impression that perhaps made the employer 
overconfident. Meanwhile, the union was still methodically working to shore up the weaker 
schools identified by the mock strike vote, and also working with parents and community allies, 
making sure everyone was on the same page.  
Exercising Workers Most Powerful Weapon 
In May, the union began to prepare for the real, not mock, strike vote. The contract was 
set to expire on June 30, 2012. The old guard inside the union was leading an interesting 
campaign against the strike vote. They formally challenged the vote at a meeting of the union’s 
rules committee, charging that holding such a vote over three days was a violation of the union’s 
constitution. They were grasping at straws. According to Schmidt, who was a member of the 
rules committee, the old guard understood something few people did: 
 
 “The old UPC folks were fighting this so hard because they knew something 
important: that if the new leaders led workers through a successful strike, they would 
likely stay in power for a very long time because that’s what happens when you lead 
people through a tough fight, they give you their trust.”  
 
Eventually, Schmidt said, the lawyers had to be brought into a rules committee meeting 
before the new leaders could establish that a three-day strike vote was in fact perfectly legal. In 
the past, more than twenty-five years back, the CTU hadn’t taken strike votes that seriously 
because they hadn’t had to. Delegates called for a strike vote, and without much fanfare, over the 





While the rules committee debated the procedure for a strike vote, a momentum-building 
structure test was playing out on the streets of Chicago. The union called for a rally on May 23 to 
show support for their negotiations team. They reserved a location downtown, the Auditorium 
Theater, at the corner of Wabash and Michigan. This theater is a national landmark, its great 
arches lined with 24-karat gold leaf,; it has hosted many of Chicago’s most famous 
performances. The CTU’s turnout—some 7,000 teachers strong, all wearing their red T-shirts—
far surpassed the theater’s 4,000-person
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 maximum capacity, and the rally spilled out onto the 
street.
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 A sea of red below and vaulting gold above created a spectacular visual, and the 
Chicago media made the most of it. Footage from the many clips on YouTube reflects a crowd 
electrified by their newfound power, the power of unity and purpose. After this rally, with the 
rules committee clear about the union’s right to conduct a three-day strike vote, planning was 
under way for June. The union leaders knew they had to complete the vote before school let out 
or they’d lose their chance of the high turnout they needed. The vote was held June 6–8 and by 
the end, 24,000 union members had voted, surpassing the number required by SB7’s anti-union 
law. Ninety percent of all teachers cast a ballot, and of them, 76 percent voted to authorize a 
strike. The vote count each night was conducted by local religious leaders, working with the 
religious group ARISE, adding moral authority to the public image of the teachers’ decision and 
a validation that strengthened the workers’ courage. 
But SB7 also had language mandating that the union and the CPS go to fact finding and 
seek the recommendations of a fact finder, and at least one side had to reject the fact finder’s 
report before a strike could commence. In late July, the CTU and the CPS both rejected the fact 
finder’s report, and everything was in place for the first teachers strike in twenty-five years. The 
union was running a Summer Organizing Institute, and had hired a few dozen extra teachers to 
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do parent and community outreach over the vacation. By August, the union was debating 
whether to strike on day one of the new school year, or to wait, let the schools open, then strike 
in week two. They decided the latter plan would be more effective. Their strategizing took into 
account that there would be brand-new teachers who hadn’t been a part of the mobilizing efforts, 
and many other teachers who’d been away on vacation would need to be briefed about how the 
summer’s events had unfolded. Walking out on kids and parents is a difficult act for mission-
driven workers, such as teachers, and many in the rank and file would have to be shown that 
there really was no other option, that every attempt to reach a fair settlement had been made in 
good faith.  
On September 9, the union called a press conference, and Karen Lewis announced that 
the strike was on, starting the next morning. From September 10 through September 18, the 
Chicago Teachers Union closed the Chicago schools, under a limpid sky. According to Schmidt, 
“God gave us nine of the most perfect-weather days in Chicago history!” On day one of the 
strike, an estimated 35,000 teachers and their allies marched through the heart of Chicago, 
effectively shutting not just the schools but the entire downtown and marking the largest rally in 
the city since McCarthyism first chilled the voice of Chicago labor. Not since the declaration of 
the end of World War II had Chicagoans showed up in such force to let their voices be heard.
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Each day, the teachers would picket their schools, then join together in downtown marches. 
Three days into the strike, the CPS had consolidated 600 schools into 120 designated cluster 
schools, desperately trying to keep enough classes open to reduce the number of parents 
demanding that they settle with the teachers. Then the teachers’ union and their allies 
consolidated their pickets, sending them to only the cluster schools, maintaining strong lines 
during the school day wherever the CPS tried to keep classes open, before moving to downtown 
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for daily direct actions. Teachers at almost every consolidated picket line felt the validation of 
parent committees, who even cooked for them, keeping the picket lines well fed during their long 
school-day vigils. This food for the teachers went way beyond shiny red apples. Parents grilled 
BBQ, cooked giant pots of traditional stews and soups representing every ethnic group in that 
diverse city..  
Many parents had been placed in a tough position by the strike. “We talked about 
childcare for the working parents,” Sarah Chambers, a teacher at Saucedo school recalls. “It was 
really tricky, because you want the parents pressuring the CPS and the mayor to settle, but we 
knew it was really hard for a lot of people. Some parents came and cooked for us, and we just 
took their kids on the picket lines and the marches all day, meeting them later.” 
The strike passed its fifth day and continued into the weekend, and the pressure to settle 
was indeed rising. Everyone wanted to avert a second week. The teachers were hearing it from 
the parents and the Mayor and city leaders were hearing it from them even more loudly. Up to 
this point, CORE members had forcefully exercised their power as the rank-and-file caucus only 
once, when they made Karen Lewis do an about-face on SB7. Now they again felt strongly the 
need to hold their leaders accountable as the time for a settlement drew near. The bargaining 
committee, in previous decades numbered in single digits, had been enlarged to forty-five 
people. Among the forty-five sat Sarah Chambers, teacher leader and co-chair of CORE: 
 
 “I was the only rank-and-file person in the room, and I was already a CORE 
steering committee member. Karen came in and said, ‘We are close to an agreement,’ and 
I said, ‘There is no way “we” can come to an agreement without the members who are 
walking the picket lines getting a chance to discuss this…our members feel like they got 
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to write some of those proposals for the first time; they own this fight; the entire 
membership has to decide to call this off, not you or us.’ The leaders said we were being 
too radical. People were screaming and crying and saying no, the members have to make 
this decision, not you, not the house of delegates.”  
This moment, when Lewis and the CTU leadership agreed to extend the strike, against 
the intense pressure of the media and growing numbers of parents demanding they settle or go 
back to the table and try again, was decisive for CORE and for the new leadership’s decision to 
genuinely empower the rank and file. Tammie Vinson, a teacher who had hated the old union 
and became a very active rank-and-file leader through CORE and helped make her union her 
union, said: 
 “It’s so different now. I remember when Marilyn Stewart was president, we 
would just find out about contract settlements. She didn’t even give members the right to 
vote on them. I was so proud of CORE because we forced the leadership to make the time 
to let the members decide to come off the picket lines, to go from not even voting on our 
contract to being allowed to come off the picket lines and set up group readings by school 
and by picket line. It was so important.”  
 
For two days, the strike continued, as teachers sat in the unusually warm Chicago sun 
reading the proposed contract line by line. They found that concessions had been made in the 
negotiations, but not many. Considering how much effort had been spent by the mayor and the 
political elite to pass a state law that they believed would prevent the teachers from ever striking, 
the mere act of going on strike was the first and perhaps biggest victory of this struggle. But in 
the face of an all-out war declared by an ideologically driven mayor, where the cost of settlement 
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was high, teachers, parents and students had taken over the city. The mayor did win a longer 
school day, but the union extracted a pay raise in exchange. And on Emanuel’s second major 
objective, merit pay, the union defeated him, maintaining the system of raises based on years of 
service (called steps) and educational skills (called lanes). Finally, the mayor was defeated in his 
attempt to gut tenure.
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It had been a defensive fight for the teachers’ union, and defend they did. Throughout the 
strike, parents and students had stood arm-in-arm with them, squaring off against the man some 
called the bully-in-chief. Emanuel’s real objective had been to destroy the teachers union, and 
instead he had unified a group of workers who had been suffering insults for years—and a 
ferocious attack on their profession and on the reason most teachers teach: their kids.  
 
After the Strike, Challenges  
Official Chicago’s class warfare against those who occupy its classrooms went into 
overdrive with the passage of the Amendatory Act in 1995. In the years that followed, Chicago 
public schools became a laboratory for privatization and the charter program and results were 
devastating, especially for inner-city students, most of them poor and black. The 2012 strike did 
not end those troubles. In 2013, Emanuel announced the single largest public schools closing in 
history anywhere outside of New Orleans post Hurricane Katrina; he shuttered forty-seven 
schools in a gesture that many interpreted as part payback for the rank and file’s 2012 victory 
and part message that this victory had been futile. His proposal, launched in the dead of winter, 
overwhelmed the city. Once more, the teachers’ union locked arms with their community allies 
in a site-by-site fight to save the marked schools, but their protests were weakened by battle 
fatigue, and the mayor won the round. Amisha Patel—whom Chicago’s media had nicknamed 
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the shadow bargaining-committee member for her visible role in coordinating the community 
support during the strike —was in a position to see that clearly: 
“The hearings around the school closings were amazing, hundreds of people 
taking over hearings, throwing down, but it went back to being a site fight. Of the 50 sites 
proposed for closure, if it wasn’t your school, you didn’t get involved. Contrast this with 
the strike, which was a citywide fight and showed us how to lead a citywide effort for 
really the first time—but the narrative went back to a site fight and we got totally 
diffused.”  
Despite the massive amount of organization required in 2012 to get a moribund union 
ready to fight hard in an all-out war, permanent systems for capturing the parent contacts and 
broader community hadn’t been developed. Neither were the internal tracking systems developed 
enough to make the kind of assessments the CTU is going to need for the next contract fight. 
Interviewed about the situation in October 2014Sharkey said: 
 “A shortcoming to our work now is that the leader of the union in each school is 
the delegate and we are very dependent on the delegates. Traditionally many delegates 
ran their schools like they were servicing them, not organizing or mobilizing members 
onto committees so that teachers could be the union in the school. And even though 
we’ve put a lot of emphasis on a leadership development model to help shift our 
delegates to acting like leaders, not just servicing, if you asked me how many we have at 
a first-tier leader level, how many at a second-tier leader level, and third tier, and so on, I 




Shortly after this interview, Sharkey, the union’s vice president, would become its acting 
president, when the dynamic Karen Lewis was diagnosed in late October 2014 with brain 
cancer—a massive tumor. Overnight, she was completely out of the picture, dealing with urgent 
medical needs.  
Prior to her diagnosis, she and the teachers’ union had planned to announce her 
candidacy for mayor, on November 5, the day after the fall elections, traditionally when 
candidates begin gathering the signatures required to qualify for office. Polls showed her beating 
Emanuel. The mood among the teachers was electrifying. The idea that a black woman teacher 
would and could challenge the most anti-teacher mayor in the nation’s third-largest city, during 
an era of a massive, coordinated assault on unions and the teaching profession, had everyone in 
Chicago buzzing. When her unexpected diagnosis closed that possibility, a collective gasp seem 
to sound across the region. Lewis had been the main topic in coffee shops, on public buses, on 
street corners, and most definitely inside the union.  
As part of the evolution of the union’s work, and Lewis’s decision to run, CTU 
leadership decided to jump feet first into city-level politics, too, running for seats as aldermen, 
something they had never done before. Ten teachers declared candidacies in the citywide 
election slated for February 2015. [Note, I will have time to say the results, the election is Feb. 
24
th
 so I will update this with a few lines later] The transformation of their identity from 
teachers, to teacher-leaders, to union leaders, to candidates for city council has been remarkable. 
Sue Garza, running for alderman in her ward on the South Side, says: 
“I am not a politician and it’s really scary; my mouth has gotten me into trouble, 
my life has gotten me thrown into jail, but everything in my life has gotten me ready to 
run for office. When we started talking about running people for office, I said no, but my 
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father literally read me the riot act,; he said, ‘When did you ever back down from 
anything in your life?’ And these people have backed us into a corner, but we can’t let a 
few people ruin the entire career of teaching.” 
The future of the resurgent Chicago’s teacher union has yet to be written, but their efforts 
have demonstrated that teachers are willing and able to fight back and win against even their 
biggest foes. Teacher Tammie Vinson looks at the immediate future: 
 “The question of the ages right now is what is the role of CORE? How does a 
bureaucrat not become a bureaucrat? The majority of CORE’s founding leadership is now 
downtown. Now Jackson Potter is the guy sending out mandates from downtown, and he 
might be way more friendly than the people before, but how do you not let leaders get too 
far removed from the rank and file?”  
CORE members are currently debating a resolution on term limits for union officers. 
They are also struggling together with the question of how best to do electoral work.  
They’ve proved that a broken union can be rebuilt in a very short time—less than two 
years. They’ve demonstrated that the strike remains the working class’s most powerful weapon, 
but also that its successful deployment is contingent on first developing deep relationships with 
the wider community. And they’ve demonstrated the crucial importance of broad democracy in 
the union, beyond the formal vote—the democracy that let the rank and file read the proposed 
contract settlement line by line on the picket lines, that helped the teachers take full 
responsibility for their own liberation. In the process of that liberation, inevitably, there will be 
compromises on the way to more substantive victories. But Chicago has proved that when 
workers are empowered in real-life fights to make the decisions, the union becomes stronger, not 
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weaker. The union speeds the way to a better future when it slows down to allow broad 




CHAPTER SEVEN: TWO MODELS PRODUCE DIFFERENT KINDS OF SUCCESS 
 
As the cases I describe in this dissertation demonstrate, many and various types of 
campaigns and  efforts have continued into the new millennium. They span the range of relative 
success from defeat to victory, some impacting small groups of workers and involving very few 
concessions by not very powerful players, and some impacting hundreds of thousands—the 
entire working class in a given geography—and extracting enormous concessions from very 
powerful players.. If some groups can achieve high-impact victories, like the Chicago teachers or 
the nursing home workers in Connecticut, why can’t all groups achieve significant success? 
What key factors turned a double defeat at Smithfield Foods into an enormous victory in the 
most hostile climate, in a state with the lowest union density in the country, in manufacturing? 
How did largely undocumented immigrants, themselves ineligible to vote, nevertheless get 
progressive legislation passed? How effectively is that legislation now advancing their cause? 
Where are the dividing lines between success and failure, between small, middling, and great 
victories? Are there outcomes called successes that are actually defeats? Are there recognizable 
characteristics in the demands, in the approach, in the repertoire of efforts that achieve different 
outcomes? What factors have shaped these groups’ various approaches to their efforts? And what 
answer to the question (debated by sociologists in the field) Do resources such as money and 
expertise matter? What’s the relative weight of resources in the scale of an outcome? Are 
political vision, will, and risk-taking more important resources in a class war than money?  
In this discussion chapter, I hope to address all of these questions. All matter urgently, 
with a corporate right wing on a forty-year winning streak and marching toward what they 
imagine to be a final offensive against the past gains of the working class. And so I will begin 
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this chapter with a brief review of conditions today, of the context in which today’s movements 
must operate. I will then move to some overall observations from across the cases I have 
described that might suggest future research for academics and future directions for the 
movement. I will return to Saul Alinsky, often called the dean of community organizing, and 
evaluate his model and his legacy based on the past forty years of movement efforts, directly 
linking his strengths and weaknesses to the strengths and weaknesses in the New Labor 
leadership and in the community-organizing field. I will discuss, drawing on my cases, what 
appear to be the two dominant models that exist today among groups—including unions—that 
are still trying to win: the mobilizing model and the organizing model. I will delineate key 
features of each and suggest that the toughest fights can be won only by using the organizing 
model, a model I link to George Herbert Mead and his theories on the development of identity. I 
will conclude with a discussion of what is missing from the organizing model, the model with 
the potential to build the power required for success against the modern corporate popular front. 
 
Section I: Conditions and Context Today 
E.P. Thompson informed us that mass consciousness in the working class develops under 
capitalism when people can see their oppression. Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward added 
that people have to see their contribution to the oppressor’s wealth in order to act against the 
system. In both of these analyses, the twinned theme of power and acquiescence is central. 
“Power is rooted in the control of coercive force and in the control of the means of production. 
However, in capitalist societies this reality is not legitimated by rendering the powerful divine, 
but by obscuring their existence,” say Piven and Cloward in Poor People’s Movements. They 
note further, “Moreover, at most times and in most places, and especially in the United States, 
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the poor are led to believe that their destitution is deserved, and that the riches and power that 
others command are also deserved.”
267
  
There’s little question, as Bellah et al. conclude in their analysis in Habits of the Heart
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a decade later, that individualism has become a sort of cultural and moral creed. Mistrust of 
government has become so overwhelming that most Americans hold successful CEOs, actors in 
the economic arena, in higher regard than they do civic or political leaders. Americans have 
come to trust business leaders far more than politicians, corporations more than government, and 
the individual more than the collective. These conditions, playing powerfully enough to be 
clearly observed in the 1970s and 1980s, are on massive-dose steroids today.  
Sam Gindin has analyzed that a chief aim of neoliberalism is to produce an even greater 
sense of class divisions and more “fatalism” among workers, and that in many ways the biggest 
success of the neoliberal project has been a doubling down of the self-blame articulated above by 
Piven and Cloward. Gindin points out that most unions stopped fighting and started concession-
bargaining in the late 1970s—concessions having included the two-tier contract, which 
condemns every new hire to lesser pay and benefits status—and that this set the stage for the 
corporate right wing’s successful messaging to a raise-denied working class that tax cuts  (which 
hurt the working class by eroding funding for a social safety net) are the working classes’ best 
hope for a raise.  
Unions that stopped fighting did more than create the conditions for the successful 
establishment of a sophisticated frame that turned the beneficiaries of taxes, the working class, 
against taxes. From my field work and my experience as a union organizer and negotiator, I 
argue that four decades of two-tiered contracts may be a major factor in why Michigan voters 
resoundingly voted against enshrining the right to collective bargaining in their state constitution 
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in 2012. Mere weeks after the sitting governor, Rick Snyder, saw how the working class in the 
home state of that two-tiered contract union, the United Auto Workers, had voted on collective 
bargaining, he quickly moved to turn Michigan into a right-to-work state. And despite spending 
$23 million on the ballot initiative campaign,
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 unions lost it: No amount of spending could 
erase four decades of newly hired employees blaming their union—not their employer, not 
capitalism itself—for their lesser status and lesser share of compensation under the union 
contract. This might also help explain why 38 percent of union households in neighboring 
Wisconsin voted to retain Scott Walker as governor when labor attempted a recall campaign. 
Frames such as “Tax cuts are your best way to a raise” and “Collective bargaining made 
you individually more poor” play into, not against, individualism, the dominant narrative in the 
United States. When movement actors decide that frames alone will work for progressive causes, 
they don’t quite get that most progressive messaging and framing runs counter to the dominant 
narrative. Frames work for the corporate right, as does smoke-and-mirror-based grass-tops 
mobilizing, because the right is running with, not against, the deeply ingrained individualist 
creed of America. Drawing on the biggest successes among my case studies, I argue that Mead’s 
insights into the development of identity, into the creation of the I, me, and the  generalized 
other, are extremely important because the working class must experience something akin to a 
redevelopment in themselves, by themselves of I, me, and generalized other before they can 
shake the stranglehold of self-blame, of the sense that their individual inadequacy has doomed 
them to an inadequate compensation for their labor and a generally inadequate life. No amount of 
pollster-perfected frames will undo several hundred years of individuals in America being 
conditioned to their economic and political roles by a generalized other that says, Collective is 
bad, individual is good, and good individuals will earn a good life.  
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Mead noted that people need to be in a “critical condition” that shifts their roles before 
they can shift their understanding of themselves and the general other. In critical conditions like 
Hurricane Sandy and September 11, people display tear-jerking, soul-affirming levels of instant 
and intense human solidarity. But the solidarity that follows disasters, natural and otherwise is 
created in a moment of fierce emotional heat that flares up and quickly dies down. Real 
organizing, the kind done by the Chicago teachers and the nursing home workers of Connecticut, 
creates a critical condition, too—the battle with the employer—but the craft of organizing helps 
people to connect the dots between the critical, solidarity-affirming moment and the larger 
system it challenges, and gives the people in crisis, the workers, a new way of seeing themselves 
and a newly formed sense of the generalized other that persist long after the strike is over.  
 
Section II: Overarching Observations from the Cases 
Among the cases I have discussed, those in which the movement generated the greatest—
power enough to overcome very powerful institutions and players—were those in which large 
numbers of the workers themselves decided to walk off the job. Risking your job in a very poor 
economy certainly makes a critical condition quickly emerge and can induce the same kind of 
solidarity as a sudden disaster. Based on those cases, I argue that the strategic front for the most 
successful movement effort is still the workplace, but not only the workplace. When workers 
walked out of the Smithfield Foods factory in rural South Carolina in wildcat strikes, without 
advice from any professional organizer or permission from any union, they created such a crisis 
for their employer that, even in a region as hostile to labor as North Carolina, the community 
began to take note that something was seriously wrong in that factory. Much more intentional 
work with the community would be needed in a new campaign, but the fact is, the community 
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mattered a great deal in the win, once the workers helped educate them about the reasons for 
their actions—about missing fingers and limbs and the hogs being treated better than the humans 
who worked with them. 
The case of the nursing home workers in Connecticut is even more striking. It takes a 
gut-wrenching decision for medical workers to walk off the job: they must walk away not only 
from their livelihood but also from fellow human beings they care for day in and day out. In 
Connecticut, they do so only after they talk with the patients’ families and prepar the families to 
step in during a strike to make up for the inadequate care that temporary or scab staff provide 
during a majority strike because the temporary staff can’t possibly know the individual special 
needs of each patient. The employer may not and often is not concerned, but the workers and the 
families do care. Healthcare workers pre-strike can earn the support of the community by 
supporting these families, who are often like their own extended families, by explaining to them 
step by step how to care for their loved ones, so that the workers, freed to carry through their 
strike, can demand better conditions but for their patients.  
Similarly, when Chicago’s teachers walked off the job in a strike that riveted the nation, 
they did so after several years of good work with the broader community and months of 
intentional discussions with the parents in Chicago. Their community enabled their success by 
backing them against a vicious and powerful opponent who immediately took to framing the 
fight as teachers abandoning their students and their community. In that case, the neoliberal 
frame failed the mayor precisely because the relationships between teacher and parent and 
teachers’ union and community had already been forged, and unlike the failed second campaign 
in the Smithfield fight, forged over several years, not several weeks.  
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There is still a manufacturing workforce in the United States that desperately needs 
unionization, and although the employers’ exit threat makes it objectively harder, it is not 
impossible, as we eventually saw in Chapter Five. Within the service economy, I argue, 
education and healthcare are the strategic sectors, for several key reasons. First, there can be no 
exit threat: schools, nursing homes and hospitals, clinics, and many other sections of the always 
changing healthcare delivery system can’t be moved offshore and can’t be relocated from a city 
to its suburbs or from the North or Midwest to the South. This is why the corporate right is 
campaigning tirelessly to change the opportunity structure of the Rust Belt—and the nation—via 
the cases they bring before the Supreme Court. Immune to the exit threat, education and 
healthcare are also particularly strategic fields for organizing and movement building because of 
their placement in the community, geographic and social: they aren’t walled off industrial parks, 
and the nature of the value-based services they provide creates an intense contact between the 
workers and their community.  
While some see this contact as a complication, I think it’s an incredible strategic 
advantage. For starters, as long as the workers, and especially their leaders, grasp the context of 
this relationship and do what the Chicago teachers did (in stark contrast to the efforts of most 
teachers unions and their national union officers), it seems clear they can win over the broader 
community not only to the importance of the craft of teaching but also, even more 
fundamentally, to the importance of unions in our society. Teachers and healthcare workers can 
hone that relationship by taking the conversation right to the families they live among and work 
for, showing them how their needs as workers and the quality of their work life relate directly to 
student performance (and patient outcomes). When unions get this right, when they understand 
the basis of the relationship between the workers and their own community, they can defeat not 
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only a bad employer but also America’s centuries-old anti-collective messaging; they can change 
not only their workplace but also Mead’s generalized other: society. Kimeldorf pointed out that 
the social base of a workforce is key to the kind of unions it forms. I argue that the social base of 
educators and healthcare workers trends fundamentally toward solidarity and collective behavior, 
because the workers are mission-driven, their motivation for success is high, and their work is 
performed in teams and in the context of success in outcomes with patients and students, the 
community. The workers get this; too bad their leaders don’t.  
And because of the context of power, victories for education and healthcare workers will 
be greatest when all the workers struggle together as one force, in one union, up against their 
employer in a united front. Why? For the same reason it was true in the 1930s and 1940s. 
Schools and nursing homes are today’s factories, in the sense of the sheer numbers of workers 
who regularly work cooperatively inside them. In fact, it is even more true today, because the 
community matters so much to the success of these no-exit, highly community-oriented strategic 
sectors. For the best possible outcomes, healthcare workers and educators need to maximize their 
power inside and outside the workplace simultaneously The hardest-to-replace workers in 
education and healthcare—those with degrees and professional status—obviously have more 
strategic power   directly against the employer inside the workplace in a strike. But it’s often the 
easier-to-replace workers in these settings—clinicians, paraprofessionals, secretaries, and the 
workers who serve in cafeterias, drive buses, and clean rooms—who have more powerful 
strategic relationships with the community outside the workplace, and in the cases I have 
described,  though less strategically powerful inside the workplace such workers are crucial 
partners with a huge impact on the success or failure of these struggles when it comes to the 
crucial element of community backing. Both are needed, not one in one union and another in 
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another. Both types of workers, harder to replace and easier to replace have equal value and have 
to stay united to be most effective inside and outside against their employers.  
Many of the new teachers being hired in Chicago today are from programs like Teach for 
America, or teachers fresh out of graduate school, and they see teaching as something they will 
do for a few years before moving on. They are a whiter group than in the past, younger, more 
mobile. They often don’t live in their school’s community, a big difference from the social base 
of recruitment thirty years ago, back when the union contract could control the hiring from a 
central office. Now individual principals hire whomever they want, whenever they want, and the 
result, according to everyone I interviewed in Chicago, is that although teachers have 
tremendous relationships with the parents of the students in their classroom during each school 
year, it’s the rest of the education team that has a long-term relationship with those parents and 
with the local communities. A similar dynamic operates with registered nurses and everyone else 
in the healthcare setting. Although the socioeconomic base of the positions commonly regarded 
as less skilled—a concept I reject—makes them easier to replace, certainly less valued by 
employers in spite of their often heroic efforts, it also positions them more strongly in the 
community, in the churches, in the neighborhoods, and in local politics. Since it takes an inside-
outside power strategy to win a labor fight, these “more skilled” and “less skilled” workers can’t 
strike at different times and can’t be at the bargaining table at different times: they need each 
other, and must forge solidarity by struggling together. With solidarity of action, they consolidate 
their power in the workplace and their power in the community, and they win their fight.  
Finally, these strategic workforces are most powerful when united with a risk-taking, 
rather than risk-averse, leadership team. To save their jobs and to save the work they do, which 
the community can easily see means saving working-class neighborhoods’ schools and 
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healthcare facilities, they must be willing to fight neoliberalism itself. Teachers and nurses are up 
against financial power brokers in venture capitalist firms who have invested in a long-term 
effort to privatize their two fields, precisely because these employers know they cannot use the 
exit weapon. Instead, bankers and Wall Street, who see profits where others see patients and 
students, have chosen automation and privatization for their primary line of attack.  
Converting teachers and educators into robots who deliver tests via computer is a sure 
way to get these professionals and their salaries down to janitorial level. Changing laws so that 
any individual tasks that registered nurses or licensed practical nurses do can also be done by 
certified nurses’ aides, and many isolated tasks that certified nurse’s aides currently do can be 
done by anyone, is yet another way to cheapen the costs of staff and facilitate privatization and 
profit. The fight to save education and healthcare is a fight against the logic of neoliberalism, and 
it’s deeply personal to every worker in each field. Their jobs are not to make cars faster, but to 
care for human beings—which is done best by other human beings exercising minute-to-minute 
judgment based on a deep well of experience. Computer programs can react to test scores or to 
levels of toxicity in the blood—even triggering a warning beep if the latter are too high. But they 
cannot save the failing child or the critical patient. Teachers, nurses, and the community know 
that. 
The attack on public education feels more present and is more publicized, yet there are 
already far more for-profit healthcare corporations than there are for-profit schools. The battle 
Steve Lopez chronicles so beautifully in Reorganizing the Rust Belt took place when big private 
companies first began buying up mom-and-pop nursing homes in neighborhoods across the 
country. When Beverly Industries became the nation’s largest owner of nursing homes, they 
declared war on the nursing home workers’ unions. Good unions with more left-wing leadership, 
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like the 1199 locals discussed in Lopez’s book and this dissertation  directly challenged and 
defeated these venture-capitalists. The national union, however, facilitated the demise of high-
quality nursing home care by promoting schemes like that of the Washington union featured in 
chapter three. As the rank-and-file leader Bernie Mintor, quoted in that chapter, said, unions have 
a choice; they can go one of two ways. In chapter six, Chicago community leader Madeline 
Talbot describes the impact of the new leadership in the Chicago Teachers Union—a leadership 
that began to consistently fight Rahm Emanuel, a Democrat—as daily putting out “a frame about 
the schools that was never there before, and Chicagoans began to understand education 
differently,”
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 Chicago’s teachers chose to fight, not acquiesce in, privatization and public 
school closure, and backed by the community they educated, they, too, are winning.   
 
Section III: Saul Alinsky: His Legacy in New Labor and the Community 
Organizing Sector 
“But it wasn’t just, or even mainly, the infrastructure of Alinskyism that secured for Saul Alinsky 
a place in [Cesar] Chavez’s small pantheon of heroes; it was Alinsky’s ideas.” 
—Frank Bardacke, Trampling Out the Vintage
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“Alinsky offered a model! You could get aspects of what organizing looked like from reading 
about SNCC or other movements. But what did it look like for sharecroppers, for example, to 
take the steps they were taking, none of that was anywhere. It’s 1963, and 250,000 people are 
marching on a monument, but what did the buses look like, how did they fill up those buses, get 
people to the march? It wasn’t till I was reading Alinsky that there was some process about this 
stuff. Finally, there was some idea of how to do it. He documented his practice in clearly 
digestible ways—like a cooking recipe with really helpful steps and very few competing 
organizing models have been documented as holistic models.”
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“The National Conference of Catholic Bishops initiated in 1969 the most significant and longest-
running experiment of the 20
th
-century U.S. Catholic social action. Why would Catholic bishops 
approve funds for the poor to organize for power, much of which went to the community 
organizing projects associated with Saul Alinsky?”
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Lawrence J. Engel, Asst. Professor, Writing in Theological Studies, 1998 
 
There are many strong links between New Labor and key strands of Alinskyist 
organizing. Several recent books and articles document and trace numerous leading figures 
across the New Labor diaspora to the Alinsky diaspora.
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 Some came into New Labor unions 
via what Maryanne Clawson
275
 calls the “redistributionist movements” in the 1970s, groups like 
ACORN and Citizen Action. Randy Shaw’s 2008 Beyond the Fields is the most comprehensive 
examination and is partly dedicated to demonstrating the strong ties between the United Farm 
Workers and the leadership of New Labor, in particular UNITE HERE and SEIU. Shaw has an 
entire chapter in his book, chapter eleven, called “Harvesting Justice Beyond the Fields, The 
Ongoing Legacy of UFW Alumni,” which consists of pages of charts with the name of former 
UFW activists and where they work today. Twenty one occupy staff positions in UNITE HERE 
and SEIU, some very key positions. Another thirty six former UFW staff are in a smattering of 
other unions, many considered part of the New Labor framework used in this dissertation (see 
introduction). Frank Bardacke, too, in his Trampling Out the Vintage, includes a full chapter 
about Alinsky’s influence on Cesar Chavez (and Fred Ross, though his focus is on how Alinsky 
influenced Cesar and subsequently the UFW writ large).  
 A long article in Theological Studies
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asserts, with copious evidence, that the 
development of the single biggest source of funding for four decades of community organizing 
starting in the early 70’s, the Catholic Campaign for Human Development (CCHD), was 
developed to support Alinsky’s work. Engel’s research describes the Catholic Bishops 1969 
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commitment to raise $50,000,000 to support community organizing and power building to 
alleviate poverty through a national collection strategy church by church. In today’s dollars, the 
commitment the Catholic Church was making to fund Alinsky-based work would be just over 
$300 million. Engel asks, “Why would Catholic bishops approve funds for the poor to organize 
for power, much of which went to the community organizing projects associated with Saul 
Alinsky?”
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 Given the lack of resources for organizing, it’s not hard to understand why Alinsky-
based organizations have dominated the field since the 1970s. Many of these groups serve as  
what Kimeldorf called the social base for New Labor’s organizer recruitment. While some argue 
that Alinsky’s influence in introducing power building for the poor might rightly have benefitted 
the church, it’s less clear that the adherence to Bishop-approved ideological politics benefitted 
the development of the community organizing movement.  
For the purposes of this discussion, the national Alinsky diaspora includes the United 
Farm Workers (UFW), National Welfare Rights, ACORN, Citizen Action and the Midwest 
Academy, PICO, Gamaliel, the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF), and the many hundreds of 
local, neighborhood-based organizations funded by the Campaign for Human Development. 
Although there are surely differences among the Alinskyist groups in the community organizing 
sector, and also among the corollary New Labor unions, I argue that they share a set of core 
postulates that are evident across their various organizations.  
I have used Alinsky’s own texts, what he himself said and wrote, as the foundation for 
this discussion. I conducted a line-by-line content analysis comparing his first book, Reveille for 
Radicals,
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 with Rules for Radicals, which I consider the defining Alinsky text. And I put a 
premium on his very last public words, an extensive interview conducted by Playboy magazine 





Alinsky did not invent community organizing, but he did codify it into a practice. When 
he wrote Reveille for Radicals in 1946, it was the first book that discussed organizing as a craft 
devoid of ideology (and the first book on organizing published by a mainstream press). Prior to 
Reveille, organizers in the movements for race, gender and class-based emancipation had to hide 
their activity, or they might be murdered, jailed, or fired—and any of those outcomes would have 
had a disastrous effect on the movements they led. There was a smattering of pamphlets that laid 
out theories of mass collective action, but these were embedded in Socialist and Communist 
party circles.
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 As a result, there is a scarcity of literature on the actions of these individuals. 
Alinsky’s books attained preeminence in part due to the sheer absence of any other books on the 
craft. 
Alinsky has been mistaken by the leftwing as a community-organizer who emerged from 
the neighborhood, devoid of any notion that big problems couldn’t be solved at the local level, 
rather than considered for his roots in labor struggles, and his experience in social analysis as a 
Chicago school sociology graduate student. Alinsky’s skills were based on this multi-faceted 
integration of experience and struggle.  
Alinsky, writing in the American Journal of Sociology in 1941, said, “The point of view 
of the [Back of the Yards] Council on organized labor is quite clear. First it looks to the national 
organized labor movements to cope effectively with many of those major social forces which 
impinge upon the Back of the Yards community with disastrous results.”
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Alinsky was not 
wrong to imagine, in 1941, that his job, his added value back then, was to teach the disposed how 
to fight for themselves locally on a range of issues where unions and big business had a seat at 
the table, but not the community. He understood his initial work to be similar to what Francesca 
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Polletta calls prefigurative organizing, to enable community members to participate in and 
practice power aka praxis. 
The abstract to his article begins, “In the industrial area adjacent to the Stock Yards of 
Chicago, a community council was formed which included the two basic institutions of the 
area—(1) organized religion and (2) organized labor—as well as all the other interest and action 
groups in that community.” Today, however, given the absolute decimation of both  labor’s 
power and their abandonment of 1939-like ideology, it’s absurd to think that local community 
groups can simply attend to local issues while national unions “cope effectively with” anything, 
let alone take care of the big issues. Alinsky did a few things well, but when standing in isolation 
from the 1939 CIO unions in Chicago, they just don’t in any way measure up today. In fact, his 
biographer Sanford Horowitz notes that even in the later 1940s and early 1950s in Alinsky’s first 
forays outside of Chicago, in Kansas City and in Los Angeles, he couldn’t make a community-
only model work as well as Back of the Yards.
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Horowitz says this was causing real concern for 
Alinsky at the time because he was fundraising and couldn’t quite show the model working. I 
argue what wasn’t working was he didn’t have the very smart and very left Packing House 
Workers Organizing Committee with him. Conditions and context matter. 
According to organizer/scholar Marshall Ganz, Alinsky’s primary gift was “his brilliant 
understandings of strategy and tactics.”
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 This “brilliance” about strategy was anchored in 
Alinsky’s sharp understanding of power. He routinized the practice of understanding who and 
what he was going up against, what source or sources of power they relied on most, how 
invested they were or weren’t in some stated or unstated ideology, what their vulnerabilities 
were, who their allies and competitors were or could be, and, especially, how to create and 
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exploit cleavages using wedge issues.
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 The UFW that Ganz worked with for so long reflects 
this Alinsky influence. 
Surely in part from his years in the University of Chicago, Alinsky spent months in each 
new community patiently studying the picture around him and testing his assumptions before he 
got into a big fight. In Reveille for Radicals, he states, “A fundamental difference between 
liberals and radicals is to be found in the issue of power or its application. They [liberals] labor 
in confusion over the significance of power and fail to recognize that only through the 
achievement and constructive use of power can people better themselves. They talk glibly of 
people lifting themselves up by the bootstraps but fail to realize that nothing can be lifted or 
moved except through power.”
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Alinsky understood how to draw a foul, that is, how to prod the bosses or the opposition 
into an overreaction that would generate sympathy for his campaigns and divide the opposition. 
(The match that lit #OWS was the video of the NYC cops teargasing young women. Alinsky 
would have set that up, not just waited to take advantage of its aftermath). Once Alinsky 
understood how power moved in a given community, he set out to build an organization 
anchored in the church and capable of turning out thousands of community residents for what 
Alinskyites call accountability sessions with business or political leaders. Conflict and agitation 
were the name of the game in these often well-rehearsed dramas. These were often so well-
rehearsed that the deals had already been cut behind the scenes between Alinsky or his top staff 
and the local power brokers, but Alinsky thought it was important for the “leaders” meaning the 
ordinary people to have the ‘experience’ of winning, so, they’d stage the big session all the while 
knowing the end game. This, too, is prevalent in New Labor today and showed up in how the 
New Labor unions secretly negotiated with NYC power brokers to “let #OWS” stay in Zucotti 
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Park without being removed because the labor leaders assured the power brokers that they could 
more effectively end the encampment. If the police raided it, more protesters would show up. But 
the clever Alinsky-influenced SEIU leaders had a better plan, in light of winter coming, they 
said, and, calling for the big, final march across the Brooklyn Bridge, a highly orchestrated end 
move where SEIU and other staff were made to wear thousands of brightly colored shirts 
emblazoned with “MARSHALL” on them to police the marchers themselves and actively 
dissuade anyone from engaging in civil disobedience that was not pre-approved, like the New 




Some critics rightly say Alinsky made himself too much the center of the action. Fair 
enough. But whether or not people agreed with it, Alinsky had a theory of power. Nothing 
produces deer-in-the-headlights moments among social movement groups today like the 
question, “What’s your theory of power?” As a consequence, activist groups across the country 
such as Make the Road or its new, national quasi-parent group, the Center for Popular 
Democracy, situated in a heavily pro-immigrant, union-dominated New York City with still 
progressive traditions—err by thinking they can export their models into Virginia or Iowa. 
Likewise, people outside or on the periphery of labor think the Justice for Janitors strategy has 
some kind of universal applicability, missing the point that the cost of settlement, what Luders 
called the concession costs—meaning how much money the employer has to spend to buy labor 
peace through a contract—changes with different sectors of workers. And, concurrently, so does 
the amount of power required to win. Banging on drums in downtown office buildings and 
staging a handful of symbolic arrests and symbolic, not production shuttering strikes, might work 
for the lowest wage workers, but not to save the pensions of 30,000 teachers in Chicago. As 
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Alinsky understood early-on, there is no universal tactic or universal strategy; strategy is 
contingent on the specific power analysis of each campaign. 
The limitation in Alinsky’s thinking about power was his unwillingness or inability to 
develop models for keeping it. He assumed our democracy functioned, just as long as every once 
in a while some people put together an interest group and balanced some other interest group that 
might be getting away with too much in that moment. Drew Astolfi, Executive Director of Faith 
Action for Community Equity (FACE), a Gamaliel affiliate in Hawaii, and third generation 
trained Alinsky organizer, says, “Alinsky really only gave us one set of rules, the rules to fight, 
we need another set of rules, the rules for what you do when you get to the table.”
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 A common 
Alinsky axiom is that power can only be exercised by building organization. But despite this oft 
repeated adage, he didn’t really believe in building permanent organization. Mike Miller, a 
longtime Alinsky associate, says, “Alinsky was more anarcho-syndicalist than organization 
builder.”
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 Alinsky said himself that he didn’t think any of the groups he formed were any good 
after five years, because they either atrophied or were co-opted. The left continues to cede 
governing to the corporate class because of our inability to sustain democratic unions, or, large 
organizations of any kind. Some groups in the Alinsky diaspora “hold politicians accountable,” 
but have rarely embraced running their own and taking over local and state government.
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Alinsky frequently quotes the French political scientist Alexis de Tocqueville and so does Newt 
Gingrich. As a result, Alinsky often sounds like a right wing anti-government activist with 
nothing but contempt and scorn for politicians. This may be one reason Glen Beck, the Tea 
Party
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 and other rightwing social forces have adopted Alinsky and his Rules. Fundamentally, 




Alinsky’s take on ideology was paradoxical, and, a significant weakness. His most 
serious dogma— a dogma that he fervently preached—was that no one should have dogma. No 
one should have dogma, and there was only one ideology, which he repeated in everything he 
wrote and in every speech. He sums it up on page 11 of Rules for Radicals: “In the end [this is] a 
conviction—a belief that if people have the power to act, in the long run they will, most of the 
time, reach the right decisions.” But genocide against Native Americans, centuries of slavery, 
today’s mass incarceration of people of color, the fight for gay marriage, debates about taxes and 
government, and the ongoing denial that unpaid homemaking is as hard as most wage work 
doesn’t easily square with Alinsky’s simple “conviction.”  
This is one reason why Gary Delgado, founder of the Center for Third World Organizing, 
and his successor and protégé Rinku Sen, have each written and published solid, constructive, 
nonsectarian, critiques of Saul Alinsky.
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 Delgado locates his critique of Alinsky in the 
limitations of the politics of place and race in segregated America. Sen, in her book Stir it Up, 
argues that Alinsky’s obsession with pragmatism and non-divisive issues resulted in generations 
of otherwise good organizing that often undermined the very people who need good organizing 
the most, the poor, working class and people of color, none of whom have issues that could be 
easily characterized as non-divisive. For example, with Alinsky groups focused locally and on 
winnable issues, many reacted to the infusion of drugs into their communities by calling for more 
police and more prisons. Activists involved in Black Lives Matter and others trying to block and 
end the mass warehousing and deportation of immigrants today likely would agree with Sen that 
these simplistic Alinsky politics continue to be highly problematic.  
Because Alinsky’s center of gravity was the Catholic Church, it necessarily limited what 
issues could be engaged (though his successors at the Industrial Areas Foundation broadened 
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from the Catholic Church to first a cross denominational ‘congregational’ model, and later to 
what they now call a ‘Broad Based Community Organizing’ model, it is all still rooted in the 
church). Though Mike Miller, a direct Alinsky disciple and longtime community organizer, says, 
“Few people appreciate the impact he had on American Christendom. Before Alinsky, the church 
dealt with poverty with food and clothing pantries. Alinsky comes along and says you want to 
speak truth to power, to do that you have to organize for power. All of a sudden, the Catholic 
Church and the mainline Lutherans all start moving to build power.”
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As put by Steve Williams, long time Executive Director of PODER, a community 
organizing group in the San Francisco Bay Area whose membership is overwhelmingly people 
of color, now working with LeftRoots,  
“Alinsky’s attempt to strip the organizing model of ideology manifests in various 
concrete practices. For example, the Alinsky model of organizing insists that groups 
should only wage winnable fights and that the organizer should refrain from bringing her 
political views into the organizations discourse. Though this decision is understandable in 
the context of the state-sponsored repression brought down on left and radical movements 
in the US, the ramifications render the Alinsky model impotent relative to many 
contemporary challenges because ideology is a central front of the rightwing, and, 





The rightwing’s methodical, patient, steady ascendency to power during the past forty 
years, using cultural issues to wedge workers and the poor against each other in and outside the 
workplace, requires a significant investment in mass level popular political education and an end 
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to ideology-less politics. The left sits politics out, liberals engage in threats and Alinsky-like 
accountability sessions and then routinely endorse the same bad candidate just because they are 
less evil than the opposition.  
But in chapters six and three, in discussing the Chicago Teachers Union and 1199NE, 
each union is running a not-business-as-usual political strategy. Each have embraced running 
actually progressive candidates to the left of center inside the Democratic Party system, replacing 
bad Democrats with good. This is highly unusual in New Labor, just like the fact that they also 
run strikes. Not covered in the period under discussion in chapter three was 1199NE almost 
single handedly, and up against the house of labor, recruiting of Lowell Weicker to run as a third 
party independent candidate for Governor in Connecticut for the exclusive purpose of instituting 
the state’s first income tax. Weiker understood the deal from day one, he was wealthy but liberal 
in a state with outrageous income disparity in part because despite the wealth there was no 
income tax. He understood it would take his money and 1199NE’s troops to do what has rarely 
happened in U.S. history, run for major office as a third party candidate and actually win. And, 
equally rare, follow through on your promise to force an income tax, accepting all along he 
would be a one term-only governor because after instituting the income tax, he’d never be 
elected again. That’s a little more risk taking than Warren Buffets sweet pronouncements that his 
secretary should pay less taxes than he does, a sort of frame approach to the tax question when a 
power approach is required, like that displayed by 1199NE’s deal with Weicker. 
 The biggest weakness in community organizing, and, the aspect of the Alinsky 
legacy that has negatively impacted and deeply penetrated some segments of the union sector, 
notably the United Farm Workers (UFW), the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) 
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and the Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union (UNITE-HERE), is his discussion about and 
framework for organizers and leaders.  
Saul Alinsky simultaneously christened a new agent for struggle, the reified outside 
organizer, and, obscured the issue of organizer strategy in his most well-known book, Rules for 
Radicals. In it, Alinsky declares that there are leaders and there are organizers, and, they are 
different. In his construction, the organizer is a behind the scenes individual who is not a leader, 
who does not have anything to do with decisions and decision making, and who must come from 
outside the community. According to Alinsky, the leaders, who have to come from the base 
constituency, “make all the decisions.” This is a problematic narrative because, as Sen and 
Delgado have observed, and many others, the organizers in the Alinsky model ultimately make 
all key decisions. 
A lot of good ink has been devoted to the problems with Alinsky’s view of the “outside 
organizer,”
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including in Frank Bardacke’s 2012 book Trampling out the Vintage. By denying 
the organizer is a leader, with substantial influence on the organization, the corresponding 
accountability of the organizer is left unchecked. Jerry Brown, the long-time leader of District 
1199 New England, still one of the most militant and successful local unions in the SEIU,
 
explains it this way: 
“I never heard anyone use Alinsky in any way as a model for us.
 
 He was always 
talked about only in the context of community organizing, and how they always had to be 
behind the curtain—their job wasn’t to speak publicly, their job was to find and recruit – 
who came closest to this was HERE (the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees 
Union)– because they always had rank and file officers who appeared to be the leaders. 
The rank and file officers were often wonderful union members who put a lot of work 
226 
 
into the union but they were very seldom the real, strategic leaders. I thought the 1199 
model, with all its troubles with staff being members and sharing leadership not just 
facilitating recruitment, it was 100% more honest to what was going on, and actually who 
was really leading. I just always felt that the way in which they actually led, and the way 
in which it appeared they led, were very different realities.” 
 
Given the fact that the local union that Jerry Brown founded and led from the early 
1970’s to 2005, depicted in chapter three, is well known for routinizing all-out strikes every few 
years, for setting and maintaining the nation’s highest wage, benefit and working conditions 
standards in their nursing home contracts, and for being the most powerful player in Connecticut 
politics, it hardly seems that obscuring the real and active role of the organizer impinges high 
levels of militant rank and file member participation. To the contrary, the role of the organizer in 
the 1199NE model is transparent, not hidden, and the role of the members is primary, not 
secondary. Only the rank and file can strike, not the organizers. Majority strikes are evidence that 
workers are primary leverage and of central importance in any union. And, that successful strikes 
still exist is evidence that labor leaders make a strategic choice to not strike. It would be hard to 
have found a political opportunity structure more hostile to a teachers strike than Chicago in 
2012.   
While the outside organizer pretending not to be the leader but who is really the leader in 
Alinsky’s work is covered in some recent literature, not addressed in the many critiques of 
Alinsky’s organizer v leader theory is a second related but separate question: who is a leader? 
This may be attributable to the fact that in Rules, the only Alinsky book that most people read, he 
doesn’t discuss the concept of what some union organizers call leader identification. The words 
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and concept don’t exist in Rules. But Alinsky does discuss leader identification in Reveille for 
Radicals, his first book published in 1946, twenty five meaningful years earlier. Based on the 
evidence in chapters three and six, I argue that there is a direct and profound relationship 
between building powerful mass scale movements and leadership identification theory. And, I 
believe that understanding the distinction and relationship between two separate concepts, 
leadership identification and leadership development, is a prerequisite for a return to power for 
the Left and progressives. The glaring omission of this discussion in Rules has perhaps done the 
most damage to the subsequent development of community organizing, and, to today’s New 
Labor unions. 
In Reveille Alinsky has an entire chapter devoted to leader identification, called, “Native 
Leadership." But he never really explains how to do leadership identification. Perhaps this is 
because he was never actually a union organizer, but rather a popular front agitator.
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 He simply 
didn’t get this crucial skill embedded in the heart of successful organizing, despite his assertion 
that he “mastered” the CIO model. And, part of why unions remain the most strategic sector is 
because workplace union fights draw the foul of the class struggle or what Mead calls the 
“critical conditions” that make new identity creation happen faster and more broadly than in a 
non-workplace setting. Alinsky explains most of his theories with stories. Not surprisingly, his 
only stories about understanding leaders in 1946, before McCarthyism decimated the CIO, are all 
references to unions. Alinsky says, “Any labor organizer knows of the Little Joes. When a man is 
being solicited to join a union he will usually respond along these lines: ‘Everything you say 
sounds pretty good, Mister, but before I sign up I want to know if Joe has signed up.”
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  Leaders 
have followers, and the CIO had a method to identify the “Little Joes.” But to understand how to 
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do leadership identification, the heart of the communist’s gift to the CIO, Alinsky would have to 
have done it. And, done it a lot. 
As discussed in almost every chapter, because union staff is barred from touching even 
one foot inside the private sector workplace, including parking lots, the theory of who an organic 
leader is, not just what they do, and persuading them to be pro-union, equates to winning or 
losing. And, as I earlier described, owing to school shootings and more, public schools are also 
off limits to outsiders now. This means workers are the agent, not the organizers. This was as 
true in 1936, when William Z Foster, head of the Communist Party, wrote and published, 
“Organizing Methods in the Steel Industry,”
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 describing the method of the “Little Joe’s” that 
Alinsky didn’t quite master as it is today. Outside paid union organizers, including those in the 
1199NE model in chapter three or the CTU in chapter six, given their structured position as 
legally barred from the workplace, simply can’t get sloppy or lazy and go inside and do the work 
“for the workers,” the way community organizers do outside the workplace, including in today’s 
worker centers.  
This results in a nuanced understanding of who the organic leader is inside the 
workplace, something successful union organizers who run and win NLRB elections or lead and 
win standard setting contracts using the strike weapon call “charting and list work.” To 
understand it, in fact to master it, requires endless repeat application, much like any craft. Smart 
people can probably get the basics of how to lift an airplane off the ground by reading a book 
and watching a pilot thrust the throttle to and fro, but to survive a lightning storm or engine 
failure requires an experienced pilot. The big business consortium in the US is like an endless 
lightning storm and all Alinsky did was read the book. We’ve crashed.  
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Social movement organizations, and now unfortunately unions, too, treat all humans as 
flat, labelling anyone who shows up at a meeting a ‘leader’ and often interchanging the words 
activist and leader. It’s an egalitarian impulse, similar to having an aversion to power. Occupy 
has muddied this discussion even more with talk of “leaderless movements” and 
“horizontalism.” But in any strategy to build power, all people are not the same. Marx 
understood this as evidenced by his proclamation that the proletariat alone, not peasants or any 
other type of poor person would be the agent, so too do successful union organizers. As 
demonstrated in my cases and as discussed earlier in this chapter in section II, there are workers 
who are more influential than others because of the ease or difficulty management has in 
replacing them, there are workers in strategic industries versus non-strategic industries—the 
ports, or hospitals say, versus McDonalds, and, there are workers who have followers and 
workers who repel co-workers (even if they are nice or wonderful, respect is an odd thing, better 
to understand this and win versus not and lose). And, all the aforementioned types of workers 
exist in all classes, in all races and ethnicities, all genders and of any sexuality identification.
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This understanding of workers and people with relative power should not in any way to 
be construed as saying all people aren’t equally important and deserving as human beings, of 
course they are. But in community organizing there is an obsession with leadership development, 
not leader identification. One without the other is like a bicycle without wheels. It severely limits 
success and scale. Because the organic leaders are often the very ones most capable of being 
developed as volunteer organizers themselves, magnifying the scale of people with the skill of 
mass mobilization, the community organizing sectors failure on this front, and now New 
Labor’s, produces a movement over reliant on paid staff. Even New Labor can’t afford to staff a 
movement absent developing organic leaders as the key skilled flank. 
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ACORN was the Alinsky influenced group that veered the farthest from Alinsky 
orthodoxy in two ways, but not all. They were willing to take on national, not just local issues, 
and controversial, not just safe, issues. They also overtly rejected Alinsky’s theory of 
organization of organizations or priest as leader. This is probably because Wade Rathke was 
influenced more by Alinsky disciple Fred Ross than Alinsky himself. Ross himself rejected the 
organization of organization idea and that led directly to the UFW structure of a mass 
membership base, and, a union with no local union structure, assuring staff and top leader control 
in the same ways that Rathke controlled ACORN.   
Ross and Cesar Chavez at the UFW and Rathke at ACORN unfortunately did embrace 
the organizer-leader false bifurcation set as creed in Alinsky’s model. Seth Borgos, an early and 
longtime ACORN national staffer now at the Center for Community Change says, “At ACORN, 
the theory was that leaders of existing organizations were already too compromised, so ACORN 
decided to grow their own leaders. The approach was too broad, Wade [Rathke] had this idea 
that everyone could be a leader, if we found them and we developed them into a kind of ACORN 
brand. I don’t think this is actually true.”
1
At the extreme other end of the diaspora, Alinsky’s 
disciples at today’s Industrial Area’s Foundation (IAF) do today have a clear theory of who the 
leader is, but they stick to narrow issue constraints and rarely if ever play in the movement 
sandbox with anyone, limiting their potentially positive influence on this crucial method. 
ACORN and the UFW were key social bases of organizer recruitment for New Labor.  
  
                                                 
1
 Author Interview, June 2013 
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Section IV: Two Models, Distinctly Different:  
Mobilizing and Organizing 
 
In this section, I will outline the key elements of what have become two distinct models. I 
argue that the Alinsky-influenced New Labor model is a campaign-focused, short-term, 
transactional mobilizing model. By contrast, the high-participation model of the CIO-1199 
tradition is a movement-building organizing model that places its emphasis on base expansion. 
“Base expansion” means bringing more and more people who have never participated in any way 
with activism who don’t consider themselves activists—who have never protested anything or 
written a letter, into an experience which happens through an interactive process involving direct 
action and risk. Plenty of mobilizing, such as that with flag-waving marches, happens in the 
organizing model, but its primary purpose is to recruit a constantly increasing number of 
previously never-involved-in-anything, ordinary people: key to the model is that people’s ideas 
about themselves and their society transform in the process. In the mobilizing model, paid staff 
constantly rely on a diminishing number of the already converted to participate in events but 
after a highly enthusiastic roaring start, they tire of “always being the ones to show up” and burn 
out and lose interest. To compensate, the mobilizing model then finds new people to tire out—
people also already converted to the cause—so the base never expands, which makes the whole 
affair like shoveling sand uphill. There’s a very telling term in the mobilizer-only model: burnt 
turf.  
In table #1, the left-hand column consists of Alinsky’s well-known core principles for his 
“radicals”—the organizers who are the agents of change—which he laid out in Rules for 
Radicals. I contrast this with right-hand column, which are the core principles of an 1199 
organizer—understood to be a teacher and coach to the primary agents of change, the organic 
232 
 
leaders of the workers. The 1199 key postulates are taken from what passes for the “manual” at 
1199: a handwritten, dated, single sheet of paper that hangs on the door or pinned on the bulletin 
board of most 1199 organizers’ office. It is often covered with coffee stains and marker of some 
kind and is simply called simply “Advice for Rookie Organizers.”
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Table #1: Key Postulates 
Alinsky’s Rules for Radicals 1199’s Advice to Rookie Organizers 
1. “Power is not only what you 
have, but what the enemy 
thinks you have." 
2. “Never go outside the 
expertise of your people.” 
3. “Whenever possible, go 
outside the expertise of the 
enemy.” 
4. “Make the enemy live up to its 
own book of rules.” 
5. “Ridicule is man’s most potent 
weapon.” 
6. “A good tactic is one your 
people enjoy.” 
7. “A tactic that drags on too long 
becomes a drag.” 
8. “Keep the pressure on. Never 
let up.” 
9. “The threat is usually more 
terrifying than the thing itself.” 
10. "The major premise for tactics 
is the development of 
operations that will maintain a 
constant pressure upon the 
opposition." 
11. “If you push a negative hard 
enough, it will push through 
and become a positive.” 
12. “The price of a successful 
attack is a constructive 
alternative.” 
13. “Pick the target, freeze it, 
personalize it, and polarize it.” 
1. Get close to the workers, stay close to the workers. 
2. Tell workers it’s their union and then behave that way. 
3. Don’t do for workers what they can do. 
4. The union is not a fee for service; it is the collective 
experience of workers in struggle. 
5. The union’s function is to assist workers in making a 
positive change in their lives. 
6. Workers are made of clay, not glass. 
7. Don’t be afraid to ask workers to build their own 
union. 
8. Don’t be afraid to confront them when they don’t. 
9. Don’t spend your time organizing workers who are 
already organizing themselves, go to the biggest worst. 
10. The working class builds cells for its own defense, 
identify them and recruit their leaders. 
11. Anger is there before you are—channel it, don’t defuse 
it. 
12. Channeled anger builds a fighting organization. 
13. Workers know the risks, don’t lie to them. 
14. Every worker is showtime—communicate energy, 
excitement, urgency and confidence. 
15. There is enough oppression in workers lives not to be 
oppressed by organizers. 
16. Organizers talk too much. Most of what you say is 
forgotten. 
17. Communicate to workers that there is no salvation 
beyond their own power. 
18. Workers united can beat the boss. You have to believe 
that and so do they. 
19. Don’t underestimate the workers. 
20. We lose when we don’t put workers into struggle. 
Taken from Rules for Radicals by 
Saul Alinsky, 1971 
Taken from the 1199 Organizing Conference, Feb. 6-9, 




Although several of 1199’s postulates could be and are embraced by some New Labor 
staff, people who might call themselves organizers or more recently “campaigners,” most cannot 
be. These postulates are the defining feature that separate an organizing model from a mobilizing 
model. For example, most people who call themselves organizers would probably adhere to these 
postulates: 
[1] Get close to the workers, stay close to the workers. 
[11] Anger is there before you are—channel it, don’t defuse it. 
[12] Channeled anger builds a fighting organization. 




But there are other postulates—the most important ones—in the CIO organizing model 
that simply cannot manifest in a model that doesn’t vest the primary power in the workers 
themselves. Postulate #2, “Tell the workers it’s their union, and behave that way,” is 
significantly worded: behave, not act. It’s a commandment. In the 1199NE tradition, it’s a 
commandment with teeth: an organizer will be fired for not behaving that way. Similarly, 
postulates #17 (“Communicate to workers there is no salvation beyond their own power”) and 
#18 (“Workers united can beat the boss, you have to believe that and so do they”) conceive of 
workers as the primary leverage in their own liberation. Professional organizing staff trying to 
play Bruce Lee—outmaneuvering the boss in a series of high-flying karate moves—cannot 
replace the workers’ army when it comes to the long march. Real organizers never underestimate 
the true fighting value of workers; they put them into the struggle, they’re not afraid to ask them 
to build their own union. Organizers play a crucial but distinctly different role in each model. 
With the kind of endless warfare documented and superbly described by Kate Bronfenbrenner, 
there’s little question that workers in the service economy need coaching on the employer 
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offensive that they’ll face and on how to beat the professional union busters by staying ahead of 
them. Falling behind the employer’s war is usually fatal; as I demonstrate in chapters three, four, 
and six, it was crucial that the unions knew how to build a majority before the first skirmishes 
begin, before the union busters really turn up the heat and start firing workers. And for that, you 
need excellent teachers who can school workers for their role as primary actors and coach them 
through the stages of the boss fight. If workers didn’t need good coaches, about seventy-five 
percent of all workers in America would be unionized. That’s the most consistent percentage of 
how many say they’d like to be in a union, when they’re polled before their employers convert 
the workplace into a war zone. Once the boss starts firing people, the number drops considerably. 
Good organizer-coaches—such as those I profile in chapters three, four, and six—circumvent 
that attrition by preparing workers to face and fight the worst the boss can do.  
The workers in the North Carolina Smithfield Foods plant were able to exercise the kind 
of power that workers in manufacturing plants once could—the kind Marx imagined when he 
thought about the unique power of the proletariat with his or her hands on the levers of the 
machines. But when they engaged in production-disrupting wild-cat strikes, they ran a bigger 
risk by staying out more than four to five hours, which they did several times. The boss could 
easily fire and replace all of them: unloading hogs from trucks and getting them ready for the kill 
room isn’t a job that requires certifications and degrees. And although it is a horrifically 
dangerous job, the relatively high pay it commanded gave it a perennial, though temporary, 
allure in the rather destitute region the employer had intentionally chosen as a site for its factory. 
So even in the case today where workers still have their hands on the lever of power 
(such as the livestock team in rural North Carolina, described in chapter four), they still needed 
more power and found it through a combination of worker power on the shop floor and what 
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Bronfenbrenner describes as a genuine comprehensive campaign. But a real comprehensive 
campaign such as theirs is just as rare today as a strike, because New Labor has given up on 
workers altogether and relies instead on what it calls the corporate campaign. Workers in the 
Smithfield third campaign stayed as co-primary power with the community campaign, and with 
the national leverage strategy and they won in a giant manufacturing plant in the right-to-work 
south in the new millennium. That will not be successful for educators or health-care workers, 
whose conditions are different and require their own power analysis. Strictly speaking, in the 
case of Smithfield, a corporate campaign—without workers running massive actions constantly 
inside the plant and making the fight real in the community in daring and courageous public 
acts—would have led to a third defeat. 
In each of the three cases discussed that involved unions, a set of common traits can be 
observed that correlate to two distinct models. The cases with the highest impact of success fall 
under the organizing model (which I call the CIO model), while the cases representing victories 
of a lesser magnitude correlate to New Labor’s mobilizing model. The first Smithfield defeat 
wouldn’t even be considered a fair example of mobilizing; rather, it was simply inept. The 
second drive at Smithfield, the one undertaken in the Sweeney era, with its attempt to marshal 
community support barely two months before the election—and a devastating defeat—does fit 
the mobilizing model. 
Three sets of factors distinguish the two models: the purpose of the union, the power 
analysis defining the fight, and governance methods. I argue that the first factor, the purpose of 
the union, conditions the other two; and that each of the three factors involves a set of strategic 




Table #2: Two Models 
 Alinsky–New Labor 
“For” = Low Participation 
Choice Point CIO-1199 













Material conditions only 
Pragmatic, Business Unionism 
Purpose of the 
Union 
[Ideology] 
Workplace and nonworkplace 
Material and nonmaterial conditions 
Belief system explicit, anchored in 
struggle 
Pro-union activists central 
Training of “authentic messengers” 
Workers as “flat”; staff-driven “Get Out 
the Vote” GOTV operation 




Organic worker leaders central 
Development of organic leaders into 
organizers 
Staff organizers work with and help develop 
skill of organic leaders, who lead workers 



























Power only calibrated to achieve growth 
deals  
Lower concession costs 
Goal/Power 
Analysis 
Power is calibrated to raise quality-of-life 
standards at work and at home 
High concession costs 
Primary struggle is outside the workplace 
No/few strikes, mostly ‘symbolic’ 




Primary struggle is inside the workplace  
Production-disrupting, majority strikes 
key 
Members routinely donate to a strike fund 
Union staff  
Consultants including pollsters, political 




Complemented by organizers 
Workers 
“The community,” but disconnected from 




Workers' own community, Including faith 
leaders, community orgs, activated and 
engaged via the workers in struggle 
Researchers, Lawyers, Communicators 
Corporate campaigns, driving a mostly 
national focus 
Amorality in tactics: “anything to get the 
deal” (serious compromises) 
Card check 
Election procedure agreements (EPAs) 
Bargain to Organize (BTO) 
Types of 
Campaign 
NLRB Elections, market-based, driving a 
mostly local & regional focus 
Principles in tactics: ethical limits on 















Strict limits on bargaining often tied to 
‘agreement,’ few or no workers present 
Negotiators mostly lawyers or ‘Reps’ 





Achieved through open, transparent, 
bargaining, lots of workers involved 
Negotiators mostly organizers 
Contracts tool for teaching self-
governance, all issues on the table 
Standards crucial 
Narrow shop floor issue reach, if any 
Contract enforcement follows grievance 
and arbitration procedures (if allowed by 
accord, some prevent this) 
Representatio
n Model 
Broad shop floor issue reach 
Direct action by workers 
Grievance and arbitration followed if 




The first factor, the purpose of the union, produces very different approaches to power 
analysis and governance. If individual actors believe that the purpose of the union is to enable a 
majority of workers to engage in mass-collective struggle—for the betterment of themselves, 
their families and their class, then in the related choice point, the role of the workers—those 
workers will not be mere symbols; they will be central actors in the struggle. If, however, the 
purpose of the union is to improve the material conditions of workers by increasing the share of 
profits they receive, the workers’ role will be greatly diminished; they will function as symbolic 
actors, not central participants. In his organizing manual for 1199, Bernie Mintor describes a 
variation of the two models in the section “A Union Can Go in One of Two Directions.” 
Direction I: “A small group of top officers decide that they know what’s best for members. They 
then proceed to make decisions and manipulate the decision-making process on all levels. Their 
primary concern is total control.” Direction II: “Raising the union-consciousness level of the 
membership must be the main program. The union is a tool for struggle where workers learn how 
to struggle as a class.”
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 [Emphasis original.] 
Alinsky is frequently credited with helping to develop the concept of the corporate 
campaign. In a 1993 paper on corporate campaigns, the authors claim, “In fact, for those of us in 
the 40-something bracket, the classic strategic labor campaign of our formative years was the 
United Farm Workers Grape Boycott of the 1960s… it came from Saul Alinsky and his Chicago 
brand of community organizing.”
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 Likewise, in an interview Ray Rogers posted on his website, 
Corporate Campaign Inc., Rogers proclaims the JP Stevens fight from 1976 to 1980 as “the Birth 
of Corporate Campaigns”; he also references Alinsky.
302
 The corporate campaign model directs 
and trains unions to see the employer from the employer’s point of view, not the worker’s. 
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There are many examples of flow charts and organograms that outline the corporate 
campaign’s focus on the employer, including on Corporate Campaign, Inc.’s website. The 
example below, Diagram #1, fairly represents the many in circulation: 
Diagram 1: Typical Corporate Campaign Schematic 





 the workers are flat, shown as one actor in relationship to a dozen 
others; they are a piece of the “available leverage points” used to get the employer to agree to 
union demands. This power analysis has been widely accepted by New Labor and rationalizes 
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the shift in focus away from workers as the primary source of leverage against employers to all 
other actors as the primary source of leverage. With workers representing only one of a dozen 
possible leverage points, it makes sense to rely upon the other eleven just has fervently. There 
are so many other leverage points besides the “worker piece” that the proportion of union staff 
devoted to workers has been reduced, while the proportion of union staff that drives toward 
securing “victory” in card-check and neutrality campaigns and election procedure accords has 
dramatically increased.
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 The workers also get a twelfth-part consideration when it comes to 
whose interests are represented in the deal, and rarely, if ever, are they present in negotiations 
with employers or consulted about the terms when the deal is concluded. 
In this now-dominate power analysis, workers play the role of what is often called the 
authentic messenger. Some workers are needed—enough to be presented to the media and to 
perhaps testify before legislative bodies—to diffuse and inoculate against an employer’s claims 
that the fight is not about workers but rather about the “union bosses.” Workers are seen as a 
largely undifferentiated mass, and the chief criteria for engaging them is the answer to a simple 
question, do they favor a union or not? From among workers who favor the union, staff select 
those pro-union activists who are the most telegenic to an elite audience, such as the media, and 
use them as the public face of the campaign. They will then be called “leaders.” Professional 
communicators write press and legislative statements for them and prepare them in how to 
present well in public. In this model, union staff need not engage more than a minority of the 
workforce, since the real victory is achieved through one or more of the other eleven points of 
leverage in the corporate campaign and not by workers themselves. 
Peter Olney, longtime national organizing director of the West Coast–based International 
Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU), said in one interview, “Just before the split at the 
240 
 
AFL-CIO, the conversations [that New Labor was driving] were about how workers really got in 
the way of organizing. We [the national organizing directors] would actually sit in rooms, in 
annual meetings about the state of organizing, and the discussion would be that workers often got 
in the way of union growth deals.”
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 It would be difficult to find a clearer statement of the view 
of workers by key staff in the New Labor model. 
This sidelining of the majority of a workforce, engaging only those already predisposed 
to support the union—union activists—would be impossible in the CIO-1199 model (the one 
with which the CTU is aligned) and the leadership of the third Smithfield campaign (where the 
union is a “tool for class struggle where workers learn how to struggle as a class”). The CIO-
1199-CTU model (which won Smithfield) is contingent on winning a majority of the workers in 
a workplace to the cause of the union: class struggle. Majorities are also practically necessary, 
because these unions run real strikes, not so-called symbolic ones. And, as in the case of 
1199NE, they expand their base by running and winning NLRB elections, which also 
necessitates majorities.  
To achieve majority participation, the CIO organizing model relies on the organizers’ 
ability to correctly identify and develop a network of those workers who are the most respected 
by their peers, whether they are initially pro- or anti-union or undecided. The respected worker 
leaders are the key to this model. The core to this method is the ability of the organizer to first 
identify the most respected workers and then persuade them to support the union, again, be it for 
a massive strike or for an election. And, in the case of the CTU as discussed in chapter six, the 
privatization forces had changed the opportunity structure by setting a minimum threshold to 
strike requiring that more than seventy-five percent of all teachers had to vote and had to vote 
yes to strike before the strike vote would be legal. If that were the standard for all U.S. civil 
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elections to count, we’d never yet have achieved the threshold for any member of Congress or of 
almost any legislature, anywhere. When has seventy-five percent turnout of all potential voters 
ever been mandated except in anti-union legislation? The point is, the CTU did it—and did it 
because they followed a real organizing model. Against all odds, among almost 30,000 teachers, 
it generated more than a seventy-five percent turnout and secured a super majority voting in 
favor of striking. That’s organizing, not mobilizing.  
As already discussed, but little understood today and crucial to my argument about a key 
element to the organizing model, leader identification is the mechanism that allows union 
organizers (skilled coaches) to connect to worker dynamics in the workplace by analyzing the 
workers’ own preexisting social groups. This is done in conversation with the workers, not apart 
from them. Organic workplace leaders have followers, and—like the leftist factions of the old 
CIO, and the 1199NE type union today and others still working in a true organizing model—
there is a heavy emphasis on the organizer’s mastering the method for identifying organic 
worker-leaders, which is achieved through many repeated applications, as in other craft. The 
organizer has to be a master of the method because she or he is teaching the method to the brand 
new recruits in a high-stakes war—under what Mead would call a critical condition, where the 
workers’ sense of self is being instantly altered by taking on new roles—by seeing the employer 
and their managers taking on new roles and by an entirely new kind of generalized other being 
created in the heat of the struggle. 
The basic principle behind the method is that the organic leader cannot be identified by 
union staff or any other outsider, but only by a majority of workers who are in the same shift and 
unit. The process is in stark contrast to the activities commonly called organizing in the New 
Labor model, where professional staff choose and anoint worker activists (who they call leaders) 
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based on their own observation and preference.
306
 In the New Labor mobilizing model, they 
never have to build majorities, so they can pick pro-union activists who like the union, and from 
them, the telegenic ones who speak well to TV cameras. In other words, workers as props. 
Rarely, if ever, does a worker accurately announce himself or herself as a leader. 
According to union organizer Kristin Warner, a fourth-generation, trained 1199 organizer, “It’s 
almost never the workers who most want to talk with us. More often than not, it’s the workers 
who don’t want to talk to us and remain in the background. They have a sense of their value and 
won’t easily step forward, not unless and until there’s a credible reason. That’s part of the 
character that makes them leaders.”
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In the CIO-1199 model, strikes that cripple production are not only possible, they are 
seen as the highest “structure test” of whether worker organization in a given shop is at its 
strongest.
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 What is called a “structure test” in the organizing model is the method used by the 
organizer to test and assess whether they’ve correctly identified the real organic worker leaders 
(which happens by having conversations with most workers in the first place). A typical early-on 
structure test involves assessing how effectively and efficiently organic leaders can get a 
majority of their shift or unit to go along in a public act, typically signing a public petition, 
having their photo taken for a public photo poster, all wearing a sticker or button on the same 
day or any number of endless structure tests —in which case their manager knows they are 
announcing they are pro-union. This is an example of a “majority petition,” where a majority of 
workers in a large workplace publicly sign a petition that becomes a three-by-five-foot poster 
given to all the decision makers. In the example shown here, management and the elected body 






If the organic leaders can turn these types of actions around in one or two shifts only, the 
organizer knows they’ve correctly identified an organic leader. On the other hand, even if the 
worker is demonstrably enthusiastic for the union—if they cannot get a majority in their shift and 
unit to do anything quickly, let alone engage in high risk actions—it’s an immediate clue to the 
organizer that his ID was incorrect, and its back to the drawing board of talking, again, with all 
the workers to better assess who they most respect. Majority petitions, majority photo posters, 
majority sticker days, and majority T-shirt days serve multiple purposes: they are high risk 
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because they are public, so workers are being socialized to take risk; they are solidarity and 
confidence building, so workers realize pretty much everyone agrees with them; and they are 
part of an endless serious of assessments of the strength of each organic leader. In a big unit’s 
beginning of an organizing drive or lead-up to a contract-related strike, it might take weeks to 
achieve this; if the workers can never turn around majority high-risk actions inside their 
workplace, it’s an indication that they will be defeated and a different strategy must be deployed. 
Should they choose to, organic leaders can lead their coworkers in high risk-action; pro-union 
activists cannot. One depicts the organizing model; the other, the minority-participation 
mobilizing model. 
In the organizing model, from the opening conversation with a newly formed organizing 
committee in a nonunion facility—a committee made of the organic leaders, not activists as in 
the New Labor–mobilizing model—one of the key subjects is being ready to strike for the first 
contract. This conversation about strikes is directly linked to the ability of the workers to win for 
themselves the kinds of contract standards that are life-changing, such as control of their own 
hours and schedules, the right to a quickly address workplace health and safety issues, the right 
to increased staffing and decreased workload, and the right to meaningful sick and vacation time. 
Compared with these gains, a mere pay raise—too often the chief goal of the New Labor 
model—is a significantly limited win. Semantics are a key symbolic gesture in Mead’s analysis 
of the interactive nature of two-way conversations. And semantics are absolutely key to good 
organizing. As mentioned in chapter three, the nursing-home case study, a key question in 1199 
for generations is are there two or three sides in a workplace fight? Upon learning of a union 
drive, the employer will usually begin an anti-union campaign by declaring, “We don’t need a 
third party in here”—meaning a union as the third party. In the CIO and 1199 organizing model, 
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a key to victory is, do the workers see themselves as the union—in which case there are only two 
sides—defeating the employers message? 
Examples from the opening of two separate training workshops in an organizing model 
union such as the union in chapter three reveals the centrality of Mead’s concept of semantics 
(emphasis in original):  
 
Introduction 
Everything an organiser does must have a purpose that is about 
moving the vision and the plan forward in their industry. Conversations are 
the primary vehicle for doing that. 
 
EVERY CONVERSATION MUST INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:  
 Have a purpose                                      70% DISCOVERY – worker speaks 
 Shift how the worker                             30% UNION AS SOLUTION – 
organiser speaks 
 Have an ask 
 
Organising conversations are not about giving information, giving updates, 
and leaving it up to the worker to decide what to do with that information. Good 
organisers always have a conversation agenda which is about how to shift 
workers in their attitudes, beliefs and commitment to both their workmates and their 
campaign.” 
 
A second example of “semantics drills,” numbering to fifteen examples of how to say 
something, were practiced for hours and daily in the organizing department  
Semantics Training  
 
 Why do semantics matter (pose question to the group) 2-3 minute discussion 
 Point = People learn about their union from us and how we talk about it. 
 General Principles 
 DO NOT 3rd Party the union 
 Examples: (put up the bad statements on the flip chart and have people discuss why 
they are not good and then the group comes up with a better answer) 
 
1. Bad = “Thank you” as a way to end a conversation 
a. Better = Good talking to you/See you later/Look forward to seeing you soon 
2. Bad = We need you to get a schedule for us. 
a. Better = It’s important that you and your co-workers know who works at the 
facility and where to keep track of membership/surveys/COPE etc. The best 




The relationship between how central semantics are to Mead and organizers, and that 
these semantics are used in interactive conversations where “70 percent is the worker talking,” 
are clearly shown in these two snippets of actual CIO-1199 type trainings. This is what the 
Advice for Rookie Organizers postulate number 16 means: “Organizers talk too much, most of 
what you say will be forgotten.” The emphasis is on a two-way interactive conversation in which 
organizers speak only up to thirty percent of the time.  
The conversation about gaining the strength needed to strike continues in the discussion 
about governance is in last of the three core factors in the model. In a 1199 conversation with 
workers, contract enforcement does not happen primarily through the power of lawyers and 
arbitration, it happens on the shop floor, in direct actions led by the organic worker leaders who 
ideally graduate from the organizing committee to the bargaining team to a delegate’s 
(steward’s) post. And to cement the idea of “three sides to two”—that the union really is the 
workers and not a third party—a foundational principle of the union is that all workers are 
invited and encouraged to attend open negotiations with employers. For Mead, role play is 
essential. Characteristic of organizing-model unions, in an open-negotiations model, the workers 
being present in large numbers at the negotiations table is an important form of what Mead 
considered role play: the workers and top management are learning to view each other in very 
different roles, as legal equals. Collective bargaining is the only place under U.S. law where 
workers sit as legal equals to their employer. As such, it’s seen as crucial to the organizing model 
for reasons that align with Mead’s concept of the development of self and the generalized other. 
In contrast, in the New Labor mobilizing model most collective bargaining is handled in 
top-down, staff-only negotiations with employers. If workers are present at all, there will be 
fewer than five and they won’t be afforded the right to speak at the negotiations table. In 
247 
 
negotiations for neutrality deals, be they for card-check or election-procedure agreements, it has 
become routine for union staff alone to prenegotiate certain terms, including how “bargaining” 
will take place and even the actual contract terms. Alinsky was not known for his governance 
skills; he famously quipped in the Playboy interview (and in documentaries) that none of his 
organizations were any good a few years after the victory (whatever the campaign was). This 
Alinskyist tradition, too, has morphed into New Labor. 
 
Section V:  The Missing Power of the Current Organizing Model 
Secondary Power Is In the Community,  
Not Corporations or 1% Stakeholders 
 
As demonstrated in some form in each case study chapter, the mobilizing model is 
capable of winning certain kinds of successes. But it has not proven to achieve success in the 
hardest fights. In the hardest fights, even when the workers are the primary power source—such 
as the educators and health care workers in chapters three and six and the Smithfield workers in 
chapter four—today’s hostile climate requires additional power except in the rarest of situations 
such as airline pilots, Boeing engineers, men who carry guns (police and prison guards), and a 
handful of other very selective groups of workers. The vast majority of workers in the U.S. now 
require additional sources of power to enable their ability to stage all-out strikes and to win 
elections and standard-setting contracts. The source of secondary power, like the source of 
primary power, is a strategic choice. 
No divine power has blessed the corporate campaign; rather, the mostly male decision 
makers in the Alinsky-influenced New Labor mobilizing model chose, above all other options, to 
embrace a strategy of high-level backroom dealing with politicians and corporate power brokers 
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on behalf of workers. And to be clear, there are almost no comprehensive campaigns. In the 
same way that people claim to be organizing when few of them actually are, people assert that 
they are running comprehensive campaigns when they are really only running corporate 
campaigns—the deciding factor is the degree of worker participation and worker agency. 
Smithfield’s model is highly unusual despite its success, just like running strikes is highly 
unusual even though they generate the biggest gains for the working class. They are hard, messy, 
and complicated. And they alone can rebuild the devastated base of this country. 
Building on Luders’s thesis about the relationship between disruption and concession 
costs in the Civil Rights movement,
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 I extend his logic into my dissertation’s overall argument 
about relative success and which kind of success is possible under the mobilizing model versus 
the organizing model. In figure#1, Power Required & Disruption Required, [note to committee, 
this chart only right below this text, others at end of chapter] I specify a set of conditions that 
will generate employer concession costs from low to high. The vertical axis is the cost of 
settlement—meaning, in real dollars, what the employer has to pay out of its overall expenses 
and profit to settle a contract with a given group of workers. Importantly, this isn’t just wages or 
benefits; this is the cost in relationship to the overall expense of running the business. 
The horizontal axis is what I call ideological resistance. Drawing on my cases, it is clear 
there are two types of business leaders: the pragmatic-practical and the diabolically antiunion. 
There might be an ‘in-between’ pragmatic and diabolical with high-cost employees, but I have 
found no evidence. Evidence exists in chapter three and in the literature about some employers 
being in-between but these are employers with lower cost employees and with low demands 
from the union yet the employer has a large number of employees—they can still be bought if 
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the union pays for the cost, such as securing higher government subsidies or lower taxes, just as 
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While ideological resistance is often correlated with the cost of doing business, it is not 
always so. In fact, the key to most of the high-impact, high-success union strategy for one 
hundred years has been looking for the pragmatic-practical type within the higher cost 
workforces because this is how unions with high-cost workers make significant breakthroughs. 
The entire concept of “pattern bargaining” is based on an organizing model union—such as the 
old United Auto Workers of the 1940s or today’s 1199 New England—the workers have to have 
the ability to strike; they’ve already “lined up the market,” meaning they have strategically 
aligned all their contracts in a given geography to expire simultaneously. Then, the union starts 
the bargaining process with the practical-pragmatic employer to “set the pattern high,” assuring 
the employer that they have the power to win the same settlements with the next employer with 
which they will sit across the table days later. Still, striking—or the credible threat of a real 
strike based on recent real strikes—is required to move employers at the high cost of settlement 
level. As discussed in chapter three, the reason 1199NE can win strong contracts, including 
neutrality for unorganized nursing homes without any negative consequences in their neutrality 
agreements, is precisely because they run majority strikes often enough that the employers 
knows the threat is credible. The threat is a real threat, not a pretend threat. 
Ideological resistance can also be relevant to the issue of shop floor rights versus material 
gains only in contract settlements and concession costs. Kimeldorf discusses this difference 
when it came to the west versus east coast dockworkers. For the west coast workers, who wanted 
control of production, they had to strike to win. On the east coast, because the union only 
demanded lots of money, the boss was willing to settle without strikes being needed (and engage 
in actual corruption to pay people off). Some employers in the higher cost of settlement category 
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might accede to increased wages and substantial benefits after a strike but hold out on workers’ 
rights over production decisions for ideological reasons, for employer control of the shop floor.  
But within the 1199 case, I have found evidence that employers will even surrender 
production issues when two conditions are present: the union can effectively strike, and, the 
employer comes to understand that the workers might actually make better decisions than line 
managers, particularly ones that can positively impact the employer’s bottom line. The present 
day example is that the new Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement rules under Obamacare tie 
higher reimbursement rates to better patient outcomes. Nurses often do have better ideas than 
management regarding what will heal the patient better and faster so if the employer is the 
pragmatic-practical type, they might even grant production decision making to a high power 
generating union.  
On the other hand, janitors, for example, are low-wage workers and they represent a tiny 
fraction of the overall cost to the corporations whose buildings they clean. If the demand on the 
part of the union is also low, a mobilizing model with only a minority of workers and a handful 
of not-very-powerful community allies can “win.” This is a typical Justice for Janitors campaign 
model, one I argue is based on that of the United Farm Workers. In this model, essentially all the 
employer needs is the union’s guarantee that it will negotiate a “trigger agreement,” meaning the 
small wage increase to the workers—fifty cents per hour or even one dollar per hour—won’t 
take effect until it succeeds at getting all cleaning contractors in the area to agree to the terms. 
Because the cost is so low, the settlement is so cheap to the corporation as a ratio of cost to 
overall expenses, it’s easy to shift even a conservative corporate owner to invoke his more 
practical business side and simply settle the workers’ demands. I argue that little real power is 
developed from this version of mobilizing. Few worker leaders are developed, rarely are new 
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community leaders developed (they tend to be the already activist types), but the union expands 
its membership. 
In terms of the disruption power of the organizing model, the missing element today is a 
more systematic approach to the community, using the same Mead-like strategic interaction 
principles embedded in the organizing tradition inside the workplace. With the exception of the 
Chicago Teachers Union, most organizing unions today rarely systematize their brilliant 
approach with workers on the inside by using an equally brilliant approach to the workers’ own 
organic community on the outside. The Chicago Teachers Union, as I describe in chapter three, 
learned from the British Columbia Federation of Teachers that to win a massive and illegal 
strike, it had to have staunch support—active support, tested and well prepared for support—
from parents. The Chicago teachers voted in a new leadership in 2010 that already met the first 
criteria for the organizing model; they believe the purpose of the union is to enable workers to 
radically change their lives in all aspects: the union as a tool for class struggle. As CORE (the 
caucus in the union before they won the 2010 election), the teachers had built “strong ties” to key 
community-and neighborhood-based groups throughout Chicago. But they saw the relationship 
with parents as something different from an alliance; the leadership understood that parents 
would be somehow decisive if they had to strike. They were right, and they had just enough of a 
direct rapport with parents directly and indirectly through their many community allies to beat 
Rahm Emanuel and save their union by rebuilding it through a strike. 
The most profound success of the Chicago teachers strike was the building of powerful 
solidarities among and between teachers and among and between teachers and the whole of 
Chicago’s working class. That their leader, Karen Lewis, an African American high school 
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teacher, would go on to poll consistently as the most popular person in the city to challenge the 
incumbent in the mayoral race would have been utterly unimaginable before the strike. 
 The success of the national war on America’s teachers has been pretty thorough going. 
The average “good liberal” will say he or she support unions, but not a teachers union. In 
Chicago, the teachers showed that Mead’s concept of the generalized other can be transformed 
for the whole of the class when it is brought into the fight as partners, not merely through some 
self-interested community-labor coalition. Chicago changed—not just the teachers, not just the 
parents, not just the students—and its working class was given agency in an all-out fight for the 
right to have public schools in its neighborhoods, taught by teachers interested in staying with 
their kid. The working class also changed its view of teachers, schools, racism, neoliberalism, 
and the city’s slick mayor. That doesn’t happen through a messaging campaign or a mobilizing 
model. 
The 1199 organizing locals are struggling to catch up to the CTU community aspect of 
this model, if they are struggling. The dominant power of the SEIU in their lives is pushing hard 
for these local unions to see minority-worker strategies and corporate campaigns as secondary 
power if they need more power in a given fight—this is presently in contention and there is not 
yet a decision. But the pressure is on as even the mighty 1199 locals feel the pain of the full-
frontal assault on labor. To be more specific, their employers smell blood in a way they haven’t 
in years: a combination of one state after another’s falling to right-to-work laws, the results of 
the Harris v. Quinn Supreme Court case, and the relentless pressure of a parent union wedded to 
a mobilizing model filled with high-paid consultants peddling their services, which are certainly 
not about organizing deeply in the broader community. 
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There is enough evidence from Chicago and from experiments and test cases involving 
1199 in the period under discussion in chapter three (namely, the Stamford Organizing Project) 
that when the community is strategically engaged in Mead-like interactions and enlisted as a 
partner in struggle—not an afterthought or rent-a-collar model—broad pressure can enable 
strikes and have a seriously constraining effect on employers, thereby creating conditions for 
workers in their own communities to win. This goes far beyond what’s commonly called labor-
community-alliance building and even beyond what’s sometimes called social-movement 
unionism. This is an organizing model in the community, where time-tested methods of the best 
unions inside the workplace get put to work outside the workplace. This means the workers, not 
staff, are the primary agents of change. Where “chain and list work” are developed to unearth the 
organic leaders—the powerful among the nonelite forces in a given community—and where 
these forces are brought in as partners in struggle, not distant allies whose backs are scratched at 
award dinners and with occasional or constant donations from labor unions. Diagram #2 depicts 
the boundless relationships which workers can best access themselves in an organizing model 

















Two recent books reinforce the potential influence of one of the most powerful forces left 
in American communities, the religious community, though neither author deploys an 
understanding of the organizing versus mobilizing model. 
In Adam Reich’s book With God on Our Side,
310
 he argues that unions need to embrace 
the noneconomic and value-based motivations of health care workers. I agree, but Reich does not 
attend to why or how workers themselves—particularly health care, education, and other 
mission-driven workers, and not professional union staff—can and must be the agents. In Reich’s 
single case study (the Santa Rosa hospital fight), staff, not the workers, lead the outside strategy. 
This may be a factor in why the employer was successful, for several years, in out maneuvering 
the union’s attempts to undermine the employer’s credibility among religious players. Alinsky, 
writing about his first organizing campaign in the Back of the Yards, shows that he understood 
what today’s labor leaders fail to: “It is obvious that the membership of this union is very closely 
related to the membership of the Catholic church. It is quite common to find that a steward or 
member of the Packinghouse Workers Organizing Committee is also an official of a Holy Name 
society or another religious organization.”
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 I ask, had the tens of thousands of rank-and-file 
members of the union that Reich profiles—surely many of them members of houses of faith 
themselves—been tapped to use their own organic connections to the various churches, would it 
have been harder for the employer to set the union up as an outside third party? 
Given the lack of moral authority of today’s unions—especially but not exclusively as up 
against an employer viewed as having higher moral authority than organized labor, the 
progressive nuns who ran the hospital in Reich’s case study—the union needs to systematically 
map their membership’s connections to the many social forces and community ties among the 
rank and file. The strongest ties produce the strongest bonds, and those will invariably exist 
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between the workers and their faith and community leaders, not between strangers, aka paid 
staff. To blunt employers, the rank and file members’ strong ties must replace today’s pattern of 
paid staff doing the work the workers themselves can do. 1199’s own Advice to Rookie 
Organizers needs to be directly extended to the model of engagement done with the broader 
community—including understanding how to tell the workers it’s their community and then 
behave that way, and the postulate about not underestimating the workers. In Chicago, the results 
were stunning. 
The second book, Jake Rosenfeld’s What Union’s No Longer Do,
312
 makes several points 
with which I don’t agree, namely those in his discussion of the public sector. He misses what 
motivates people to go to work for the public sector and almost falls prey to the right’s message 
about the public sector as faceless, bureaucratic workers. He doesn’t see the motivations of most 
public sector workers: the quiet beauty of public health nurses saving babies and mothers in 
county maternal health clinics; or stories of success, not tragedy, when social services 
workforces try and do rescue children from horrors in abusive households; or accounts of the 
guys who lay the baseball diamonds perfectly and on time each day so neighborhoods kids can 
enjoy sports in well-kept parks and engage in Mead’s “Me” development stage. And the overall 
gestalt in government service where many workers feel a kind of pride to be serving their 
communities in the way soldiers feel pride in serving their nation. We don’t treat our soldiers 
well, but we sure respect them more than nonsoldier government workers—ironically, soldiers 
are government workers too. 
Rosenfeld’s entire analysis about the wage gap not being as significant in the public 
sector simply misses the mark. Workers know they don’t get wage gain from working for the 
government—for equivalent work, it’s well known to be considerably less in the public than in 
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the private sector. Workers understand their lower wage will be made up for by significantly 
better benefits. He then analyzes the “retirement plans” of each sector and remarkably arrives at 
a similar close-to-equal-benefits-to-workers calculation and he declares them ‘not much 
different.’ Rosenfeld is dead wrong here too, even just factually. He says he didn’t have access to 
the content of the plans, so he simply did statistics on the percentage of employers who “offer” 
retirement plans. The vast majority of plans in the private sector don’t pay anywhere near enough 
to actually let people retire. They do in the public sector, which is why it’s top on Rauner’s hit 
list in Illinois. 
But what Rosenfeld gets right—aside from overall message, which is good—is his 
discussion of religion. He has impressive regression analysis, which basically says there are only 
two forces in all society that have an equal and high rate of influence on how ordinary people 
vote: unions and religion. He describes how well the right has plied this, an intentional power 
move to build an evangelical base of voters, steadily growing while leftists in unions say, “I 
don’t like religion, I do class, that’s why I am not building relationships with them.” That’s an 
actual quote from an extremely successful organizer in an interview for this dissertation.  
A good point Reich makes in his book is that a reason why unions should enter the moral 
values arena is of central importance: it matters to the workers themselves. If it matters to the 
workers, that is supposed to be enough for good union organizers. If faith matters to workers, I 
argue it has to matter to unions. Otherwise, the union remains a third party in the church—not of 
the member, but apart from. As Reverend Nelson says in the conclusion of chapter five—when 
the relationship is congregation member to faith leader and it’s a personal conversation about 
their congregation member—labor wins many new and often more powerful religious leaders to 
the cause of unions. That’s why this work is so much more important than devoting time to 
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tactical maneuvers with one percenter shareholders or businesses in the supply chain of a 
corporate target. 
For people in labor who say they don’t like religion or, as I heard it, “I don’t do religion, I do 
class,” then they ought to at least view doing the work with religious leaders via their members 
defensively because as Rosenfeld points out, the right continues to expand into this base. And 
this base is voting for Walker and for Snyder and for the many Trifecta Red State power 
structures that promise to cut taxes by gutting public pensions to “give the little people, the hard 
workers in our state, a raise.” The many statistics about religion and voting are the most 
important numbers in Rosenfeld’s book because they don’t tell us about the past, they tell us 
about the future. They hint loudly toward the strategy I am describing, after studying relative 
success and observing New Labor’s twenty years of missed chances. 
For the entire climate to change the way it did in Chicago, good unions need to engage 
the broader community in the fight so that the entire community, of which the workers are an 
organic part, transforms too. This would be an organizing model with a bottom-up strategy 
capable of movement building, not moment actualization. The large numbers of women in 
today’s workforce—saddled with wage work and endless nonwage work—don’t separate their 
lives in the way industrial era mostly male workers could, with one life beginning when they 
arrived at work and punched the clock, and another starting when they punched out. The pressing 
concerns that bear down on most workers today are not divided into two neat piles, only one of 
which should be of concern to unions, while the other pile gets divvied up among a dozen other 
weak interest groups. To effectively challenge neoliberal capitalism in the present moment, to 
successfully challenge the excessive corporate power that defines our era, organizing unions 
must create a whole worker organizing model that facilitates, not retards, large numbers of 
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Americans to make the connections between corporate domination of their work lives, their 
home lives, and political structures. Diagram #3 offers an illustration of what Chicago after 
2010, Smithfield in the third round attempt, and Connecticut sometimes looks like when the 





Diagram 3: Whole Worker Campaign Model 














CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION: PRETEND POWER VERSUS ACTUAL POWER 
The core argument of this dissertation is that for movements to exercise maximum power, 
the power required in the hardest campaigns, there is no substitute for a real, bottom-up 
organizing model. This argument involves a set of associated questions aimed at understanding 
the common elements of the most successful strategies in my case studies. The first common 
element involves movement actors correctly assessing the power required to win their demands. 
The second element involves developing good strategy. The third rests on whether a group can 
execute the strategy: in effect, can the approach chosen generate the power required to win? 
My cases clearly demonstrate successful strategies being deployed in the new 
millennium, a period that is generally considered hostile to workers and especially to unions. I 
selected a range of cases that allowed an investigation of power, strategy, and collective action 
method, examining them against different levels of power required to achieve the group’s 
demands. All cases involved workers making demands for change. Outside a union context, I 
examined low-wage immigrant workers trying to get their employers to pay them money owed. I 
analyzed two distinct approaches to nursing-home workers’ forming unions between 2000 and 
2014, the model of governance deployed by the unions once the workers were unionized, and the 
relative outcomes of the two strategies for the workers themselves. I examined one local teachers 
union over two decades—discussing their success before and after a major leadership change—
to gage the relative success with the same group of workers under even more difficult 
circumstances but with different kinds of leaders. Similarly, I interrogated the different strategies 
of one union in its three attempts at helping manufacturing workers: in this case, the formation of 
a union in a meat-production factory in the state considered the most hostile to unions and with 
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the lowest percentage of unionized workers. I compared the strategies of the two defeats and the 
one big success. 
Because production-crippling majority strikes were deployed in all three cases with the 
most success— Chicago’s teachers after 2010, Connecticut’s nursing-home employees, and 
North Carolina’s meat-production workers—I conclude that in order for workers to win 
substantial gains, the strike weapon is essential. More importantly, in chapter seven, I examined 
what is necessary for workers to deploy the strike again today on a mass scale. I conclude, 
drawing on the analysis in my cases, there are two clear and distinct models in and outside 
unions in the New Labor era, only one of which can enable majority strikes. I name these distinct 
models a mobilizing model and an organizing model, and I conclude they produce different 
levels of success. What I defined as a mobilizing model places primary agency on staff and is 
only capable of winning under certain restrictive conditions: those that do not require high levels 
of power. An organizing model, however, which instead places the primary agency for success 
on an ever-expanding base of ordinary people, can win even in more difficult circumstances, 
those requiring high levels of power. In each model, staff plays a very significant role, but the 
agent for building power is the key delineator. 
Although my cases offer evidence of the superior power of the organizing model, its 
effects are not ubiquitous. It does not work under all circumstances at all times, but it does work 
considerably better than the mobilizing model when up against powerful opponents. In situations 
of total repression, organizing will not work. In the case of workers who had decades of bad 
experiences with unions, it will be harder but not impossible to gain success (Steve Lopez 
showed us how, even under the conditions of workers with bad union experiences, good 
organizing did succeed). In the case of a benevolent employer—where workers are given agency 
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and respect, and where the employer meets or exceeds the pay and benefits of unionized 
workers—it is unlikely to work (given typical employer behavior, this is not a threat to the 
organizing model).  
Paying close attention to today’s conditions and looking at which sectors in the U.S. 
economy are expanding or at least stable, with little or no threat of exit, and being mindful of the 
workforce of these sectors, I suggest that success is contingent not only on the organizing model 
as it has been deployed by a handful of successful unions inside the workplace, but that for even 
these unions to keep winning, the model must be expanded to into the community via the 
workers themselves. The agency for labor’s community actions to be as successful as the best 
workplaces’ must rest with workers, not staff. Today’s good organizing unions face a choice: see 
the community their members live in (and unorganized workers) as their secondary power 
strategy, or, surrender to overpaid consultants who promise perfect messaging, high quality 
consumer data as strategy, and slick but fake community-labor alliances. 
Drawing on my case studies, I conclude that this expanded vision of the organizing 
model, one that bridges the workplace and the community via the workers, is more capable of 
winning in the hardest fights than labor’s chosen weapon of the past twenty years: the corporate 
campaign. I explored the roots of the corporate campaign model and linked them to the legacy 
and the ideas most closely linked to “organizing” from the early 1970s on, those of Saul Alinsky. 
I argue that in 1995, despite the promise of bold new organizing, the Alinsky-influenced New 
Labor leaders ushered in an era of election-less unions, workerless unionization growth deals, 
and contracts settled by national agreements between union and corporate lawyers rather than by 




Ironically, Alinsky’s brilliant understanding of power, strategy, and tactics has morphed 
into New Labor’s grossly disproportionate emphasis on the corporate campaign—good rope 
twisted into a noose. It is not that unions do not need smart research; they do. But smart research 
should augment, not replace, workers as the primary source of leverage against employers. Smart 
union research departments could shift from corporate-focused research to geographic power 
structure analysis, involving workers themselves in the research methods. With workers as 
research partners in the community, the strategy of understanding who holds power, how and 
why, and, how to change it, can be arrived at for less money than high paid consultants, and, this 
process can teach the workers about power in their own community.  
In the latest effort to avoid engaging workers in their own liberation, during interviews 
conducted for this dissertation, organizers described the latest schema: flowing directly from the 
Obama campaign’s data driven success in 2008 and again in 2012, the consultant industrial 
complex that straddles national unions and the national Democratic Party is now persuading 
unions that they can spend tens of millions “purchasing” consumer data bases, meaning data 
gathered and aggregated by search engines like Google, and develop predictive models for which 
workers might be inclined to vote yes for a union. This is incredibly expensive, and, like polling 
and pollsters, it derives this ‘data’ outside the context of an employer fight, rendering it as absurd 
as the promise of framing-alone for the past two decades. Data, like messaging, can be useful but 
not when the people driving the data and driving the polling are also driving transactional one-
time get-out-the-vote efforts. Transformational experiences come through high risk collective 
action, not computer geeks crunching data.  
Some of the misunderstanding of the promise of the corporate campaign, which is 
characterized by minimal worker involvement, stems from which kind of sectors, what type of 
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workers, and what the relative concession costs will mean to the employer. A handful of so-
called authentic messengers and a minority of workers engaged might work for a Justice for 
Janitors campaign, where concession costs are a tiny fraction of those in a hospital workers’ 
campaign, or of the pension plan that actually facilitates a real retirement still enjoyed by 30,000 
teachers in Chicago. High concession costs require high power. The Koch brothers and the 
power elite today require high power if progressives are to reclaim the country from the 
corporate right. 
The greatest damage to our movements today has been the shift in identity of the agent of 
change: workers and ordinary people, or cape-wearing, sword-wielding, swashbuckling staff. It’s 
not that having fulltime paid organizers isn’t important. It’s how they understand their role, and, 
the emphasis on the identification and development of the real organic leaders in the base that is 
missing. Without this reorientation in focus, today’s movements can’t get to scale. Scale comes 
from seriously skilling up the organic leaders among the masses of ordinary people. 
As discussed in detail in chapter seven, Alinsky obscured the issue of agency by 
declaring that there are organizers and there are leaders: the organizer is a behind-the-scenes 
individual who is not a leader, who does not have anything to do with decision making, and who 
must come from outside the community; the leaders must come from the base constituency, and 
they make all the decisions. Yet near the beginning of his chapter “The Education of the 
Organizer,” Alinsky writes, “Since organizations are created, in large part, by the organizer, we 
must find out what creates the organizer.” He then reveals his real point: 
“Those out of their local communities who were trained on the job achieved certain levels 
and were at the end of their line. If one thinks of an organizer as a highly imaginative and 
creative architect and engineer then the best we have been able to train on the job were skilled 
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plumbers, electricians, and carpenters, all essential to the building and maintenance of their 




By “on the job,” he means grassroots leaders. Outsiders are “imaginative and creative 
architects,” and community members are “plumbers and electricians.” This inviolable Alinskyist 
principle relates directly to a core strategy of the New Labor era, the distinction between 
organizer and leader, and the corollary between external organizing and servicing. External 
organizing is the supreme driver, and existing worker-leaders and the shop floor are relegated to 
the backseat (maybe even the trunk). The result is the kind of ineffectual contract “negotiated” 
for Washington’s nursing home workers, which stripped them of shop-floor rights, of real 
negotiations, and of the right to strike, and resulted in marginal material gain at best. 
New Labor’s efforts at developing a more robust political program, considered a 
hallmark of the post-1995 era, have not made matters better, and for the same reason: the focus 
has been away from the shop floor. The union’s chief priority was massively increasing the 
money unions raised and coordinated for the Democratic Party. But while labor unions ponyed 
up more and more for election coffers—mostly at the national level—big-business groups 
working with right-wing forces got busy on two frontal salvos that would obliterate union hopes 
of competing in the election-spending game. They plotted a legal strategy in the courts that 
resulted in the Citizens United and McCutcheon decisions, blowing the doors open on campaign 
spending. And they developed their own evangelically antiunion candidates and ran them in local 
and state races, an effort culminating in the 2010 election cycle—a disaster for workers and their 
communities (and repeated in 2014). Tellingly, in the wake of the 2010 election, Wisconsin’s 
new governor, Scott Walker, provoked a showdown with the state’s public-sector unions. After 
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stripping these workers of their collective-bargaining rights, Walker faced a union-financed 
recall campaign and he won. Yet in the vote, fully thirty-eight percent of union households voted 
to retain Walker. The margin of victory for a recall existed well within Wisconsin’s union 
households; unfortunately, all the union financing in the world will not matter if the union’s 
rank-and-file members do not understand who is causing their problems, or why, before they go 
into the voting booth. Walker’s re-election in 2014, like Michigan’s Rick Snyder’s re-election 
after instituting right-to-work rule, feels as if someone is hitting the replay button over and over 
again. Data geeks may have mobilized enough first time voters in a Presidential election cycle, 
but obviously, each mid-term election cycle produces bigger and bigger disasters. Mobilizing is 
not a substitute for organizing. 
The community-organizing sector today is weak, and labor is weak—and weak plus weak 
does not add up to the strength that can stem the antilabor tide. Forty years of Alinsky-inspired 
community organizing have not done it, seventy years of business unionism have not done it, and 
the past twenty years of what amounts to a mobilizing model veneered as a robust organizing 
plan to revitalize unions, centered on relegating workers to one of a dozen points of leverage, 
have not done it either. It is pretend power and it is not fooling the employers. 
At this point there is almost no organization left among private-sector workers, and if the 
corporate right succeeds, this will soon be true among the public sector too. Sprightly strategy 
and cunning tactics matter, but labor cannot “jujitsu” its way out of its demise. Furthermore, it is 
time to acknowledge that growth strategies and theories that rely on giving workers less say in 
the workplace only compound the problems of unaccountability that put New Labor and its 
promises of reform in power in the first place. New Labor desperately needs to return to bottom-
up base-building as its core strategy: organizing, not merely mobilizing. 
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Given the differences in relationship to the broader community implied by service 
workers versus factory production workers today, the organizing model must systematically 
extend charting and list work into the broader community. By first identifying organic leaders in 
the workplace and by enabling workers to sharpen their understanding of how to win tough 
fights, labor can grow an army that will meaningfully engage with its own organic network in the 
broader community and in the political arena. Given that the low-to-no exit workplaces with 
strategic power are heavily female, imagine producing hundreds of Karen Lewis’ in every 
community across the United States? Karen Lewis was one of hundreds of top tier mostly 
women leaders who was developed in struggle, through a strike. The Whole Worker model 
offers a way to overcome the silos brilliantly analyzed by Ira Katznelson in City Trenches 
because it structures class into the community via rank-and-file union members. This is a 
considerably different approach from today’s labor-community coalitions, which reinforce rather 
than resolve the Katznelson divide.  
Unions are under pressure from extraordinary external forces. But unions are also dying 
from the inside out. Although many of the external factors would be difficult for unions to 
change, deciding to return to a bottom-up organizing that encourages and equips workers to 
resist the multifaceted assault on their interests inside and outside the workplace is within the 
decision-making control of today’s unions.  
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